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Abstract 
 
This thesis analyzes different types of business relationships under different scenarios in three 
essays. In Chapter 2, we focus on a stable business relationship between mutual funds and 
brokerage firms and investigate the interaction of this relationship with the brokerage firms’ analyst 
recommendations on the stocks that are held by stably related funds (SRFs). First, we find that 
analysts issue more optimistic recommendations on stocks held by the brokerage firms’ SRFs than 
on stocks held by other funds. Second, we provide direct evidence of the effects of stable business 
relationships on recommendations by showing that analysts increase (decrease) recommendations 
on their covering stocks when these stocks are added to (dropped from) the portfolios of the 
brokerage firms’ SRFs. Third, we identify the factors that influence the decision to cultivate the 
stable business relationship between funds and brokerage firms; these factors are the proportion of 
commission fee a broker firm receives from a client fund, fund size, brokerage firms’ resources, 
fund age and fund family size. 
In Chapter 3, we focus our attention on the study of the effect of the bank-firm relationship within 
the context of exploring the association between economic policy uncertainty (EPU) and firms’ 
capital structure choices. EPU could influence firms’ capital structure by influencing firms’ 
financing needs and external capital supply. Because the banking system plays an important role in 
providing capitals, especially in emerging markets, we analyze whether the impact of EPU differs 
for firms with and without existing bank-firm relationships to examine the supply channel (among 
other tests). We find that leverage ratios are negatively associated with EPU, on average, and this 
negative effect is more significant for firms that are from regions with higher marketization indexes, 
are non-state owned, or have no prior bank-firm relationships. We also provide consistent evidence 
that the negative relationship between capital structures and EPU is sourced from the deterioration 
of the external financing environment caused by the EPU. Finally, we show that firms’ usage of 
trade credit is positively related to EPU, suggesting that firms tend to adjust their financing 
structures as a response to EPU. 
In Chapter 4, we examine the same fund-broker relationship investigated in Chapter 2 but within the 
context of Initial Public Offering (IPO) analysis. We take advantage of an exogenous shock to the 
IPO allocation method in the Chinese market to explore the effects of institutional factors on IPO 
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underpricing and aftermarket performance. Specifically, the November 2010 regulation mandates 
that IPOs from the Small and Medium Enterprise Board (SMEB) and the ChiNext (which is an 
exchange similar to NASDAQ) replace the pro rata allocation method with the lottery method to 
allocate new shares; whereas the pro rata method is retained for IPOs on the main board. The nature 
of this regulation change allows us to conduct a quasi-natural experiment and to use 
difference-in-difference method to analyze the efficiency of different allocation methods. First, we 
find that the new allocation method is associated with lower underpricing and better aftermarket 
performance. Second, we hand collect detailed allocation data, and by comparing allocations in the 
pre- and post-regulation periods, we find that the new allocation method leads to larger allocations 
for the median investors. The results are consistent with our conjecture that investors have stronger 
incentives to reveal private information under the new allocation method, which leads to a change 
in underpricing and aftermarket performance. Third, our analysis of the effects of business 
relationships between funds and brokerage firms does not show that underwriters favorably allocate 
new shares to their related clients.
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 Introduction Chapter 1
Business relationships exist all around us. In financial markets, financial intermediaries such as 
commercial banks and investment banks establish various relationships (e.g., bank-firm 
relationships, underwriting relationships) with market participants. With the large inflow of 
information from their clients, they become information hubs.  
On the one hand, the information gathered by financial intermediaries is valuable for decision 
makers because of market frictions, particularly information asymmetry. For example, investors 
value the research reports released by sell-side analysts who are hired by investment banks. In 
addition, banks take advantage of such information when making lending decisions. For instance, it 
is more likely for them to approve new loans with lower interest rates for firms with outstanding 
loans, i.e., firms with bank-firm relationships (Petersen and Rajan, 1994; Ivashina and Kovner, 
2011).  
On the other hand, the valuable information may be subject to misuse by financial 
intermediaries such that conflicts of interest arise. For example, as shown by Schenone (2010), 
commercial banks may benefit from the possession of private firm-specific information, as they can 
charge higher rates if firms face high switching costs. In addition, sell-side analyst recommendation 
bias has been under the spotlight in the past two decades. Researchers have documented that 
brokerage firms’ and investment banks’ economic incentives (e.g., to generate more trading 
commissions) induce analysts to issue more optimistic recommendations (Lin and McNichols, 1998; 
Michaely and Womack, 1999; Bradley et al., 2003; Jackson, 2005; Cowen et al., 2006; Malmendier 
and Shanthikumar, 2014). 
To better understand business relationships, this thesis analyzes different types of business 
relationships under three different scenarios in three essays; the first and third essays examine the 
fund-broker relationship and the second essay investigates the bank-firm relationship.  
In Chapter 2, we focus on a stable business relationship between mutual funds and brokerage 
firms and investigate the interaction of this relationship with the brokerage firms’ analyst 
recommendations on the stocks that are held by the stably related funds (SRFs). First, we define the 
“stable” relationship based on the “paying to play” relationship (i.e., mutual funds pay trading 
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commissions to brokerage firms). Second, to examine the effect of stable relationships on 
recommendations, we compare recommendation variables between SRFs and other funds at both 
the stock level and the broker level. Furthermore, to provide direct evidence, we examine how 
brokerage firms’ analysts change their recommendations in response to the SRFs’ initiation or 
winding of stock positions. Finally, we study the factors that are associated with the decision to 
forge stable business relationships between funds and brokerage firms and how these factors affect 
the decision.  
In Chapter 3, we focus our attention on the study of the effect of bank-firm relationships within 
the context of exploring the association between economic policy uncertainty (EPU) and firms’ 
capital structure choices. EPU could influence firms’ capital structure through both supply and 
demand channels, i.e., by influencing firms’ financing needs and external capital supply. Because 
banking systems play an important role in providing capital, especially in emerging markets, we 
analyze whether the impact of EPU differs for firms with and without existing bank-firm 
relationships to examine the supply channel (among other tests). 
In Chapter 4, we examine the same fund-broker relationship investigated in Chapter 2 but 
within the context of Initial Public Offering (IPO) analysis. We take advantage of an exogenous 
shock to the IPO allocation method in the Chinese market to explore the effects of institutional 
factors on IPO underpricing and aftermarket performance. More specifically, in November 2010, 
the Chinese government mandated that IPOs from the Small and Medium Enterprise Board (SMEB) 
and the ChiNext (which is an exchange similar to NASDAQ) boards replace the pro rata allocation 
method with the lottery method to allocate new shares
1
. The nature of this regulation change allows 
us to conduct a quasi-natural experiment and to use the difference-in-difference method to analyze 
the importance of the allocation method for IPO activities. First, we examine the effect of the 
regulation change on IPO underpricing and aftermarket performance. Second, we hand collect bids 
and allocations data, and by combining these data with fund-broker relationship data, we directly 
test whether underwriters influence allocation and examine the association between allocation and 
underpricing. 
                                                             
1
 The pro rata method is retained for IPOs on the main board. 
2
 According to a Forbes report, the average “trading” revenue (sometimes called “institutional client services” revenue, 
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In the remainder of this chapter, we address our motivations, main findings and contributions 
in separate sections. Within each section, we describe the three scenarios separately for the sake of 
structuring convenience. 
1.1 Motivations 
1.1.1 The Effect of the Fund-Broker Relationship on Recommendation Bias 
The fund-broker relationship arises when mutual funds make trading commission payments to 
investment banks/brokerage firms. This relationship is intuitively important to investment banks, as 
trading revenue still constitutes a considerable amount of their total revenue
2
 (even after the 
deregulation of commissions on May 1, 1975). As a consequence, investment banks are motivated 
to issue biased recommendations to generate more trading commissions, and such bias has been 
under the spotlight in the past two decades (Lin and McNichols, 1998; Michaely and Womack, 1999; 
Bradley et al., 2003). Moreover, investment banks have incentives to curry favor with institutional 
investors who pay them lucrative commissions or are related to them through ownership. For 
example, Mola and Guidolin (2009), Gu et al. (2012), and Firth et al. (2013) find that analysts are 
more likely to provide favorable ratings to stocks after their affiliated/related mutual funds invest in 
those stocks.  
The relationship is also important to mutual funds because such payments render them with 
certain bargaining power
3
, which could be utilized to achieve their economic goals. For example, 
there is evidence that the effect of institutional investors’ role in disciplining corporate managers is 
subject to the influence of their business ties with the underlying firms (e.g., Borokhovich et al., 
2006; Davis and Kim, 2007). Particularly, in the context of institutional investors’ role in affecting 
recommendation bias, Gu et al. (2012) indicate that institutional investors act as predators rather 
than monitors. In other words, institutional investors could pressure related investment banks to 
                                                             
2
 According to a Forbes report, the average “trading” revenue (sometimes called “institutional client services” revenue, 
which can be further categorized into “Fixed income, currency and commodities client execution” (FICC) and 
“Equities”) in the past 11 quarters from 2012 to 2014 accounts for 23.6% for the US’s five largest investment banks (i.e., 
Goldman Sachs, JP Morgan, Morgan Stanley, Bank of America and Citigroup), ranging from 15% to 51%. Moreover, 
“FICC to equities” ratio is approximately 2 to 1. 
(http://www.forbes.com/sites/greatspeculations/2014/11/19/understanding-trends-in-banks-trading-revenues/). 
3
 This is because mutual funds may threaten to divert lucrative revenue to other banks. 
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issue favorable ratings on stocks they hold. By contrast, Ljungqvist et al. (2007) suggest that 
institutional investors act as arbiters of analyst reputation because institutional investors 
periodically evaluate analysts’ research quality and decide which brokerage firms to use. Thus, 
analysts are less likely to issue biased recommendations in general or for stocks that are highly 
visible to institutional investors due to their reputational capital and career concerns (also see 
Ljungqvist et al., 2006). Hilary and Hsu (2013) further show that analysts provide more consistent 
forecasts for firms with more institutional investors.  
These mixed findings suggest that more subtle factors need to be considered in analyzing the 
effects of the fund-broker relationship on analyst recommendations. Recently, customer relationship 
management has attracted increased attention, and a large body of literature has shown that past 
business ties are one of the most important factors in whether investment banks and brokerage firms 
win underwriting and trading business. However, limited empirical evidence exists on how a stable 
relationship between a brokerage firm and its client funds might affect the recommendations of the 
brokerage firm’s analysts and on what factors motivate brokerage firms and their client funds to 
maintain stable relationships.  
In sum, investment banks tend to be influenced by their clients’ incentives, and institutional 
investors could play both a moderating and a predating role in analysts’ recommendations. Drawing 
from the customer relationship management (CRM) literature (Morgan and Hunt, 1994; Richards 
and Jones, 2008), we argue that analysts are not only more attentive to the concerns of SRFs but are 
also more acquiescent in terms of their demands because stable relationships reduce brokerage 
firms’ costs to serve, streamline brokerage firms’ future revenues, improve information sharing and 
reduce decision-making uncertainty, and enhance customer loyalty. As a consequence, a stable 
relationship between brokerage firms and mutual funds is no less important for analysts’ 
recommendation than ad hoc commission fees or deal by deal “paying to play”. We investigate the 
effects of such a stable relationship on recommendations in Chapter 2. 
1.1.2 The Effect of the Bank-Firm Relationship in the Context of the Association between 
Economic Policy Uncertainty and Firms’ Capital Structure Choices 
Prior literature has explored the associations between EPU and asset pricing (Pa´stor and Veronesi, 
2013; Brogaard and Detzel, 2012), corporate investment decisions (Julio and Yook, 2012; Gulen 
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and Ion, 2013) and IPO activities (Colak, Durnev, and Qian, 2013), while little is known about the 
effect of EPU on firms’ capital structure choice, which is at the core of the corporate finance 
literature. Because economic policies typically generate a large amount of uncertainty in the 
business environment, they not only affect firms’ investment decisions and financing demands 
(“demand channel”) but also deteriorate the external financing environment (“supply channel”); 
thus, such policy uncertainties have important bearings on firms’ capital structure. Specifically, 
when EPU increases, the information asymmetry between borrowers and creditors becomes more 
severe and, at the same time, firms’ future cash flows become more volatile, which indicates a 
higher default risk. Both of these effects can lead to higher external financing costs, with firms 
generally lowering their leverage ratios to achieve financial flexibility (Gao and Qi, 2012; Cao et al., 
2013; Francis et al., 2013). The demand effect refers to the scenario in which firms reduce their 
financing demand in the face of increasing policy uncertainty (Bloom et al., 2007; Gulen and Ion, 
2013; Kang et al., 2014; Wang et al., 2014). 
To identify the possible channels through which EPU affects firms’ capital structure decisions, 
we further investigate the two channels. First, the bank-firm relationship has long been recognized 
as an important factor in banks’ lending decisions, thus affecting capital supply to firms. This strand 
of research has drawn on information asymmetry theory (e.g., Hale, 2012; Uchida et al., 2012) and 
concluded that firms with such relationships are likely to obtain more financing and lower interest 
rates (Petersen and Rajan, 1994; Ivashina and Kovner, 2011). Therefore, in the presence of high 
EPU, firms with an existing (or prior) bank-firm relationship will be subject to less information 
asymmetry; thus, their capital structure choices are less sensitive to the effect of EPU. Second, we 
control for the effect of firms’ investment changes to measure the importance of the demand 
channel. In addition, to gain power for the empirical estimation, we choose the experiment setting 
of China, where the regional divergences in the institutional environment and firm heterogeneities, 
such as ownership structure and bank-firm relationships, are more typical and where the primary 
source of financing is bank loans (Allen, et al., 2005; Allen et al., 2009; Ayyagari, et al., 2010; Fan 
et al., 2011). The analysis is presented in Chapter 3. 
1.1.3 The Effect of the Fund-Broker Relationship on IPO Activities 
The seminal work by Benveniste and Spindt (1989) and Benveniste and Wilhelm (1990) 
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emphasized the role of underwriters’ discretion over allocation on underpricing, which has gained 
tremendous recognition. This finding inspired at least three strands of studies: (1) analysis of the 
effects of IPO institutions on IPO activates; (2) examination of the allocation “black box” during 
IPO; (3) exploration of the optimal offering mechanism, which has led to a debate over using 
bookbuilding and auction methods to conduct IPO.  
In this study, we take advantage of a regulation reform concerning the IPO allocation method 
in the Chinese market. This reform provides an excellent setting to analyze the effects of allocation 
methods on IPO for the following reasons. First, because only a subset of IPOs are affected, it 
provides us with a quasi-natural experimental research framework that allows us to compare the 
changes in the underpricing and long-run performance of IPOs between the treatment group (IPOs 
listed on the SMEB and the ChiNext) and the control group (IPOs listed on the main board) 
subsequent to the reform (i.e., difference-in-difference analysis). Second, this regulation change is 
an exogenous shock to the affected firms, which alleviates self-selection and endogeneity concerns. 
Additionally, as the new allocation method (i.e., lottery) is an innovation that has not been used in 
other markets, our study should provide alternative options for regulators in those markets to 
conduct IPOs and shed light on constructing an optimal offering mechanism. 
Recently, Cornelli and Goldreich (2001) and Jenkinson and Jones (2004) examine bids 
information of IPOs underwritten by two different European investment banks but come to different 
conclusions. In particular, Cornelli and Goldreich (2001) support the information soliciting function 
of the bookbuilding process. In contrast, Jenkinson and Jones (2004) find that “long-term” investors 
who do not flip are favored. Moreover, Jenkinson and Jones (2009) conduct a survey to reflect 
institutional investors’ views of IPO pricing and allocation. Most strikingly, they find that a 
relationship with the lead underwriter of an issue is perceived to be the most critical factor affecting 
allocations by institutional investors; this result is consistent with underwriters’ conflicts of interest. 
However, these studies are based on bids information from a single underwriter, which makes it 
difficult to draw a generalized picture. We hand collect bids and allocation data for almost all of the 
IPOs that were underwritten by various underwriters during our sample period. By examining the 
allocation outcomes under the old and new allocation methods and relating them to the underpricing 
change, we are able to provide a greater understanding of the effects of different allocation methods. 
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Underwriters play a critical role in assisting firms during IPO, but they may also misuse their 
power and intervene in IPO allocations (Reuter, 2006; Nimalendran et al., 2007; Puri and Rocholl, 
2008; Liu and Ritter, 2010). By utilizing the manually collected bids and allocations data, together 
with the business relationship data, we are able to provide a direct test of whether underwriters 
misuse their power to favorably allocate new shares to their business-related investors and examine 
how the regulation change affects the conflicts of interest faced by underwriters. However, to avoid 
potential lawsuits and audits, underwriters may be selective on their preferential clients. Based on 
the CRM literature (Morgan and Hunt, 1994; Richards and Jones, 2008) and our findings presented 
in Chapter 2, it is likely that only stable clients are favored. Alternatively, according to Goldstein et 
al. (2008), there may be a trade-off between favoring short-term clients and maintaining long-term 
clients (i.e., stable clients). Ritter and Zhang (2007) find that lead underwriters have incentives to 
dump “bad” issues to their affiliated mutual funds rather than to independent investors from whom 
they receive “kickbacks” (i.e., brokerage commissions). Therefore, the question of whether there 
are differences in allocation among underwriters’ clients who are associated with different levels of 
connection is an empirical question. We address this question in Chapter 4. 
1.2 Main Findings 
In Chapter 2, using a newly available dataset containing detailed information on commission 
payments for approximately 300 open-end equity funds and 77 brokers from Jun 2004 to Dec 2012 
in China, we obtain the following findings. First, analysts issue more optimistic recommendations 
on stocks held by the brokerage firms’ SRFs than on stocks held by other funds. Second, analysts 
increase (decrease) recommendations on their covering stocks when these stocks are added to 
(dropped from) the portfolios of the brokerage firms’ SRFs. Third, we identify the factors that 
influence the decision to cultivate a stable business relationship between funds and brokerage firms, 
and these factors are the proportion of commission fee a broker firm receives from a client fund, 
fund size, brokerage firms’ resources, fund age and fund family size.  
In Chapter 3, using a recently available measure of economic policy uncertainty for China, we 
explore the relationship between EPU and Chinese firms’ capital structure choices from 2003 to 
2013. We find that leverage ratios are negatively associated with EPU, on average, and this negative 
effect is more significant for firms that are from regions with higher marketization indexes, are 
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non-state owned, or have no prior bank-firm relationship. We then provide consistent evidence that 
the negative relationship between capital structures and EPU is sourced from the deterioration of the 
external financing environment caused by the EPU. Finally, we show that firms’ usage of trade 
credit is positively related to EPU, suggesting that firms tend to adjust their financing structures as a 
response to economic policy uncertainty. 
In Chapter 4, we investigate the efficiency of different IPO allocation methods by examining 
the effects of a new IPO regulation that replaces the pro rata allocation method with the lottery 
mechanism for some of the listed firms in China. First, we find that the new allocation method is 
associated with lower underpricing and better aftermarket performance. Second, through an 
examination of detailed allocation data in the pre- and post-regulation periods, we find that the new 
allocation method leads to larger allocation for the median investors. The results are consistent with 
our conjecture that investors have stronger incentives to reveal private information under the new 
allocation method, which leads to a change in underpricing and aftermarket performance. Third, our 
analysis of the effects of the business relationship between funds and brokerage firms does not 
show that underwriters favorably allocate new shares to their related clients.  
1.3 Contributions  
This thesis makes a number of contributions. In Chapter 2, we shed light on the current literature by 
showing the important impact of stable relationships between brokerage firms and their client funds 
on analysts’ recommendations, which has not been fully recognized. The current study provides 
direct empirical evidence on this important issue and helps fill a gap in the literature. Second, prior 
studies have indicated that institutional investors moderate recommendation bias; we shed 
additional light on the literature by showing that the moderating effect is compromised by these 
investors’ economic incentives and ongoing business relationships. More importantly, this is the 
first study to uncover the key factors affecting the formation of stable relationships between 
brokerage firms and their client funds. 
Chapter 3 contributes in at least three ways. First, we provide evidence from an emerging 
market (China) for recent studies on the relationship between economic policy uncertainty and firm 
capital structure choices. The current study provides “out-of-the-sample” tests of the existing findings 
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on a market with distinct institutional features (such as banking as the primary source of financing, 
the dominating role of state ownership, etc.), which largely affect corporate capital decisions. Second, 
our paper relates to the literature concerning the supply-side factors affecting a firm’s capital 
structure. Specifically, we provide consistent evidence that EPU affects firms’ capital structure 
choices mainly by influencing the firms' external financial environments through the banking system 
in China. Finally, this paper also contributes to the growing studies examining the effect of policy 
uncertainty on corporate behavior. By providing evidence of the effect of the EPU index on Chinese 
firms’ capital structure decisions, our study suggests an overarching impact of policy uncertainty on 
financing choices. 
The contributions made in Chapter 4 are as follows. First, through comparing the effects of 
different allocation methods on IPO underpricing, aftermarket performance, and new share 
allocation, we add to the growing literature that pays attention to the important role of institutions in 
IPO activities. Second, by utilizing detailed business relationship data and hand collecting 
bidder-level IPO allocation data, we directly test whether lead underwriters have incentives to 
misuse the allocation discretion by favoring their related investors. This analysis also adds to the 
literature that explores the “black box” of allocation, which Ritter and Welch (2002) consider the 
“most interesting open question”. Third, the lottery mechanism is an innovative trial; its current 
success sheds light on the debate about the optimal method for IPO (e.g., bookbuilding vs. auction).  
The remainder of the thesis proceeds as follows. Chapter 2 examines which fund-broker 
relationship matters, “paying to play” or stable relationships, for analysts’ recommendation. Chapter 
3 explores the influence of economic policy uncertainty (EPU) on firms’ capital structure, focusing 
on differentiating investment and financing channels. Chapter 4 investigates the impact of a 
regulation change on Chinese IPOs, with special attention to the association between the 
fund-broker relationship and IPO allocation. The last chapter concludes the thesis. 
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 Beyond Commission Payments: The Effects of Stable Business Chapter 2
Relationship on Analyst Recommendation 
2.1 Introduction  
Ample evidence shows that sell-side analysts issue more optimistic recommendations because of their 
brokerage firms and investment banks’ economic incentives (Lin and McNichols, 1998; Michaely and 
Womack, 1999; Bradley et al., 2003; Jackson, 2005; Cowen et al., 2006; Malmendier and 
Shanthikumar, 2014). Recent studies highlight the important role of institutional investors in 
moderating recommendation bias. Ljungqvist et al. (2007) suggest that institutional investors act as 
arbiters of analysts’ reputations because institutional investors periodically evaluate analysts’ research 
quality and decide which brokerage firms to use. Thus, analysts are less likely to issue biased 
recommendations, or their recommendations are less biased in stocks that are highly visible to 
institutional investors due to their reputational capital and career concerns (see also Ljungqvist et al., 
2006). Hilary and Hsu (2013) further show that analysts provide more consistent forecasts for firms 
with more institutional investors. 
However, the effectiveness of institutional investors’ moderating role on recommendation bias 
could be impaired by the institutional investors’ own economic incentives. Mola and Guidolin (2009), 
Firth et al. (2013) and Gu et al. (2012) find that analysts are more likely to provide favorable ratings 
to stocks after their affiliated mutual funds invest in those stocks. Gu et al. (2012) further indicate that 
institutional investors actually act as predators rather than monitors, whereas Irvine et al. (2004) show 
that analysts make more accurate forecasts on stocks that are held by their affiliated fund families 
because high-quality research helps the asset management department’s portfolios. Business ties and 
“paying to play” certainly matter in analyst research, but the mixed evidence indicates that 
recommendation bias is not simply or merely affected by whether business ties exist between 
brokerage firms and institutional investors and that more subtle issue need to be addressed.  
In the current study, we add to the literature by investigating not only how the business ties 
(measured by commission fee payments) between brokerage firms and mutual fund companies affect 
the recommendation bias of the affiliated analysts but also what additional effect a relatively stable 
business relationship between brokerage firms and their client funds may have on the recommendation 
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bias. More importantly, we extend our research by identifying the factors that motivate brokerage 
firms and mutual funds to maintain stable business relationships. 
We conjecture that a stable relationship between brokerage firms and mutual funds is no less 
important than ad hoc commission fees or deal-by-deal “paying to play” in analyst recommendations 
for two primary reasons. First, drawing from the customer relationship management (CRM) literature 
(Morgan and Hunt, 1994; Richards and Jones, 2008), we argue that analysts are not only more 
attentive to the concerns of the funds with which their brokerage firms have stable relationships (i.e., 
“stably related funds”, hereinafter SRFs) but are also more acquiescent in their demands because 
stable relationships reduce the brokerage firms’ costs to serve, streamline the brokerage firms’ future 
revenues, improve information sharing, reduce decision-making uncertainty, and enhance customer 
loyalty.  
Second, in the context of corporate governance, Chen et al. (2007) show that only independent 
institutions with long-term investments and concentrated holdings exert monitoring; whereas, for 
other institutional investors, either their monitoring ability is compromised due to business interests, 
or they trade on their information for short-term gains instead of monitoring for shared long-term 
benefits. Although the primary interest of the current study is not how fund companies’ long- or 
short-term investments affect their monitoring in the firms they invest, Chen et al.’s evidence 
unambiguously implies that stable relationships between brokerage firms and mutual fund companies 
affect their economic incentives and need to be considered when analyzing mutual funds’ moderating 
effect in analyst recommendation bias. 
We use Chinese open-ended equity funds and brokerage firms to address these issues because the 
Chinese data contain detailed information on the commission fees paid by each fund to its affiliated 
brokerage firms, and such detailed information is not available for most other markets. The main 
results of this study are summarized as follows: 
First, consistent with the existing literature, we find that both the amount of commission fees that 
a brokerage firm receives from its clients and the proportion of stocks held by client funds are 
positively related to the aggressiveness of the recommendations issued by the brokerage firms’ 
analysts. Second, analysts make more optimistic recommendations on stocks held by SRFs than on 
stocks held by other funds. This effect remains consistent under a battery of tests, and the results are 
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robust after controlling for various factors. More importantly, the effect of stable relationships on 
recommendations varies with economic incentives. When funds do not pay any commission fees, the 
analysts of SRF brokerage firms actually make less optimistic recommendations than those of “other” 
brokerage firms. In contrast, when the economic stakes are very high, analysts of both SRF brokers 
and “other” brokers issue more optimistic recommendations, and the difference in the 
recommendations between SRF brokers and “other” brokers is not significant. Third, analysts 
increase (decrease) recommendations on the stocks they cover when these stocks are added in 
(dropped from) the portfolios of their brokerage firms’ SRFs. Consistent with the mixed evidence in 
corporate governance studies (Shleifer and Vishny, 1986; Kahn and Winton, 1998; Maug, 1998; 
Borokhovich et al., 2006; Chen et al., 2007), these results further suggest that the effectiveness of a 
fund’s moderating role in recommendation bias is compromised by its own economic incentives. 
Our results further indicate that the major factors that motivate brokerage firms and their client 
funds to maintain stable business relationships are the amount of commission fees, future business 
potential, and the brokerage firm’s resources. Specifically, the proportion of commission fees that a 
brokerage firm receives from its client funds, fund size, the brokerage firm’s net capital, and the 
number of analysts working for the brokerage firm are positively related to the possibility of 
maintaining a stable relationship between the brokerage firm and its client funds. In addition, young 
funds and those in small fund families are more likely to maintain business ties with their current 
brokerage firms. Furthermore, when a fund company and a brokerage firm are owned by another 
institution or when a brokerage firm is one of the owners of a fund company, a stable relationship is 
more likely to be maintained between the brokerage firm and the funds because of additional aligned 
interests.  
The current study contributes to the literature in several ways. First, maintaining a stable 
relationship with key customers has become more important in different industries, and firms spend 
billions of dollars on CRM each year (Richards and Jones, 2008). A recent Forbes article (June 18, 
2013) predicts that spending on CRM software alone will be approximately $36 billion by 2017.
4
 
However, the effect of stable relationships between brokerage firms and client funds on analyst 
recommendations and its significance have not been fully recognized. The current study provides 
                                                             
4
 http://www.forbes.com/sites/louiscolumbus/2013/06/18/gartner-predicts-crm-will-be-a-36b-market-by-2017/
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direct empirical evidence on this important issue and helps fill a gap in the literature. Second, prior 
studies indicate that institutional investors moderate recommendation bias; we shed additional light on 
the literature by noting that this moderating effect is compromised by the institutional investors’ own 
economic incentives and by their ongoing business relationships. More importantly, this is the first 
study to uncover the key factors that affect the formation of stable relationships between brokerage 
firms and their client funds. 
2.2 Literature Review 
In this section, we provide a brief review of (1) the recommendation bias of sell-side analysts; (2) the 
monitoring role of institutional investors; and (3) the effects of business ties in monitoring and in other 
finance areas in general, which are closely related to the questions that we investigate in this study. 
2.2.1 Common Explanations for Recommendation Bias  
Sell-side analysts hired by investment banks and brokerage firms issue earnings forecasts and make 
recommendations on the stocks they cover. Although analysts and most of their firms do not sell their 
research directly to clients, the research is funded indirectly by their clients through other services. 
More importantly, analysts’ research has a direct effect on their employers’ business, such as the 
underwriting, trading, and asset management departments (see Cowen et al., 2006 for a detailed 
discussion). Thus, analysts’ recommendations are found to be biased due to the economic incentives 
of their brokerage firms and investment banks. The common explanations for recommendation bias 
include: 
(1) Revenue-generating pressure. Analysts face implicit or explicit pressure from their employers 
to create underwriting business or maintain current clients by issuing more optimistic 
recommendations (Lin and McNichols, 1998; Michaely and Womack, 1999; Bradley et al. 2003). 
Jackson (2005) and Cowen et al. (2006) also show that optimistic recommendations help the trading 
department of the analysts’ brokerage firms increase market share and generate trading commissions.  
(2) Currying favor with covered firms. Many studies indicate that analysts issue more optimistic 
recommendations to maintain friendly relationships with their covered firms’ management so that they 
have timely information and access to senior managers (Francis et al., 1997; Boni and Womack, 2003; 
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Chen and Matsumoto, 2006). Malmendier and Shanthikumar (2014) further suggest that analysts 
speak in different tongues to please different audiences. They issue overly optimistic 
recommendations to induce trades from small investors and gratify management, but they also provide 
less optimistic forecasts because institutional investors correct for recommendation bias and value 
high-quality research. Paradoxically, managers like both overly optimistic recommendations and less 
optimistic forecasts because less optimistic forecasts allow firms to “meet or beat” the consensus.  
(3) Boosting the value of fund families. Mola and Guidolin (2009) indicate that bundling the 
brokerage research and asset management services of brokerage firms reduces analysts’ motivations to 
make pessimistic recommendations. These authors find that analysts are more likely to provide 
favorable ratings to stocks after their affiliated mutual funds invest in those stocks. Firth et al. (2013) 
and Gu et al. (2012) find that recommendation bias is positively related to commission fees from 
mutual funds.  
(4) Joining underwriting syndicate. Devos (2014) shows that analysts upgrade their 
recommendations for other investment banks just before their banks initiate syndicate relationships 
with those banks, and they continue to issue more optimistic recommendations for the investment 
banks with which their banks have syndicated relationships. He concludes that analysts’ optimistic 
recommendations reward their banks with more syndicate appointment opportunities.  
2.2.2 Institutional Investors’ Monitoring Role  
Theoretically, institutional investors are assumed to play a key role in disciplining corporate managers 
because these investors have incentives to monitor due to their relatively large holdings and because 
they have the ability and more resources than small investors to perform such tasks. However, whether 
they exert monitoring efforts and how effective their monitoring is largely depend on the potential 
benefits they receive from monitoring, the costs of monitoring and the trade-off between the shared 
gains through monitoring versus the private benefits from trading on their own information (Shleifer 
and Vishny, 1986; Maug, 1998; Kahn and Winton, 1998). Brickley et al. (1988) find that affiliated 
large shareholders (block-holders) are more likely to vote with management than unaffiliated 
block-holders. A study by Chen et al. (2007) shows that independent institutions with long-term 
investments engage in monitoring for their long-term benefit rather than trading on their information 
for short-term gain. 
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Maug (1998) suggests that stock market liquidity also affects large shareholders’ incentive to 
monitor. A liquid stock market makes it less costly for large investors to sell a large amount of shares, 
which implies less incentive for monitoring, but a liquid stock market also makes it easier for 
investors to accumulate large stakes without affecting the price. Overall, the author shows that liquid 
markets increase large shareholders’ monitoring incentives and are beneficial for corporate 
governance. Kahn and Winton (1998) further show that intervention and monitoring by institutional 
investors are more likely for mature firms and those in low-technology industries, where information 
is relatively more accessible for well-informed outsiders.  
In the context of institutional investors moderating recommendation bias, Ljungqvist et al. (2007) 
find that analysts are less likely to make biased recommendations or their recommendations are less 
biased in stocks that are highly visible to institutional investors due to the analysts’ reputational capital 
and career concerns. Similarly, Ljungqvist et al. (2006) show that more reputable analysts and those 
working for more prestigious banks make less aggressive recommendations. Hilary and Hsu (2013) 
further show that analysts provide more consistent forecasts for firms with more institutional 
investors.  
2.2.3 Importance of Business Relationship 
Borokhovich et al. (2006) show that large block-holders who are outsiders but have potential business 
ties play a less effective role in monitoring management than outside block-holders who are 
unaffiliated with the firm, although the difference in monitoring effectiveness is not significant 
between affiliated and unaffiliated institutional investors when their holdings are small. This evidence 
indicates that both the size of institutional investors’ holdings and their business ties with the firms 
matter to their monitoring effectiveness. Similarly, Davis and Kim (2007) investigate the effect of 
mutual funds’ business ties with their portfolio firms on voting practices. They find a positive 
relationship between business ties and the propensity to vote with management based on aggregate 
votes at the fund-family level, but funds are no more likely to vote with the management of their client 
firms than to vote with the management of non-clients for votes at specific firms. In the context of 
business ties and recommendation bias, Barber et al. (2007) show that a pre-existing underwritten 
relationship with an investment bank results in higher recommendation ratings for the stocks issued by 
the firm and covered by the bank’s analysts.  
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Past deals and existing business ties with clients are also found to be critical in other finance 
areas. Cliff and Denis (2004) find that past underwriting deals are more likely to help investment 
banks obtain future business from the firms. Similarly, Ljungqvist et al. (2006) suggest that the most 
important factor in determining whether an investment bank wins either debt or equity underwriting 
mandates is the bank’s past dealings (such as prior lending relationships) with the issuer and the 
strength of the relationship as measured by the share of the issuer’s past securities offerings 
underwritten by the bank. The evidence suggests that an investment bank’s loyal client enables the 
bank to compete less fiercely and have less need to pressure its analysts to win underwriting mandates 
by making aggressive recommendations. The accounting literature also shows that auditors are more 
likely to compromise their independence to retain key clients (Khurana and Raman, 2006; 
Krishnamurthy et al., 2006; Zhou and Zhu, 2012). Extensive studies in the banking literature show 
that prior firm-banking relationships help firms enjoy lower costs of borrowing, and banks also benefit 
from firm-specific information and reduced marketing costs (Petersen and Rajan, 1994; Dass and 
Massa, 2011). 
2.3 Data Source, Sample Selection, and Variable Descriptions 
2.3.1 Data Source and Sample Selection 
We collect data from three different datasets because our analysis covers three entities: brokerage 
firms, mutual funds and public firms traded on the Chinese stock markets. Analyst recommendation 
data are obtained from the Guo Tai An database (GTA) and CSMAR (China Stock Market & 
Accounting Research Database), which contain recommendations issued by analysts belonging to 127 
brokerage firms at the end of 2012, with the earliest available data starting in January 2001.  
CSMAR also provides funds’ portfolio information, including the top ten stock holdings of each fund 
at the end of each quarter and the holding information of all other composite stocks at the end June 
and December, which are available starting from June 2004. The data on funds’ commission fee 
payments to brokerage firms are downloaded from the Tian Xiang database (TX). The commission 
data include the amount of commission fees paid by each fund to all receiving brokerage firms at a 
semi-annual frequency; the earliest available date for this dataset is January 2001. There were 787 
funds and 112 brokerage firms covered by the TX database at the end of June 2012. 
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Our sample period covers 17 semi-annual periods, from June 30, 2004 to June 30, 2012, which is 
the overlapping period of all three datasets. We confine the fund sample to open-ended equity and 
hybrid-equity funds that hold primarily A-shares because these are the main stream of funds.  We 
exclude index funds, bond funds and monetary funds because such funds are not actively managed. 
Thus, the incentives for these funds to pressure their broker firms to issue biased recommendations for 
their portfolio stocks should be low. In addition, for the sake of defining stable relationships between 
funds and brokerage firms, we require funds to be at least two years old to be included in our sample 
(see the next section for a detailed discussion). We further exclude funds and broker firms that cannot 
be matched in all three datasets. After applying these criteria, we end up with 1287 stocks, 77 brokers 
and 300 funds at the end of June 2012. The average number of stocks is 723 during the whole sample 
period and ranges from 194 to 1315. The number of brokerage firms ranges from 25 to 79, with a 
mean value of 55, and the average number of funds is 174, with minimum and maximum values of 22 
and 300, respectively.  
2.3.2 Proxy for Stable Relationship  
The identification of stable relationships between brokerage firms and mutual funds is complicated by 
the fact that there is no ex ante “agreement” available, either explicitly or implicitly. Thus, we identity 
stable relationships using two criteria: (1) the proportion of time that a fund pays commission fee to 
the brokerage firm is at least 75% of the fund’s life span during our whole sample period; and (2) the 
number of consecutive periods that a fund does not pay any commission fees to the brokerage firm is 
less than two. Note that one period covers six months because most of the data items from the three 
datasets are available at a semi-annual frequency. The average proportion of time that a fund pays 
commission fees is 48% of its life span over our whole sample period (with a median value of four 
paying periods), and the average number of consecutive non-paying periods is 3.4, with a median 
value of two.  
  
20 
 
Table 2.1 Summary Statistics of the Key Variables 
This table reports summary statistics of key variables for the whole sample. The number of observations is at 
stock-broker-semiannual level. We use two recommendation measures: Recommendationi,j (raw) is the recommendation of 
Broker i for Stock j, and it takes a value from 1 (strong sell) to 5 (strong buy); Stock-relative recommendation 
(Stock-Relative Rec) of Broker i for Stock j is computed as Recommendationi,j subtracts the median recommendation for 
Stock j by all brokers. Stablei,j,k is an indicator variable and takes a value of 1 if Stock j covered by Broker i is held by at 
least one of Broker i’s stably-related funds (SRFs) defined in Section 3.2. Total commission fee is the total amount of 
commission fee (measured by the Chinese currency, RMB) paid by all funds that hold Stock j to the recommending broker 
– Broker i in a given period. The number of shares is the total number of shares of Stock j held by all funds that pay 
commission fees to Broker i. Brokerage firm variables include Age, size measured by the total net capital, and the number 
of analysts working for the broker’s firm. Stock character variables include profitability – the ratio of EBITDA to total 
assets (EBITDATA, winsorized at 1%), Sales Growth rate (also winsorized at 1%), State Ownership, Top 10 Shareholder 
Ownership, three-factor adjusted return, and the standard deviation of daily stock return. 
Variables N of obs Mean Std. Min Median Max 
Recommendation (Rec) 77943 4.129 0.670 1 4 5 
Stock-Relative Rec 77943 0.048 0.603 -4 0 2.5 
Stable (dummy) 77943 0.571 0.495 0 1 1 
Total commission fees  
(1000/RMB) 
60450 7,739 12,190 0.0 3,282 166,446 
Total number of shares (Millions) 77941 113.3 244.5 1 34.06 3512.6 
Broker Age (years) 77870 12.98 5.544 0.164 13.11 24.85 
Net capital (Millions/RMB) 62293 8,439.9 9,577.0 47.6 4,729.2 50,029.8 
N of Analysts 77943 31.04 15.87 1 30.0 78.0 
EBITDA/TA  71776 0.089 0.057 -0.011 0.076 0.261 
Sales Growth  76021 0.370 0.913 0.748 -0.202 3.60 
State Ownership (%) 77904 15.60 23.03 0 0 97.12 
Top 10 Shareholder Ownership (%) 77916 63.32 15.30 8.86 64.15 100.0 
Three-factor adjusted abnormal returns 77853 0.043 0.323 -1.383 0.014 6.913 
Standard deviation of the return 77853 0.032 0.039 0 0.028 1.522 
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2.3.3 Summary Statistics of Key Variables 
The summary statistics of the key variables are reported in Table 2.1. Recommendation is the raw 
rating score, and it takes a value of one (strong sell) to five (strong buy). The average recommendation 
is 4.129, with a median value of 4.0 for the whole sample. Stock-relative recommendation is the 
recommendation of Broker i for Stock j subtracts the median recommendation for Stock j by all 
brokers in the same period; the average stock-relative recommendation is 0.048, with a median of zero. 
These results indicate widespread optimism. The average value of the dummy variable Stable is 0.57, 
indicating that approximately 57% of stock-broker pairs maintain relatively stable business ties with 
their client funds during our sample period. The average commission fee paid to a broker firm is 7.74 
million RMB (equivalent to approximately $1.25 million) semi-annually. The average number of 
shares held by all funds that pay commission fees to a recommending broker is approximately 113.3 
million, with a median value of 34.1 million shares. The average age of broker firms is 12.98 years, 
while the average number of analysts working for a brokerage firm is 31.0 and ranges from one to 78.  
Stock characteristic variables include profitability, measured by the ratio of EBITDA to total 
assets (TA), sales growth rate, state ownership, total ownership of the top 10 shareholders, three-factor 
adjusted abnormal returns, and stock risk, which is measured by the standard deviation of the daily 
return. The average EBITDA/TA ratio (winsorized at 1%) is 0.089 during the whole sample period 
and ranges from -0.011 to 0.261, with a median value of 0.076. The average sales growth rate 
(winsorized at 1% without inflation adjustment) is 37%, and the median value of the growth rate is 
-20.2%. The average state ownership is 15.6%, with a maximum value of 97.1%. The top ten 
shareholders’ ownership accounts for 63.3% of total ownership on average and ranges from 8.86% to 
100%. The average three-factor adjusted abnormal semi-annual return is 4.3%, and the annualized 
standard deviation of the daily return is approximately 0.064 (2 x 0.032). 
2.4 Empirical Analysis of Stable Relationship on Analyst Recommendations 
Prior studies show that the aggressiveness of analyst recommendations is positively related to the 
amount of commission fees a brokerage firm receives from funds that hold the stocks covered by the 
brokerage firm’s analysts (Firth et al., 2013; Gu et al., 2012). As an initial test, we compare analyst 
recommendations of brokerage firms at both the stock level and the broker level. For the stock-level 
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analysis, we first rank and divide all of the recommending brokers covering each stock into a No-fee 
group and three fee subgroups (Small, Medium, and Large) based on the total commission fees each 
broker receives from all funds that hold the stock in each semi-annual period.
5
 Then, we compute the 
average recommendation of each subgroup for each stock in each period and obtain the grand average 
recommendation across all stocks. Figure 2.1 shows a clear positive relationship between 
recommendations and the amount of commission fees. The average recommendation ranges from 3.99 
for analysts whose broker firms do not receive any commission fees to 4.18 for analysts whose 
brokerage firms are in the Large-fee group. The stock-relative recommendations show a similar 
increasing pattern that ranges from -0.012 for the No-fee group to 0.093 for the Large-fee group.  
Although it is less likely that the positive relationship between recommendations and 
commission fees is due to a coincidence that the analysts from the large commission fee groups 
simply tend to make more optimistic recommendations than other analysts, to investigate this 
possibility, we compare recommendations at the broker level. For each broker and in each period, we 
divide all stocks covered by the broker into a No-fee group and three fee subgroups (Small, Medium, 
and Large) based on the total commission fees the broker receives from all funds that hold these 
stocks. Then, we compute the average recommendation of each fee subgroup for each broker in each 
period and obtain the grand averages across all brokers. Similar to the stock-level analysis, Figure 2.2 
shows a monotonic increase in recommendations. The average raw recommendation (stock-relative 
recommendation) is 3.96 (-0.154) for the No-fee group, and it increases to 4.23 (0.074) for the 
Large-fee group. This evidence leads us to reject the argument that some analysts simply tend to make 
more optimistic recommendations for all stocks they cover regardless of the amount of commission 
fees received by their brokerage firms. To further investigate the difference in the recommendations 
among the four commission fee groups, we conduct pooled sample t-tests and Wilcoxon rank sum 
tests, and a paired T-test. The unreported results of these three tests show that the differences in both 
raw recommendations and stock-specific recommendations between any of the four commission fee 
groups are all significant at the 0.01 level for both the stock- and broker-level analyses.
6
 
                                                             
5
 As an alternative, we also rank all stock-broker pairs in each period, divide them into the no-fee and three fee subgroups, 
aggregate all brokers covering each stock based on their commission fee category and compute the average 
recommendation for each commission fee subgroup. The results are largely consistent with the results reported here based 
on the classification at the stock level. For brevity, these results are not reported but are available from the authors upon 
request. 
6
 Detailed results of the three tests and the related statistics are available upon request. 
  
23 
 
Figure 2.1 Recommendations of Different Commission Fee Groups at Stock Level 
 
 
Figure 2.2 Recommendations of Different Commission Fee Groups at Broker Level 
 
Note that the bars in these figures represent raw recommendation ratings, while the red solid lines and red numbers 
indicate stock-relative recommendations.
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2.4.1 Effect of Stable Relationship on Recommendations When Controlling for Commission 
Fees 
As a preliminary test of how a stable relationship between a brokerage firm and its client mutual 
funds affects analyst recommendations, we divide brokers covering each stock into SRF brokers 
and “other” brokers based on the SRF definition in Section 2.3.2. Then, we compute the average 
recommendations of SRF brokers and “other” brokers for each stock in each period and obtain the 
grand average across all stocks. Panel A of Table 2.2 shows that the average raw recommendation 
(stock-relative recommendation) of the SRF brokers is 4.11 (0.045) compared with 4.04 (0.007) for 
“other” brokers. The differences in recommendations between the SRF brokers and “other” 
brokers are significant at the 0.01 level based on three tests: paired t-tests, which control for stock 
differences because each stock has two paired observations, one for SRF brokers and one for “other” 
brokers (Panel A1), pooled sample t-tests, and Wilcoxon sun-rank test (Panel A2).  
To control for the commission fee effect on recommendations, we compare the 
recommendations of SRF brokers and “other” brokers within each commission fee group. For the 
No-fee group, the average raw recommendation (stock-relative recommendation) of SRF brokers is 
3.92 (-0.112), which is actually lower than the recommendation of “other” brokers, 4.0 (-0.008), 
and the difference is significant at the 0.01 level based on all three tests. For the low commission 
fee subgroup, the raw recommendation difference between the SRF brokers and “other” brokers is 
not significant at the 0.1 level. For the medium and large commission fee groups, the average raw 
recommendation of SRF brokers is larger than that of “other” brokers at the 0.01 and 0.1 levels, 
respectively. However, the differences in stock-relative recommendations are not statistically 
significant among the three commission fee subgroups. Note that the insignificant difference in 
stock-relative recommendations actually reflects widespread optimistic recommendations, as 
stock-relative recommendation is computed as the difference between the raw recommendation of a 
broker for a stock and the median recommendation of all brokers for the stock in the same period. 
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Table 2.2 Recommendations of SRF Brokers and “Other” Brokers 
This table reports the differences in recommendations between the analysts of stably-related fund (SRF) brokers and 
“other” brokers. For stock-level analysis (Panel A), we first divide all brokers covering each stock into SRF and “other” 
brokers based on the SRF definition in Section 3.2. Then, we compute the average recommendations of SRF and “other” 
brokers for each stock in each semi-annual period and obtain the grand average across all stocks (the whole sample). To 
control for commission fee effect, we further divide all recommending brokers into No-fee group and three fee groups 
(Small, Medium, and Large) based on the total commission fees each broker receives from all funds that hold the stock 
in each period. Then, we compute average recommendations of SFR and “other” brokers of each fee subgroup for each 
stock and obtain the grand average across all stocks. For broker-level analysis (Panel B), we first divide all stocks 
covered by each broker into SRF stocks and “other” stocks. Then, we compute the average recommendations of SRF 
stocks and “other” stocks for each broker in each period and obtain the grand average across all brokers (whole sample) 
and for each commission fee group. Recommendationi,j (raw) is the recommendation of Broker i for Stock j and it takes 
a value of 1 (strong sell) to 5 (strong buy). Stock-relative recommendation (Stock-Relative Reci,j) of Broker i for Stock j 
is computed as Recommendationi,j subtracts the median recommendation for Stock j by all brokers. We conduct pooled 
sample t-tests and Wilcoxon rank-sum tests (Panels A2 and B2), and paired T-tests to investigate the difference in 
recommendations between SRF and other group for the whole sample and in each commission fee group. To save space, 
paired t-test results are not reported, while the significance levels (0.01, 0.05, and 0.1) are indicated by 
+++
,
 ++
, and 
+
, 
respectively. The numbers in parentheses (Panels A2 and B2) are pooled sample t-stat and Wilcoxon Sum-rank t-stat, 
and the significance levels (0.01, 0.05, and 0.1) are indicated by 
***
, 
**
, and 
*
, respectively.  
Panel A1: Raw/Stock-Relative Recommendation of SRF brokers vs. “other” brokers at stock level 
  Recommendation (raw) Stock-Relative Rec 
Whole sample N Mean Median Mean Median 
  SRF brokers 9175 4.11
+++
 4.08 0.045
+++
 0.00 
  Other brokers 10780 4.04 4.00 0.007 0.00 
No fee subgroup      
  SRF brokers 560 3.92
+++
 4.00 -0.112
+++
 0.00 
  Other brokers 8331 4.00 4.00 -0.008 0.00 
Low fee subgroup      
  SRF brokers 6768 4.09 4.00 0.023 0.00 
  Other brokers 6729 4.08 4.00 0.025 0.00 
Medium fee subgroup      
  SRF brokers 7319 4.14
+
 4.00 0.058
+
 0.00 
  Other brokers 3800 4.11 4.00 0.041 0.00 
Large fee subgroup      
  SRF brokers 5081 4.19
+
 4.00 0.090
+
 0.00 
  Other brokers 662 4.14 4.00 0.128 0.00 
Panel A2: Pooled sample comparison between SRF brokers vs. “other” brokers at stock level 
  
Difference 
Raw Rec 
Pooled T-Stat/ 
Wilcoxon Rank-Sum 
Difference 
Relative Rec 
Pooled T-Stat/ 
Wilcoxon Rank-Sum 
  Whole sample  0.07
***
 (9.30)/ (11.4) 0.038
***
 (7.35)/ (9.60)
 
  No fee subgroup        -0.08
***
 (-3.38)/ (-3.75)
 
-0.104
***
 (-4.50)/ (-5.49)
 
  Low fee subgroup  0.01 (0.66)/ (0.712)
 
-0.002 (-0.23)/ (0.094)
 
  Medium fee subgroup  0.03
***
 (2.89)/ (4.47) 0.017 (1.59)/ (2.80) 
  Large fee subgroup  0.05
*
 (1.76)/ (2.05) -0.038 (-1.44)/ (-1.39) 
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(Continued): 
Panel B1: Raw/Stock-Relative Recommendations of SRF stocks vs “other” stocks at broker level 
  Recommendation (raw) Stock-Relative Rec 
Whole sample N Mean Median Mean Median 
  SRF stocks 594 4.17
+++
 4.12 -0.007
+++
 0 
  Other stocks 925 3.99 4 -0.123 -0.061 
No fee subgroup      
  SRF stocks 143 3.99 4 -0.182 0 
  Other stocks 897 3.96 4 -0.154 -0.83 
Low fee subgroup      
  SRF stocks 526 4.06
+++
 4 -0.127
+++
 -0.013 
  Other stocks 736 4.01 4 -0.130 0 
Medium fee subgroup      
  SRF stocks 556 4.16
+++
 4.1 -0.015
+++
 0 
  Other stocks 597 4.10 4 -0.043 0 
Large fee subgroup      
  SRF stocks 541 4.26 4.24 0.079 0 
  Other stocks 274 4.21 4 0.077 0 
Panel B2: Pooled sample comparison between SRF stocks vs. “other” stocks at broker level 
  
Difference 
Raw Rec 
Pooled T-Stat/ 
Wilcoxon Rank-Sum 
Difference 
Relative Rec 
Pooled T-Stat/ 
Wilcoxon Rank-Sum 
  Whole sample  0.18
***
 (8.15) / (8.15) 0.116
***
 (5.93) / (5.33)
 
  No fee subgroup        0.03 (0.54) / (0.48)
 
-0.028 (-0.59) / (0.42)
 
  Low fee subgroup  0.05
*
 (1.89) / (0.82)
 
0.003 (0.11)/ (-0.78)
 
  Medium fee subgroup  0.06
**
 (2.12) / (1.76) 0.028 (1.02)/ (0.04) 
  Large fee subgroup  0.05 (1.16)/ (0.89) 0.002 (0.04)/ (-1.03) 
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To control for brokerage differences, we also compare recommendations at the broker level. 
Specifically, we first divide all of the stocks covered by each broker into SRF stocks and “other” 
stocks in each period. Then, we compute the average recommendations of SRF stocks and “other” 
stocks for each broker in each period and report the grand average across all brokers in Panel B of 
Table 2.2. Without controlling for commission fees, the average raw (stock-relative) 
recommendation of SRF stocks and “other” stocks for the whole sample is 4.17 (-0.007) and 3.99 
(-0.123), respectively, and the differences are significant at the 0.01 level based on pooled sample 
t-tests, Wilcoxon sum-rank tests and paired t-tests. To control for commission fees, we compare the 
recommendations on SRF stocks and “other” stocks within each commission fee group. Although 
raw recommendations and stock-relative recommendations on the SRF stocks are larger than those 
of “other” stocks for each subgroup, the differences are statistically significant at the 0.01 level 
only for the Low- and Medium-fee groups and are insignificant for the No-fee and Large-fee groups. 
These results for the whole sample (i.e., without controlling for commission fees) indicate that 
stable business ties between recommending brokers and mutual funds affect recommendations and 
that the analysts of SRF brokers tend to make more optimistic recommendations than the analysts of 
“other” brokerage firms in general. However, the different effects across commission fee groups are 
likely due to brokerage firms’ economic incentives. When analysts’ brokerage firms receive no 
commissions or a small amount of commissions, the incentive and/or pressure for analysts of SRF 
brokers to make optimistic recommendations is low; when the economic stakes are very high, all 
analysts, regardless whether they work for SRF brokers or “other” brokers, have large incentives or 
high pressure to make more optimistic recommendations. We provide more detailed analyses by 
controlling for various factors in Section 2.4.3. 
2.4.2 Effect of Stable Relationships on Recommendations by Controlling for Funds’ 
Shareholding 
The amount of commission fees that brokerage firms receive directly affects their economic 
incentives, which in turn influence analysts’ recommendation bias, and the amount of shares held by 
mutual funds that pay commission fees to brokerage firms creates pressure on the affiliated 
brokerage firms’ analysts. To analyze this pressure effect in the context of corporate governance 
concern, we compare the recommendations of analysts by dividing brokerage firms into Small, 
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Medium and Large subgroups based on the number of shares held by the broker’s affiliated funds. 
For the stock-level analysis, we rank and divide all recommending brokers covering each stock into 
three subgroups (Small, Medium, and Large) based on the total number of shares held by all funds 
that pay commission fees to these brokers. Then, we compute the average recommendation of each 
subgroup for each stock in each period and obtain the grand average across all stocks. 
Panel A1 of Table 2.3 reports the recommendations of brokers based on the shareholding of 
the paying funds. The average raw recommendations (stock-relative recommendations) for the 
small, medium and large groups are 4.06 (0.018), 4.13 (0.054), and 4.14 (0.041), respectively. The 
differences in the raw recommendations and the stock-relative recommendations between the small 
and medium and between the small and large shareholding subgroups are all significant at the 0.1 
level or higher for all three tests. 
To control for broker-firm differences, we also compare recommendations at the broker level 
by dividing all stocks covered by each broker into three subgroups (Small, Medium, and Large) 
based on the total number of shares held by all of the funds that pay commission fees to the broker. 
Then, we compute the average recommendations of each shareholding subgroup for each broker in 
each period and report the grand average across all brokers in Panel B1 of Table 2.3. Similar to the 
stock-level results, an increasing pattern exists between recommendations and shareholding. The 
raw (stock-relative) recommendation increases from 3.96 (-0.16) for the small shareholding group 
to 4.07 (-0.04) and 4.17 (0.05) for the medium and large groups, respectively. The differences 
between the small and medium groups and between the small and large groups are all significant at 
the 0.1 level or higher based on all three tests.  
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Table 2.3 Recommendations of Brokers Based on Fund’s Shareholdings 
This table reports recommendations of different brokers based on the total number of shares held by all paying funds. 
For stock-level analysis (Panel A), we divide all recommending brokers for each stock into three subgroups (Small, 
Medium, and Large) based on the total number of shares held by all funds that pay commission fees to these brokers in 
each semi-annual period. Then, we compute the average recommendation of each subgroup for each stock and obtain 
the grand average across all stocks. For broker-level analysis (Panel B), we divide all stocks covered by each broker 
into three subgroups (Small, Medium, and Large) based on the total number of shares held by all funds that pay 
commission fees to the broker. Then, we compute the average recommendations of each shareholding subgroup for each 
broker and obtain the grand average across all brokers. Recommendationi,j (raw) is the recommendation of Broker i for 
Stock j and it takes a value of 1 (strong sell) to 5 (strong buy). Stock-relative recommendation (Stock-Relative Reci,j) of 
Broker i for Stock j is computed as Recommendationi,j – the median recommendation for Stock j by all brokers. We 
conduct pooled sample t-tests and Wilcoxon rank-sum tests (Panels A2 and B2), and paired T-tests to investigate the 
difference in recommendations among the three shareholding groups. To save space, paired t-test results are not 
reported, while 
+++
,
 ++
, and 
+
 indicate that the current group (Large or Medium) is different from the small at the 0.01, 
0.05, and 0.1 significance levels, respectively. The numbers in parentheses (Panels A2 and B2) are pooled sample t-stat 
and Wilcoxon sum-rank t-stat, and the significance levels (0.01, 0.05, and 0.1) are indicated by 
***
, 
**
, and 
*
, 
respectively.  
Panel A1: Raw/Stock-Relative Rec of different shareholding groups at stock level  
  Recommendation (raw) Stock-Relative Rec 
Categories N Mean Median Mean Median 
Small 11354 4.06
 
4.0 0.018
 
0 
Medium 8275 4.13
+++
 4.1 0.054
+++
 0 
Large 5672 4.14
+
 4.0 0.041
+
 0 
Panel A2: Pooled sample comparison of Raw/Stock-Relative Rec across share-holding groups at stock level 
Pooled Sample Difference  
Difference 
Raw Rec 
Pooled T-Stat/ 
Wilcoxon Rank-Sum 
Difference 
Relative Rec 
Pooled T-Stat/ 
Wilcoxon Rank-Sum 
  Small vs. Medium  -0.07
***
 (-8.71) / (-9.87) -0.036
***
 (-5.95) / (-8.45) 
  Medium vs. Large  -0.01 (-0.63) / (-1.73) 0.007 (1.57) / (2.53) 
  Small vs. Large  -0.08
***
 (-8.38) / (-6.23) -0.023
***
 (-2.93) / (-4.25) 
Panel B1: Raw/Stock-Relative Rec of different shareholding groups at broker level  
  Recommendation (raw) Stock-Relative Rec 
Categories N Mean Median Mean Median 
Small 940 3.96 4.0 -0.16 -0.10 
Medium 875 4.07
+++
 4.0 -0.04
+++
 -0.03 
Large 823 4.17
+++
 4.1 0.05
+
 0.00 
Panel B2: Pooled sample comparison of Raw/Stock-Relative Rec across share-holding groups at broker level 
Pooled Sample Difference  
Difference 
Raw Rec 
Pooled T-Stat/ 
Wilcoxon Rank-Sum 
Difference 
Relative Rec 
Pooled T-Stat/ 
Wilcoxon Rank-Sum 
  Small vs. Medium  -0.11
***
 (-5.34) / (-5.97) -0.12
***
 (-6.09) / (-6.00) 
  Medium vs. Large  -0.10
***
 (-5.28) / (-5.44) -0.09
***
 (-5.11) / (-5.56) 
  Small vs. Large  -0.21
***
 (-9.94) / (-10.40) -0.21
***
 (-10.5) / (-10.9) 
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To disentangle the pressure effect associated with affiliated funds’ shareholding and a stable 
business relationship, we compare the recommendations of SRF brokers and “other” brokers in 
each shareholding group. To conduct this analysis, we divide all recommending brokers into three 
groups (Small, Medium, and Large) based on the total number of shares held by all of the funds that 
pay commission fees to these brokers in each period. Then, we compute the average 
recommendations of the SRF brokers and “other” brokers of each shareholding subgroup for the 
stock and report the grand average across all stocks in Panel A1 of Table 2.4.  
For the small shareholding subgroup, the raw recommendation of SRF brokers is 4.10 and that 
of “other” brokers is 4.06. For the medium and large shareholding subgroups, the raw 
recommendations of SRF brokers and “other” brokers are 4.15 vs. 4.09 and 4.15 vs. 4.06, 
respectively. Both the pooled sample t-tests and Wilcoxon sum-rank tests show that the differences 
in the raw recommendations between SRF brokers and “other” brokers are significant at the 0.01 
level for all three groups (Panel A2), whereas the paired t-tests indicate that the difference between 
SRF brokers and “other” brokers is significant at the 0.1 level for the small shareholding group and 
at the 0.01 level for the medium and large groups. For the stock-relative recommendations, although 
the recommendations of SRF brokers’ analysts are more optimistic than those of “other” brokers, 
the difference is significant at the 0.01 level only for the medium group based on the pooled sample 
t-test and the Wilcoxon sum-ran test, whereas the paired t-tests show that the differences between 
SRF brokers and other brokers are all significant at the 0.01 level. 
To provide further evidence, we also conduct an analysis at the broker level by dividing all of 
the stocks covered by each broker into SRF stocks and “other” stocks in each period. Then, we 
compute the average recommendations of SRF stocks and “other” stocks covered by each broker 
and report the results in Panel B1 of Table 2.4. Both the raw recommendations and stock-relative 
recommendations of SRF brokers are significantly higher than those of “other” brokers, and all 
three tests show that the differences between SRF brokers and “other” brokers are significant at the 
0.01 level. The overall results show that stable relationships between brokerage firms and mutual 
funds affect analysts’ recommendations after controlling for fund companies’ pressure as measured 
by their shareholding
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Table 2.4 Recommendations Between SRF Brokers and “Other” Brokers in Each Shareholding Group 
This table reports recommendation differences between the analysts of stably-related fund (SRF) brokers and “other” brokers. For stock-level analysis (Panel A), we divide brokers 
covering each stock into SRF brokers and “other” brokers based on the SRF definition in Section 3.2. To control for shareholding effect, we further divide all recommending brokers into 
three groups (Small, Medium, and Large) based on the total number of shares held by all funds that pay commission fees to these brokers in each period. Then, we compute average 
recommendations of SFR and other brokers of each subgroup for the stock and obtain the grand average across all stocks. For broker-level analysis (Panel B), we first divide all stocks 
covered by each broker into SRF stocks and “other” stocks in each period. Then, we compute the average recommendations of SRF stocks and “other” stocks covered by each broker 
and obtain the grand mean across all brokers (whole sample). Recommendationi,j (raw) is the recommendation Broker i for Stock j and it takes a value of 1 (strong sell) to 5 (strong buy). 
Stock-relative recommendation (Stock-Relative Reci,j) of Broker i for Stock j is computed as Recommendationi,j subtracts the median recommendation for Stock j by all brokers. We 
conduct pooled sample t-tests and Wilcoxon rank-sum test (Panels A2 and B2), and paired T-tests to investigate the difference in recommendations between SRF and the other group in 
each shareholding subgroup. To save space, paired t-test results are not reported, while the significance levels (0.01, 0.05, and 0.1) are indicated by 
+++
,
 ++
, and 
+
, respectively. The 
numbers in parentheses (Panels A2 and B2) are pooled sample t-stat and Wilcoxon sum-rank t-stat, and the significance levels (0.01, 0.05, and 0.1) are indicated by 
***
, 
**
, and 
*
, 
respectively.  
Panel A1: Raw/Stock-Relative Rec of SRF brokers vs “other” brokers within each shareholding groups at stock level 
 N Recommendation (raw) Stock-Relative Rec 
Small shareholding group      
  SRF brokers 6049 4.10
+
 4.0 0.028
+
 0.0 
  Other brokers 8714 4.06 4.0 0.016 0.0 
Medium shareholding group      
  SRF brokers 7263 4.15
+++
 4.13 0.065
+++
 0.0 
  Other brokers 4724 4.09 4.00 0.037 -0.02 
Large shareholding group      
  SRF brokers 5242 4.15
+++
 4.0 0.043
+++
 0 
  Other brokers 743 4.06 4.0 0.037 0 
Panel A2: Pooled sample comparison of Raw/Stock-Relative Rec between SRF brokers vs. “other” brokers at stock level 
  
Difference 
Raw Rec 
Pooled T-Stat/ 
Wilcoxon Rank-Sum 
Difference 
Relative Rec 
Pooled 
T-Stat/ 
Wilcoxon 
Rank-Sum 
  Small subgroup  0.04
***
 (3.50) / (3.61)
 
0.012 (1.49) / 
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(1.60) 
  Medium subgroup  0.06
***
 (5.59) / (7.55) 0.028
***
 
(2.95) / 
(4.73) 
  Large subgroup  0.09
***
 (3.35) / (4.71) 0.006 
(0.25) / 
(0.84) 
Panel B1: Raw/Stock-Relative Rec of SRF stocks vs “other” stocks within each shareholding groups at broker level 
 N Recommendation (raw) Stock-Relative Rec 
Small shareholding group      
  SRF stocks 455 4.01
+++
 4.0 -0.177
+++
 -0.05 
  Other stocks 921 3.93 4.0 -0.179 -0.12 
Medium shareholding group      
  SRF stocks 564 4.17
+++
 4.1 -0.013
+++
 0.00 
  Other stocks 832 4.02 4.0 -0.086 -0.019 
Large shareholding group      
  SRF stocks 564 4.23
+++
 4.2 0.056
+++
 0.0 
  Other stocks 595 4.12 4.0 0.020 0.0 
Panel B2: Pooled sample comparison of Raw/Stock-Relative Rec between SRF stocks vs. “other” stocks at broker level 
  
Difference 
Raw Rec 
Pooled T-Stat/ 
Wilcoxon Rank-Sum 
Difference 
Relative Rec 
Pooled 
T-Stat/ 
Wilcoxon 
Rank-Sum 
  Small subgroup  0.08
***
 (2.67) / (2.52) 0.002 
(0.07) / 
(0.47) 
  Medium subgroup  0.15
***
 (6.50) / (6.46) 0.073
***
 
(3.41) / 
(2.67) 
  Large subgroup  0.11
***
 (4.32) / (3.90) 0.037 
(1.40) / 
(0.08) 
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2.4.3 Regression Analysis on the Effect of Stable Relationships on Recommendations 
In this section, we use regression analyses to investigate the effect of stable business relationships 
on analysts’ recommendations by controlling for commission fees, fund shareholdings and various 
other factors. The three key variables of primary interest are Stable, Log(NOS), and Log(Commission), 
where Stablei, j, k is an indicator variable that takes a value of 1 if Stock j covered by Broker i is held by 
at least one of the broker’s SRFs k, as defined in Section 2.3.2, and 0 otherwise; Log (NOS) is the 
logarithm of the total number of shares of Stock j covered by Broker i and held by all funds that pay 
commission fees to Broker i in period t; Log(Commission) is the logarithm of the total commission fees 
paid by all funds that hold Stock j that is covered by Broker i. 
We include three groups of variables to control for the market environment, brokerage firm 
characteristics, and stock risk and performance. The market environment is captured by two dummy 
variables, Bull and Bear. Bull (Bear) takes a value of 1 if the market return in a given period is greater 
than the 75
th
 percentile (less than the 25
th
 percentile) of all semi-annual returns during our whole 
sample period and 0 otherwise. In addition, we interact Bull (Bear) with Stable to investigate how the 
analysts of SRF brokers issue recommendations differently under different market conditions. 
Brokerage firm characteristic variables include the broker firm’s Age and firm size—measured by the 
logarithm of net capital Log(Net Cap), and the number of analysts working for the broker firm. We 
include these variables because prior studies show that these variables affect the accuracy of analysts’ 
forecasts (Clement and Tse, 2005). Stock variables include profitability—measured by the ratio of 
EBITDA to total assets (EBITDA/TA) winsorized at 1%, Sales Growth rate (also winsorized at 1%), 
State Ownership and Top 10 Shareholder Ownership, three-factor adjusted returns (3-factor adj. return), 
the standard deviation of the daily stock return (Std. dev. of daily return), and New share, which is a 
dummy variable that takes a value of 1 if Stock j is listed within one year and 0 otherwise. 
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Table 2.5 Regression of Recommendations on Stable Relationship  
The dependents are Reci,j (raw) and Stock-Relative Reci,j of Broker i for Stock j in a given period. Rec takes a value of 1 (strong sell) to 5 (strong buy). Stock-Relative Reci,j is the 
stock relative recommendation and it is computed as Reci,j subtracts the median recommendation for Stock j by all brokers in the same period. Stablei,j,k takes a value of 1 if Stock j 
covered by Broker i is held by at least one of the broker’s SRFs and 0 otherwise. Bull (Bear) takes a value of 1 if the market return in period t is greater than the 75th percentile (less 
than the 25
th
 percentile) of all semi-annual market returns in the whole sample period and 0 otherwise. Log (NOS) is the log of total number of shares of Stock j covered by Broker i 
and held by all funds that pay commission fees to Broker i. Log(Commission) is the log of the total commission fees paid by all funds that hold Stock j covered by Broke i. Brokerage 
firm characteristics include Age, size (Log(Net Cap)), and the number of analysts. Stock character variables include profitability (EBITDA/TA winsorized at 1%), Sales Growth rate 
(also winsorized at 1%), State Ownership and Top 10 Shareholder Ownership, three-factor adjusted return (3-factor adj. return), the standard deviation of daily stock return (Std of 
daily return), and New share that takes a value of 1 if Stock j is newly issued within one year of listing and 0 otherwise. Panels A and B report regression results with White (1980) 
correction for standard errors and with broker-fixed effect and time-fixed effect, respectively. Note that the dummy variables Bull and Bear are not included in the regressions in 
Panel B since the time-fixed effect captures the related market conditions. 
***
, 
**
, and 
*
 indicate significance of 0.01, 0.05 and 0.1 levels, respectively. 
Panel A: Regression with broker-fixed effect  
 
Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 
 
Rec Stock-Relative Rec Rec Stock-Relative Rec Rec Stock-Relative Rec  Rec Stock-Relative Rec 
Stable 
0.107
***
 
(9.84) 
0.024
** 
(2.08) 
0.056
***
 
(4.83) 
0.028
** 
(2.25) 
0.032
** 
(2.41) 
0.008 
(0.53) 
0.024
* 
(1.85) 
0.012 
(0.81) 
Bull 
-0.133
***
 
(-6.82) 
-0.038
* 
(-1.81) 
-0.138
***
 
(-7.12) 
-0.037
* 
(-1.79) 
-0.166
***
 
(-6.63) 
-0.065
**
 
(-2.38) 
-0.168
***
 
(-6.70) 
-0.065
**
 
(-2.35) 
Bear  
-0.058
***
 
(-4.31) 
0.050
***
 
(3.43) 
-0.060
*** 
(-4.43)
 
0.050
***
 
(3.45) 
-0.040
**
 
(-2.35) 
0.060
***
 
(3.21) 
-0.046
***
 
(-2.65) 
0.063
***
 
(3.37) 
Bull*Stable (β4) 
0.028 
(1.25) 
0.024 
(1.00) 
0.025 
(1.14) 
0.024 
(1.01) 
0.051
*
 
(1.89) 
0.052
* 
(1.75) 
0.051
*
 
(1.88) 
0.052
* 
(1.75) 
Bear*Stable (β5) 
-0.019 
(-1.25) 
-0.018 
(-1.06) 
-0.024 
(-1.52) 
-0.017 
(-1.05) 
-0.025 
(-1.35) 
-0.024 
(-1.20) 
-0.027 
(-1.47) 
-0.023 
(-1.14) 
β4 – β5 
[F test] 
0.047
**
 
(4.04) 
0.042
*
 
(2.71) 
0.049
**
 
(4.32) 
0.041 
(2.70) 
0.076
***
 
(7.03) 
0.076
**
 
(5.87) 
0.078
***
 
(7.45) 
0.075
**
 
(5.70) 
Log(NOS)   
0.028
*** 
(13.0) 
-0.002 
(-0.84) 
  
0.016
***
 
(5.35) 
-0.009
*** 
(-2.74) 
Log(com)     0.038
***
 0.009
*** 
0.027
***
 0.015
*** 
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(13.6) (2.84) (7.95) (3.91) 
Log (1+Broker age) 
0.118
***
 
(3.06) 
-0.087
**
 
(-2.11) 
0.157
***
 
(4.06) 
-0.090
**
 
(-2.16) 
0.178
***
 
(4.35) 
-0.089
**
 
(-1.98) 
0.181
***
 
(4.43) 
-0.090
**
 
(-2.01) 
Log(net cap) 
0.021
*
 
(1.85) 
0.009 
(0.79) 
0.011 
(1.01) 
0.010 
(0.85) 
-0.005 
(-0.44) 
0.006 
(0.45) 
-0.002 
(-0.15) 
0.004 
(0.30) 
Log (1+N of analysts) 
-0.042
***
 
(-2.62) 
0.012 
(0.69) 
-0.052
***
 
(-3.26) 
0.012 
(0.73) 
-0.071
***
 
(-4.09) 
0.009 
(0.49) 
-0.072
***
 
(-4.13) 
0.010
 
(0.51)
 
EBITDA/TA 
0.541
***
 
(8.81) 
0.095 
(1.45) 
0.497
***
 
(8.11) 
0.098 
(1.49) 
0.394
***
 
(6.17) 
0.054 
(0.78) 
0.407
*** 
(6.38) 
0.047
 
(0.67) 
Sales growth 
-0.003 
(-0.64) 
0.002 
(0.51) 
-0.002 
(-0.57) 
0.002 
(0.50) 
0.004 
(0.83) 
0.006 
(1.20) 
0.003 
(0.69) 
0.006 
(1.27) 
State ownership (%) 
-0.0005
***
 
(-3.06) 
-0.0002 
(-1.18) 
-0.0007
***
 
(-4.24) 
-0.0002 
(-1.10) 
-0.0007
***
 
(-4.06) 
-0.0004
** 
(-2.17) 
-0.0007
***
 
(-4.48) 
-0.0003
* 
(-1.95) 
Top-10 shareholder 
Ownership (%) 
-0.0006
***
 
(-2.67) 
0.0001 
(0.34) 
-0.0005
**
 
(-1.97) 
0.0001 
(0.29) 
-0.0004
*
 
(-1.68) 
0.0002 
(0.66) 
-0.0003 
(-1.39) 
0.0001 
(0.50) 
3-factors adj. return 
0.106
***
 
(8.37) 
-0.026
* 
(-1.89) 
0.095
***
 
(7.50) 
-0.025
*
 
(-1.83) 
0.085
***
 
(6.39) 
-0.026
* 
(-1.77) 
0.085
***
 
(6.43) 
-0.026
* 
(-1.79) 
Std. Dev of daily return 
-1.04
*** 
(-2.38) 
1.48
***
 
(3.17) 
-0.606 
(-1.39) 
1.45
***
 
(3.09) 
-1.23
***
 
(-2.71) 
1.43
***
 
(2.88) 
-0.932
**
 
(-2.04) 
1.26
**
 
(2.52) 
New share 
0.019
*
 
(1.67) 
0.027
**
 
(2.22) 
0.054
***
 
(4.66) 
0.024
***
 
(1.95) 
0.032
***
 
(2.59) 
0.025
* 
(1.90) 
0.048
***
 
(3.81) 
0.016 
(1.19) 
Lagged Rec 
(Stock-relative Rec) 
0.545
***
 
(101.9) 
0.383
***
 
(64.2) 
0.539
***
 
(100.7) 
0.383
*** 
(64.2) 
0.546
***
 
(96.4) 
0.391
***
 
(61.4) 
0.545
***
 
(96.2) 
0.391
***
 
(61.4) 
Intercept 
1.54
***
 
(11.4) 
-0.010 
(-0.07) 
1.10
***
 
(7.93) 
0.020 
(0.14) 
1.98
*** 
(4.08) 
0.372
 
(0.70) 
1.78
***
 
(3.67) 
0.482 
(0.91) 
Time-fixed effect NO NO NO NO NO NO NO NO 
Broker-fixed effect YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES 
N of obs. 23688 23688 23687 23687 20469 20469 20469 20469 
Adj. R
2
 45.3% 25.8% 45.6% 25.8% 47.6% 27.6% 47.7% 27.6% 
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Table 2.5 (continued): 
Panel B: Regression with period-fixed effect 
 
Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 
 
Rec Relative Rec Rec Relative Rec Rec Relative Rec Rec Relative Rec 
Stable 
0.073
***
 
(7.02) 
0.018
 
(1.60) 
0.027
**
 
(2.50) 
0.020
* 
(1.68) 
0.010
 
(0.79) 
0.015 
(1.04) 
0.006
 
(0.45) 
0.015 
(1.07) 
Bull*Stable (β4) 
0.041
* 
(1.83) 
0.007 
(0.27) 
0.042
* 
(1.87) 
0.006 
(0.26) 
0.053
*
 
(1.90) 
0.025
 
(0.82) 
0.050
*
 
(1.81) 
0.025
 
(0.82) 
Bear*Stable (β5) 
-0.020 
(-1.27) 
-0.027 
(-1.59) 
-0.020 
(-1.30) 
-0.027 
(-1.59) 
-0.023 
(-1.21) 
-0.037
* 
(-1.78) 
-0.027 
(-1.43) 
-0.036
* 
(-1.76) 
Β4 – β5 
[F test] 
0.061
**
 
(6.54) 
0.034 
(1.65) 
0.062
***
 
(6.86) 
0.033 
(1.65) 
0.076
**
 
(6.62) 
0.062
*
 
(3.66) 
0.077
***
 
(6.92) 
0.061
*
 
(3.65) 
Log(NOS)   
0.029
*** 
(13.2) 
-0.001 
(-0.50) 
  
0.026
***
 
(8.58) 
-0.002
 
(-0.75) 
Log(Commisison)     
0.028
***
 
(9.53) 
0.002
 
(0.61) 
0.012
***
 
(3.63) 
0.003
 
(0.92) 
Log (1+Broker age) 
0.016
**
 
(2.18) 
0.023
***
 
(2.84) 
0.016
**
 
(2.19) 
0.023
***
 
(2.84) 
0.20
**
 
(2.50) 
0.025
***
 
(2.91) 
0.017
**
 
(2.19) 
0.025
*** 
(2.93) 
Log(net cap) 
0.006 
(1.20) 
0.015
*** 
(2.68) 
0.010
* 
(1.92) 
0.014
**
 
(2.66) 
0.005 
(0.97) 
0.017
*** 
(2.92) 
0.011
** 
(2.00) 
0.016
*** 
(2.81) 
Log (1+N of analysts) 
-0.024
**
 
(-2.45) 
-0.004 
(-0.39) 
-0.010 
(-1.00) 
-0.005 
(-0.44) 
-0.048
***
 
(-4.35) 
-0.009 
(-0.71) 
-0.027
**
 
(-2.35) 
-0.011
 
(-0.86)
 
EBITDA/TA(winsorized) 
0.669
***
 
(10.3) 
0.102 
(1.47) 
0.608
***
 
(9.40) 
0.105 
(1.50) 
0.534
***
 
(7.88) 
0.070 
(0.94) 
0.538
*** 
(7.97) 
0.070
 
(0.94) 
Sales growth 
0.070
*** 
(7.68) 
0.005 
(0.47) 
0.062
*** 
(6.87) 
0.005 
(0.50) 
0.061
*** 
(6.44) 
0.002 
(0.20) 
0.057
*** 
(6.05) 
0.002 
(0.23) 
State ownership 
-0.0005
***
 
(-2.87) 
-0.0002 
(-0.89) 
-0.0006
***
 
(-3.95) 
-0.0001 
(-0.85) 
-0.0006
***
 
(-3.61) 
-0.0003
* 
(-1.74) 
-0.0007
***
 
(-4.23) 
-0.0003
* 
(-1.68) 
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% of Top-10 holding 
-0.0005
**
 
(-2.08) 
0.0001 
(0.50) 
-0.0003 
(-1.24) 
0.0001 
(0.46) 
-0.0003 
(-1.18) 
0.0002 
(0.64) 
-0.0002 
(-0.65) 
0.0002 
(0.59) 
Factors adj. return 
0.105
***
 
(7.97) 
-0.010
 
(-0.70) 
0.087
***
 
(6.59) 
-0.009 
(-0.65) 
0.087
***
 
(6.28) 
-0.006
 
(-0.42) 
0.084
***
 
(6.03) 
-0.006
 
(-0.40) 
Std. Dev. of daily return 
-0.971
* 
(-1.78) 
0.566 
(0.96) 
0.128 
(0.23) 
0.522 
(0.88) 
-0.547 
(-0.96) 
0.500 
(0.80) 
0.051 
(0.09) 
0.443 
(0.70) 
New share 
0.027
**
 
(2.34) 
0.043
***
 
(3.48) 
0.063
***
 
(5.35) 
0.042
***
 
(3.26) 
0.038
***
 
(3.06) 
0.043
*** 
(3.09) 
0.065
***
 
(5.05) 
0.040
*** 
(2.82) 
Lag(rec 
/relrec) 
0.609
***
 
(119.6) 
0.458
***
 
(79.2) 
0.602
***
 
(118.2) 
0.458
*** 
(79.2) 
0.618
***
 
(115.0) 
0.473
***
 
(76.9) 
0.615
***
 
(114.4) 
0.473
***
 
(76.9) 
Intercept 
1.31
***
 
(10.8) 
-0.523
***
 
(-4.02) 
0.787
***
 
(6.18) 
-0.501
***
 
(-3.65) 
1.10
*** 
(8.62) 
-0.538
***
 
(-3.86) 
0.757
***
 
(5.67) 
-0.504
***
 
(-3.44) 
Time-fixed effect YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES 
Broker-fixed effect NO NO NO NO NO NO NO NO 
N of obs. 23688 23688 23687 23687 20469 20469 20469 20469 
Adj. R
2
 43.0% 21.5% 43.4% 21.5% 45.0% 23.0% 45.2% 23.0% 
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Panel A of Table 2.5 reports the pooled regressions with fixed effects at the broker level and 
with White’s (1980) correction for standard errors. In Model 1, we omit Log(NOS) and 
Log(Commission) in the regression to avoid any possible multi-collinearity problems among the 
three key variables. In the first regression, where the dependent variable is raw recommendation 
(Rec), the coefficient on Stable is 0.107 and is significant both economically and statistically (at the 
0.01 level), thus confirming the positive relation between a stable relationship and 
recommendations reported in Tables 2.2-2.4. The coefficients on both Bull and Bear are negative 
and significant at the 0.01 level, which indicate that analysts in general make less optimistic 
recommendations when the stock market performs either very well or very poorly. More 
importantly, the difference between these two coefficients (β4 – β5) is positive (0.047) and 
significant at the 0.05 level, which indicates that analysts from SRF brokers issue more optimistic 
recommendations during a bull market than during a bear market.  
The coefficients on Log(1 + broker age) and Log(Net cap) are 0.118 and 0.021 and are 
significant at the 0.01 and 0.1 levels, respectively, which indicate that analysts from large brokerage 
firms tend to make more optimistic recommendations. Conversely, the coefficient on Log(1 + # of 
analysts) is -0.042 and is significant at the 0.01 level, which suggests that analysts issue less 
optimistic recommendations when more analysts work for the same brokerage firm, likely due to 
career considerations, which is consistent with the results found by Clement and Tse (2005).  
The positive (negative) coefficients on EBITDA/TA and 3-factor adjusted returns (Std. dev. of 
daily return) are intuitive and indicate that analysts issue more (less) optimistic recommendations 
for well performing (high-risk) stocks. The coefficients on both State Ownership and Top 10 
Shareholder Ownership are negative and significant at the 0.01 level, although the economic 
significance is small because of the small magnitude of these coefficients.
7
 The coefficient on New 
Share is 0.019 and is significant at the 0.1 level, which indicates that analysts issue more optimistic 
recommendations for newly issued stocks, thus confirming the results of Bradley et al. (2003). 
                                                             
7
 How state ownership and shareholder concentration affect analysts’ recommendations is an open empirical question; 
no hard evidence exists, and there is no theory to explain it. Even the evidence on how state ownership and shareholder 
concentration affect firm value is mixed. For example, Wei and Varela (2013) find that state ownership has a negative 
effect on firm value, whereas Le and Buck (2011) find that state ownership is positively associated with firm 
performance. Hou et al. (2012) indicate that after the split share structure reform in China, state ownership became more 
sensitive to share price; hence, state ownership is more aligned with the characteristics of private shareholders.  
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Finally, the positive coefficient on lagged recommendation (Lagged Rec) indicates the persistence 
of analysts’ recommendations, which is largely consistent with Hillary and Hsu’s (2013) findings 
that analysts strategically increase their forecast consistency because consistent analysts are less 
likely to be demoted. 
In the second regression of Model 1, the dependent variable is stock-relative recommendation, 
the coefficient on Stable remains positive and significant, and the difference in the two interaction 
variables Bull × Stable and Bear × Stable (β4 – β5) remains positive and significant at the 0.1 level. 
A few variables (e.g., Log(1 + # of analysts), EBITDA/TA, State Ownership, and Top 10 
Shareholder Ownership) become insignificant, whereas the coefficient on Log(1 + broker age) 
changes from positive to negative.  
In Model 2, we add Log(NOS) along with Stable and all of the other control variables. The 
coefficient on Stable remains positive (0.056) and significant at the 0.01 level in the raw 
recommendation (Rec) regression, and it is 0.028 and significant at the 0.05 level in the 
stock-relative recommendation regression. The coefficient on Log(NOS) is 0.028 and is significant 
at the 0.01 level in the raw recommendation regression, but it becomes negative and insignificant in 
the stock-relative recommendation regression. This indicates that larger stake that mutual funds 
have in stocks that are covered by their related brokers does not lead to more optimistic 
recommendation after controlling for the stable relationship. In other words, the main channel 
through which relationship affects analyst recommendation is the incentives for relationship 
management, rather than corporate governance concerns. The coefficients on the other variables are 
largely consistent with those of Model 1. 
In Model 3, we replace Log(NOS) with Log(Commission). The coefficients on 
Log(Commission) are 0.038 and 0.009 in the raw and stock-relative recommendation regressions, 
respectively, and both are significant at the 0.01 level, which is consistent with the positive 
relationship reported in Figure 2.1 and in Tables 2.2 and 2.3. The coefficient on Stable remains 
positive and significant at the 0.05 level in the raw recommendation regression but is positive and 
insignificant in the stock-relative recommendation regression. 
In Model 4, we include all of the variables. The one significant change is that the coefficients 
on Log(NOS) are mixed; they are positive and significant in the raw recommendation regression but 
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become negative and significant in the stock-relative recommendation regression, which is 
consistent with the results in Model 2, suggesting that the relationship management may be the 
more important mechanism.  
The coefficient on Stable remains positive in the raw recommendation regression and 
significant at the 0.1 level, and it is positive but insignificant in the stock-relative recommendation 
regression. As we noted earlier in this paper, the lower significance of the stock-relative 
recommendation regressions actually reflects overall optimistic recommendations because the 
stock-relative recommendation is the difference between an analyst’s recommendation and the 
consensus recommendation. In short, based on the empirical results, the relationship management 
channel dominates the corporate governance channel through which the stable business relationship 
exerts significant influences on analysts’ recommendations. 
The coefficients on Log(Commission) are positive and significant at the 0.01 level in both 
regressions. In Panel B of Table 2.5, we control for the time fixed effect with White’s (1980) 
correction for standard errors. Note that the two dummy variables Bull and Bear are dropped from 
the regressions because the time fixed effect captures bull and bear market conditions. One 
noticeable change is that the significance levels of many of the variables decline. In summary, 
confirming the univariate results, the regression analyses show that stable relationships between 
brokerage firms and mutual funds and the amount of commission fees paid by funds have positive 
effects on recommendations after controlling for various brokerage firm characteristics and stock 
features.  
Although we control for market conditions by including bull and bear dummy variables in the 
regressions, it is possible that analysts’ recommendations could be different during the recent 
financial crisis. To investigate this possibility, we conduct two robustness tests. First, we repeat the 
regressions in Table 2.5 by excluding recommendations during the period from July 2007 to August 
2009. Second, we estimate the regressions using data only from the financial crisis period. The 
unreported results show that a stable business relationship has a positive effect on analysts’ 
recommendations.
8
  
                                                             
8
 We thank the discussant at the 2015 Financial Markets & Corporate Governance Conference (at Fremantle, Western 
Australia) for this comment. To save space, the results of these robustness tests are not reported but are available from 
the authors upon request. 
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Table 2.6 Recommendation Changes Associated with Stock “Add” and “Drop”  
This table reports the changes in recommendations after a stock is added to (dropped from) the portfolios of a brokers’ 
SRFs. A stock is defined as a stably related-fund stock (SRF stock) if at least one fund holding the stock is stably related 
to the broker based on the SRF definition in Section 3.2. “Add” is an event when at least one of the broker’s SRFs add 
the stock into their portfolios. “Drop” is the event when none of the broker’s SRFs holds the stock in period t, but some 
of them hold the stock in period t - 1. Other cases such as stocks that are held by SRFs in both (or neither) period t-1 
and (nor) t are not included in this analysis. For stock-level analysis (Panel A), we divide brokers covering each stock 
into “add” and “drop” in each period (semi-annual) according to whether a broker’s SRFs add or drop a stock. Then, we 
compute the average recommendations of “add” and “drop” brokers for the stock and obtain the grand mean across all 
stocks. For broker-level analysis (Panel B), we first divide all stocks covered by each broker into “add” and “drop” 
according to whether they are added or dropped by the broker’s SRFs. Then, we compute the average recommendations 
of added” stocks and “dropped” stocks covered by each broker and obtain the grand mean across all brokers. 
∆Recommendationi,j is the recommendation change of Broker i for Stock j from period t-1 to t when Stock j is added to 
or dropped from Broker i’s SFRs, and ∆Stock-Relative Rec is the change in stock-relative recommendation. We conduct 
pooled sample t-tests and Wilcoxon rank-sum tests, and paired T-tests, to investigate the difference in recommendation 
changes associated with “Add” and “Drop”. Note that for the paired T-tests, the differences in the changes of 
Recommendation and Stock-Relative Rec are reported in one column (Difference) because these numbers are the same 
due to the way that the Stock-Relative Rec is computed. 
***
, 
**
, and 
*
 indicate significance of 0.01, 0.05 and 0.1 levels, 
respectively. 
Panel A: Recommendation change after “add” and “drop” at stock level  
 N ∆Recommendation (raw) ∆Stock-Relative Rec 
  Add 1835 0.078 0.0 0.008 0.0 
  Drop 1893 -0.012 0.0 0.011 0.0 
Pooled sample differences in recommendations changes between “Add” vs “Drop” 
  Difference 
Pooled T-Stat/ 
Wilcoxon Rank-Sum 
Difference 
Pooled T-Stat/ 
Wilcoxon Rank-Sum 
    0.091
***
 (4.96)/ (5.67) -0.003 (0.15) / (-0.01) 
Paired T-tests of differences in recommendation change: Add - Drop 
 N Difference T-stat 
   374 0.062 (1.61) 
Panel B: Recommendation change after “add” and “drop” at broker level  
 N ∆Recommendation (raw) ∆Stock-Relative Rec 
  Add 418 0.088 0 0.011 0 
  Drop 385 -0.006 0 0.007 0 
Pooled sample differences in recommendations changes between “Add” vs “Drop” 
  Difference 
Pooled T-Stat/ 
Wilcoxon Rank-Sum 
Difference 
Pooled T-Stat/ 
Wilcoxon Rank-Sum 
    0.093
***
 (3.44) / (4.31) 0.004 (0.16) / (-0.27) 
Paired T-tests of differences in recommendation change: Add - Drop 
 N Difference T-stat 
 350 0.021 (0.79) 
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2.5 Dynamic Relationship between Changes in Shareholding Status and 
Analysts’ Recommendations 
In this section, we augment our findings by examining the changes in recommendations when SRFs 
add (drop) a stock to (from) their portfolio. If a stable relationship has a material effect on analysts’ 
recommendations, an exogenous experiment is to see how brokers react to stocks that are added or 
dropped by their client funds. We identify “Add” as an exogenous event when at least one of a 
broker’s SRFs adds a stock to its portfolio in period t, but none of the broker’s SRFs held the stock in 
period t-1. Similarly, “Drop” is the event where none of a broker’s SRFs holds the stock in period t, 
but some of them held the stock in period t-1. Other cases, such as where a stock is held by SRFs in 
both period t-1 and t or neither in period t-1 nor in period t are not included in this analysis. 
Panel A of Table 2.6 reports the recommendation changes at the stock level. When a stock is 
added by a broker’s SRFs, the average increase in raw recommendation is approximately 0.078, 
whereas the raw recommendation declines by 0.012 when a stock is dropped by the broker’s SRFs. 
The differences in recommendation changes associated with add and drop events are approximately 
0.091 for the pooled sample, and they are significant at the 0.01 level. However, the difference in 
stock-relative recommendations is not significant in the pooled sample tests or in the paired t-test. 
Note that it is possible for funds to sell out of a stock before analysts downgrade the rating, as 
indicated by Irvine et al. (2007), or that the stably related brokers delay the downgrading (e.g., 
Conrad et al., 2006; Firth et al., 2013). In Panel B of Table 2.6, we report the recommendation 
changes associated with add and drop events at the broker level. The raw recommendation increases 
by approximately 0.088 when a stock is added to a broker’s SRFs, whereas it decreases by 
approximately 0.006 when the stock is dropped by a broker’s SRFs; the differences in raw 
recommendations are significant at the 0.01 level based on the pooled sample tests. However, the 
differences in the changes in stock-relative recommendations are insignificant. 
To provide more evidence on the changes in recommendations associated with add and drop 
events, we regress recommendation changes on the dummy variable Add and some control variables 
that capture possible changes in the firm performance of the added or dropped stocks. In Model 1, 
the sample is a pooled sample that includes all “add” and “drop” events. The variable of interest is 
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the dummy variable “add”, which takes a value of 1 if a stock is added by at least one of a broker’s 
SRFs and 0 otherwise. The coefficient on Add is 0.083 and is significant at the 0.01 level in the first 
regression (Table 2.7), where the dependent variable (∆Rec) is the change in the raw 
recommendation. In the second regression, where the dependent variable (∆Stock-Relative Rec) is the 
change in the stock-relative recommendation, the coefficient on Add is -0.001 and is insignificant. 
In Model 2, we use only stocks that are “added” by some of a broker’s SRFs and concurrently 
“dropped” by “other” brokers’ SRFs. This matched approach avoids any possible effect of changes 
in stock character because both the “add” and “drop” events occur to the same stock. The coefficients 
on Add are 0.097 and 0.075 in the ∆Rec and ∆Stock-Relative Rec regressions and are significant at 
the 0.05 and 0.10 levels, respectively. This evidence again indicates that analysts update and issue 
more optimistic recommendations when their employers’ SRFs add stocks in their portfolios. 
2.5.1 Determinants of Stable Relationships between Brokerage Firms and Mutual Funds 
2.5.1.1 Commission Fees and Stable Business Relationships 
In this section, we investigate the factors that motivate brokerage firms and mutual fund companies 
to maintain stable business ties. In the context of CRM, as we discussed in the introduction, 
maintaining a stable relationship between a brokerage firm and its client funds is beneficial for both 
parties. From a brokerage firm’s perspective, the amount of commissions it receives from its client 
funds has a direct economic effect on its business and profitability, but receiving continuous business 
from its clients in the future is as important as increasing or maximizing its current commissions. 
From the funds’ viewpoint, brokerage firms’ research quality, resources, and reputation are of 
primary importance (Irvine et al., 2004; Goldstein et al., 2009). Thus, we estimate the following 
baseline logit regression:  
Prob(Stable𝑖,𝑘) = 𝑓(𝐶𝑜𝑚𝑚𝑖𝑠𝑠𝑖𝑜𝑛 𝑅𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑖,𝑘,𝑡, 𝑀𝑢𝑡𝑢𝑎𝑙 𝑂𝑤𝑛𝑒𝑟𝑠ℎ𝑖𝑝𝑖,𝑘.,𝑡, 𝐵𝑟𝑜𝑘𝑒𝑟 𝐹𝑒𝑎𝑡𝑢𝑟𝑒𝑠𝑖,𝑡,  
                                                𝐹𝑢𝑛𝑑 𝐶ℎ𝑎𝑟𝑎𝑐𝑡𝑒𝑟𝑘,𝑡)                                                                                 (2.1)  
where the dependent variable Stablei,k takes a value of 1 if Broker i and Fund k are stably related 
based on the definition in Section 2.3.2 and 0 otherwise.
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Table 2.7 Regression of Recommendation Changes Associated with Stock Add (Drop) 
This table reports the regression of recommendation changes when stocks are added by at least one of brokers’ SRFs or 
dropped from SRFs’ portfolios. The dependent variable is either change in true recommendation (∆Rec) or in 
stock-specific relative recommendation (∆Stock-Relative Rec) associated with add or drop events. The variable of 
interest is a dummy variable “add”, which takes a value of 1 if a stock is added by at least one of brokers’ SRFs and 0 
otherwise. In Model 1, the sample is a pooled sample including all “add” and “drop” events. In Model 2, we use only 
stocks that are “added” by some of the broker’s SRFs and “dropped” by “other” brokers’ SRFs. Control variables 
include brokerage firm’s Age, size (Log(Net Cap)), and the number of analysts working for the broker’s firm. Stock 
character variables include Log(TA) (total assets), Sales Growth rate (also winsorized at 1%), State Ownership and Top 
10 Shareholder Ownership, 3-factor adjusted return, Std. dev. of daily return is the standard deviation of stock daily, and 
New share, a dummy variable that takes a value of 1 if the stock is newly issued within a year. The regressions are 
estimated with White (1980) correction for standard errors. 
***
, 
**
, and 
*
 indicate significance of 0.01, 0.05 and 0.1 levels, 
respectively. 
 
Model 1 Model 2 
 
∆Rec ∆Stock-Relative Rec ∆Rec ∆Stock-Relative Rec 
Add 
0.083
***
 
(4.39) 
-0.001 
(-0.08) 
0.097
**
 
(2.47) 
0.075
*
 
(1.83) 
Log (1+Broker age) 
0.005
***
 
(3.11) 
0.005
***
 
(2.80) 
0.006
* 
(1.80) 
0.004 
(0.99) 
Log(net cap) 
-0.002 
(-0.14) 
-0.011 
(-0.93) 
-0.023 
(-0.82) 
0.001 
(0.05) 
Log (1+N of analysts) 
-0.001
*
 
(-1.71) 
0.0004 
(0.54) 
-0.002 
(-0.98) 
-0.002 
(-0.98) 
∆Log(TA) 
0.182
***
 
(2.96) 
0.020 
(0.35) 
0.295
** 
(1.96) 
-0.049 
(-0.33) 
Sales growth 
0.012
***
 
(5.01) 
0.009
***
 
(4.03) 
0.042 
(1.56) 
0.020 
(0.73) 
∆State ownership 
0.002
***
 
(3.69) 
0.001
**
 
(2.24) 
0.004
***
 
(2.76) 
0.003
*
 
(1.82) 
∆Top-10 shareholder  
ownership 
0.0002 
(0.08) 
-0.0006 
(-0.29) 
0.004 
(0.61) 
-0.003 
(-0.44) 
∆3-Factors adj. return 
-0.004 
(-0.14) 
-0.021 
(-0.87) 
-0.037 
(-0.69) 
0.024 
(0.45) 
∆Std. dev. of daily return 
0.140 
(0.42) 
0.410 
(1.26) 
0.353 
(0.86) 
0.417 
(1.02) 
New share 
0.038 
(1.36) 
0.042 
(1.40) 
0.047 
(0.80) 
0.110
*
 
(1.75) 
Lagged (Rec 
/Stock-relative rec) 
-0.397
***
 
(-20.2) 
-0.574
***
 
(-27.6) 
-0.418
***
 
(-9.18) 
-0.522
***
 
(-11.6) 
Intercept 
1.61
*** 
(9.11) 
0.135
 
(0.89) 
1.96
*** 
(5.02) 
0.002 
(0.01) 
N of obs. 3969 3696 775 775 
Adj. R
2
 21.6% 29.2% 22.7% 26.5% 
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    We use two different methods to compute the commission ratio and use it as a proxy for 
economic incentives. Commission ratio1 is the amount of commissions paid by Fund k to Broker i 
(Commissioni,k) divided by the total amount of commission fees paid by this fund to all brokers in a 
given period. According to Goldstein et al. (2009), a “commission constitutes a convenient way of 
charging a prearranged fixed rate for long-term access to a broker’s premium services”; thus, we 
predict a positive relationship between this measure and forming/maintaining a stable relationship. 
Commission ratio2 is Commissioni,k divided by the total amount of commission fees received by 
this broker from all funds in a given period.  
In addition, we use fund age, i.e., the number of years since the fund’s inception, fund size, 
which is measured by its net asset value, and fund family size (Family size), which is measured by 
the total net asset value of all funds in the fund family, as proxies for potential business from the 
funds and their family funds. We use Broker age, broker firm size, measured by its net capital 
(Log(Net Cap)), and the number of analysts (N of Analysts) working for the broker firm as proxies 
for brokerage firm resources, and we measure broker reputation using its market share in IPO 
underwriting in the previous period. We also include the dummy variable Mutual Ownershipi,k,t in 
the regression. It takes a value of 1 if Fund k’s management company and Broker i are owned by 
the same institution(s) or Broker i is one of the shareholders of Fund k’s management company in a 
given period and 0 otherwise. We conjecture that if a brokerage firm and its client funds are 
affiliated through shared ownership in a third company, they have an aligned interest in forging a 
stable business relationship (e.g., Mola and Guidolin, 2009).  
We first estimate a logit regression equation (1) using Fama-MacBeth’s (1973) method with 
Newey-West adjusted standard errors and with one period lag. We report the results in Panel A of 
Table 2.8. In Model 1, the coefficients on Commission Ratio1 and Mutual Ownership are 14.28 and 
1.37, respectively, and both are significant statistically and economically, which indicates that when 
the economic stakes are high, and when brokerage firms and funds are related through shared 
ownership, they are motivated to maintain a stable relationship. In addition, the coefficients on 
Log(Net Cap) and Log(1 + N of analysts) are 0.308 and 1.177, respectively, and both are significant 
at the 0.01 level, which suggests that funds maintain stable relationships with brokerage firms that 
have more resources. Surprisingly, the coefficients on broker reputation are not significant, which is 
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likely due to the special underwriting environment in China.
9
 The positive and significant 
coefficient on fund size (0.55) indicates that large funds are attractive to brokerage firms because of 
their potential business. In contrast, the negative and significant coefficients on fund age (-0.40) and 
fund family size (-0.193) indicate that young funds and small fund families are more likely to 
maintain stable relationships with brokerage firms because brokerage services are more valuable for 
and are more needed by these funds. 
In Model 2, we add two interaction variables: fund age × fund size and fund age × fund family 
size. All of the results are consistent with those in Model 1 except that the coefficient on fund age is 
insignificant. More importantly, the coefficient on the interaction variable between fund age and 
fund size is -0.299 and is significant at the 0.01 level, thus suggesting that young and large funds 
are more likely to forge stable relationships with brokerage firms, which is consistent with the 
results from Model 1. In addition, the positive and significant coefficient on the interaction variable 
between fund age and family size (0.354) suggests that young funds in small fund families have 
more incentives to stay with their brokerage firms. In Models 3 and 4, the commission ratio is the 
amount of commissions paid by Fund k to Broker i divided by the total amount of commission fees 
received by this broker from all funds in a given period. The results are consistent with those 
reported in Models 1 and 2. 
We also estimate the logit equation (1) using a pooled sample panel regression and report the 
results in Panel B of Table 2.8. All of the results are consistent with those reported in Panel A, with 
two minor changes. The first change is that the coefficients on brokerage age are negative and 
significant in Models 3 and 4, whereas in Panel A, the coefficient is significant only in Model 3. 
The second change is that the coefficients on broker reputation become positive and significant in 
Model 3 and 4. 
                                                             
9
 We double checked the IPO & SEO underwriting ranking data provided on the website of the Securities Association 
of China and found that the average annual turnover ratio of the top 10 brokerage firms is 38%, which indicates that 
four out of the top ten brokerage firms drop out of the list each year, and even for those staying in the top 10 during two 
consecutive years, their rankings often change significantly. For instance, from 2008 to 2009, one bank dropped 8 
rankings, from 2nd to 10th, and another bank rose from 8th to 3rd. This evidence indicates that the underwriting 
business changes dramatically from year to year, and a significant reputation effect is yet to be formed in China. 
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Table 2.8 Logit Regression of Stable Relationships on Commission Fee and Other Control Variables  
The dependent variable takes a value of 1 if Broker i and Fund k are stably related based on the definition in Section 3.2 
and 0 otherwise. Independent variables are defined as follows. Commission ratio1 is the amount of commission paid by 
Fund k to Broker i (Commissioni,k) divided by the total amount of commission fees paid by this fund to all brokers in a 
given period; Commission ratio2 is Commissioni,k divided by the total amount of commission fees received by this 
broker from all funds in a given period. Mutual Ownership takes a value of 1 if Fund k’s management company and 
Broker i are owned by the same company or Broker i is one of the owners of Fund j’s management company and 0 
otherwise. Broker firm variables include Broker age, broker firm size measured by Log(Net Cap), the number of 
analysts working for the broker firm, and broker reputation measured by its market share of IPO underwriting. Fund 
variables include Fund age, Fund size measured by Fund k’s net asset value, and fund family size (Family size) 
measured by the total net asset value of all funds in the fund family. Panel A reports Fama-Macbeth Logit Regression 
with Newey-West adjusted standard error and with one period lag, and the numbers in parentheses are t-statistics. Panel 
B reports pooled panel regressions and the numbers in parentheses are Wald Chi-squares. 
***
, 
**
, and 
*
 indicate 
significance of 0.01, 0.05 and 0.1 levels, respectively. 
Panel A: Fama-Macbeth logit regression with Newey-West adjusted standard error and with one period lag 
 Model (1) Model (2)  Model (3) Model (4) 
Commission Ratio1 14.28
***
 
(34.2) 
14.31
***
 
(35.3) 
  
Commission Ratio2   12.92
***
 
(8.83) 
12.96
***
 
(8.88) 
Mutual ownership 1.365
***
 
(14.4) 
1.379
***
 
(15.0) 
1.800
***
 
(17.9) 
1.820
***
 
(19.7) 
Log (1+Broker age) 
-0.156 
(-1.17) 
-0.146 
(-1.06) 
-0.278
**
 
(-1.90) 
-0.251 
(-1.57) 
Log(net cap) 
0.308
***
 
(4.53) 
0.305
***
 
(4.43) 
0.419
***
 
(4.04) 
0.412
***
 
(3.89) 
Log (1+N of analysts) 
1.177
***
 
(11.1) 
1.180
***
 
(11.0) 
1.613
***
 
(10.5) 
1.611
***
 
(10.4) 
Broker reputation 
-0.316 
(-0.47) 
-0.127 
(-0.20) 
0.646 
(0.66) 
0.875 
(0.95) 
Log (1+Fund age) 
-0.400
***
 
(-3.46) 
0.940 
(0.93) 
-0.251
*
 
(-2.03) 
1.962 
(1.04) 
Log(Fund size) 
0.550
***
 
(6.62) 
0.856
***
 
(9.73) 
0.339
***
 
(6.08) 
0.593
***
 
(7.37) 
Log (Family size) 
-0.193
***
 
(-5.68) 
-0.561
***
 
(-6.18) 
-0.155
***
 
(-5.32) 
-0.420
***
 
(-4.54) 
Log (1+Fund age) x 
Log(Fund size) 
 -0.299
***
 
(-3.88) 
 -0.269
**
 
(-2.21) 
Log (1+Fund age) x  
Log(Family size) 
 0.354
***
 
(4.67) 
 0.247
**
 
(2.71) 
Intercept -19.1
***
 
(-16.2) 
-20.3
***
 
(-14.7) 
-17.2
***
 
(-14.9) 
-18.8
***
 
(-13.1) 
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Table 2.8 (Continued): 
Panel B: Pooled sample logit regressions 
 Model (1) Model (2) Model (3) Model (4) 
Commission Ratio1 14.72
***
 
(8049.2) 
14.65
***
 
(7950.0) 
  
Commission Ratio2   13.01
***
 
(1337.2) 
12.96
***
 
(1321.2) 
Mutual ownership 1.493
***
 
(683.9) 
1.484
***
 
(675.9) 
1.854
***
 
(1461.6) 
1.845
***
 
(1443.7) 
Log (1+Broker age) 
0.001 
(0.001) 
0.008 
(0.064) 
-0.121
***
 
(19.4) 
-0.109
***
 
(15.6) 
Log(net cap) 
0.380
***
 
(441.4) 
0.389
***
 
(452.9) 
0.464
***
 
(796.0) 
0.466
***
 
(799.0) 
Log (1+N of analysts) 
1.082
***
 
(1117.3) 
1.103
***
 
(1151.4) 
1.422
***
 
(2193.3) 
1.448
***
 
(2249.5) 
Broker reputation 
-0.043 
(0.125) 
-0.083 
(0.480) 
0.704
***
 
(48.8) 
0.694
***
 
(50.1) 
Log (1+Fund age) 
-0.490
***
 
(327.3) 
0.745 
(2.42) 
-0.462
***
 
(365.9) 
1.455
***
 
(12.4) 
Log(1+Fund size) 
0.396
***
 
(987.7) 
0.674
***
 
(468.4) 
0.269
***
 
(611.5) 
0.593
***
 
(485.3) 
Log (1+Family size) 
-0.251
***
 
(335.6) 
-0.572
***
 
(317.8) 
-0.237
***
 
(374.7) 
-0.568
***
 
(398.5) 
Log (1+Fund age) x 
Log(Fund size) 
 -0.251
***
 
(98.2) 
 -0.291
***
 
(180.7) 
Log (1+Fund age) x  
Log(Family size) 
 0.286
***
 
(125.2) 
 0.298
***
 
(171.2) 
Intercept -16.1
***
 
(2896.6) 
-17.6
***
 
(810.2) 
-15.0
***
 
(3127.6) 
-17.3
***
 
(1036.8) 
Likelihood ratio 21735.4 
(<.0001) 
21881.0 
(<.0001) 
13098.1 
(<.0001) 
13330.5 
(<.0001) 
N of Obs. 128131 128131 128131 128131 
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2.5.2 Business Inter-Dependence and Stable Business Relationships 
Maintaining a stable business relationship is a two-way selection process between a brokerage 
firm and its clients, and it needs to be mutually beneficial. Although receiving higher commission 
fees from client funds is directly beneficial for brokerage firms, it is certainly not in the best interest 
of the client funds. Thus, we use funds’ relative stock holdings to measure business 
inter-dependence between brokerage firms and their client funds. To the extent that funds’ 
shareholdings also affect their commission fees paid to brokerage firms, our shareholding measure 
is also an alternative measure of economic incentives. We modify logit regression (1) by replacing 
the commission ratio with the shareholding weight (Share weight) as follows: 
Prob(Stable𝑖,𝑘) = 𝑓(𝑆ℎ𝑎𝑟𝑒 𝑊𝑒𝑖𝑔ℎ𝑡𝑖,𝑘,𝑡, 𝑀𝑢𝑡𝑢𝑎𝑙 𝑂𝑤𝑛𝑒𝑟𝑠ℎ𝑖𝑝𝑖,𝑘.,𝑡, Broker Features𝑖,𝑡,  
                                                𝐹𝑢𝑛𝑑 𝐶ℎ𝑎𝑟𝑎𝑐𝑡𝑒𝑟𝑘,𝑡)                                                                                 (2.2) 
We compute Share weighti,k,t in two different ways. Share weight1i,k,t is computed as the total 
market value of equity, MVE (i.e., period-end price x the number of shares outstanding), of all 
stocks held by Fund k and covered by Broker i divided by the total MVE of all stocks covered by 
Broker i. A larger weight indicates a higher importance of Fund k to Broker i in the sense that more 
of this broker’s limited resources (i.e., analysts) are tied to the fund’s portfolio. The second 
shareholding measure, Share weight2i,k,t, is computed as the total market value of all stocks held by 
Fund k (i.e., period-end price x the number of shares held by Fund k) and covered by Broker i 
divided by the total amount of all stocks held by Fund k in a given period. A larger weight indicates 
a higher importance of Broker i to Fund k because the fund depends more on this broker with 
respect to research services and access to information concerning its portfolio composition. 
Table 2.9 reports the results of logit regression (2) estimated by Fama-MacBeth’s method with 
Newey-West adjusted standard errors and one period lag. The coefficients on Share weight1 and 
Mutual Ownership are all positive and significant at the 0.01 level in both Models 1 and 2, which 
indicates that when funds hold more stocks covered by a brokerage firm, they are more likely to 
maintain a stable business relationship with that brokerage firm. All of the other results are similar 
to the results in Table 2.8. In Models 3 and 4, the coefficients on Share weight2 are insignificant, 
but the results on all of the other variables remain consistent with those in Models 1 and 2. 
  
50 
 
Table 2.9 Logit Regression of Stable Relationships on Shareholding Weights and Other Control Variables 
This table reports Fama-Macbeth Logit Regression with Newey-West adjusted standard errors and one period lag. The 
dependent variable takes a value of 1 if Broker i and Fund k are stably related based on the definition in Section 3.2 and 
0 otherwise. Shareholding Weight1 is computed as the total market value of equity – MVE (i.e., period-end price x the 
number of shares outstanding) of all stocks held by Fund k and covered by Broker i divided by the total MVE of all 
stocks covered by Broker i. Shareholding Weight2 is calculated as the total amount of stocks by held Fund k (i.e. 
period-end price x number of shares held by Fund k) and covered by Broker i divided by the total amount of all stocks 
held by Fund k in a given period. Mutual Ownership takes a value of 1 if Fund k’s management company and Broker i 
are owned by the same company or Broker i is one of the owners of Fund j’s management company and 0 otherwise. 
Broker firm variables include Broker age, broker firm size measured by Log(Net Cap), the number of analysts working 
for the broker firm, and broker reputation that is measured by its market share of IPO underwriting. Fund variables 
include Fund age, Fund size measured by Fund k’s net asset value, and fund family size (Family size) measured by the 
total net asset value of all funds in Fund k’s family. The numbers in parentheses are t-statistics of Fama-MacBeth 
regressions. 
***
, 
**
, and 
*
 indicate significance of 0.01, 0.05 and 0.1 levels, respectively. 
 Model (1) Model (2) Model (3) Model (4) 
Shareholding Weight1 0.453
***
 
(3.27) 
0.414
***
 
(3.17) 
  
Shareholding Weight2   -0.023 
(-0.05) 
-0.016 
(-0.03) 
Mutual ownership 2.14
***
 
(26.2) 
2.16
***
 
(27.5) 
2.13
***
 
(21.9) 
2.15
***
 
(23.7) 
Log (1+Broker age) 
-0.198 
(-1.47) 
-0.198 
(-1.47) 
-0.232 
(-1.50) 
-0.230 
(-1.49) 
Log(net cap) 
0.391
***
 
(4.57) 
0.393
***
 
(4.63) 
0.365
***
 
(5.01) 
0.367
***
 
(5.05) 
Log (1+N of analysts) 
1.46
***
 
(11.1) 
1.47
***
 
(11.0) 
1.44
***
 
(16.8) 
1.44
***
 
(16.4) 
Broker reputation 
1.04 
(1.26) 
1.04 
(1.26) 
1.13 
(1.46) 
1.13 
(1.46) 
Log (1+Fund age) 
-0.248
**
 
(-2.06) 
1.66 
(1.02) 
-0.249
**
 
(2.05) 
2.17 
(1.14) 
Log(Fund size) 
0.375
***
 
(6.52) 
0.627
***
 
(9.76) 
0.407
***
 
(6.30) 
0.674
***
 
(8.56) 
Log (Family size) 
-0.160
***
 
(-5.10) 
-0.428
***
 
(-5.49) 
-0.170
***
 
(-5.67) 
-0.439
***
 
(-5.68) 
Log (1+Fund age) ×  
Log(Fund size) 
 -0.257
**
 
(-2.71) 
 -0.282
**
 
(-2.78) 
Log (1+Fund age) × 
Log(Family size) 
 0.251
***
 
(4.17) 
 0.253
***
 
(4.48) 
Intercept -17.3
***
 
(-17.3) 
-18.9
***
 
(-20.0) 
-17.2
***
 
(-17.2) 
-19.0
***
 
(-15.8) 
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We conduct three robustness tests. First, we estimate logit regression (2) using a pooled sample 
panel regression instead of Fama-MacBeth’s method; the coefficients on both Share weight1 and 
Share weight2 are positive and significant at the 0.01 level in all regressions regardless of whether 
the interaction variables are included. The only change in the pooled sample regressions is that the 
coefficients on fund age become positive when the interaction variables are included, but the 
interaction variable between fund age and fund size remains negative and significant. Second, we 
compute the shareholding weight using the number of shares instead of the amount of stock. The 
results are consistent with the results using the amount of stock; i.e., the coefficients on both Share 
weight1and Share weight2 are positive and significant at the 0.01 level in all of the pooled sample 
regressions, but only the coefficients on Share weight1 are positive and significant in the 
Fama-MacBeth regressions. Third, we calculate the shareholding weight as the total market value of 
all stocks held by Fund k and covered by Broker i divided by the total MV of all stocks covered by 
Broker i; the results are consistent with the results for Share weight2.
10
 In summary, the results 
indicate that brokerage firms and their client funds are more likely to maintain stable business 
relationships when the funds hold more stocks covered by the brokerage firms, when the brokerage 
firms have more resources, and when the funds and brokerage firms share an ownership affiliation 
with a third entity. In addition, the interest of maintaining a stable relationship is further heightened 
for young funds in small fund families. 
2.5.3 Industry Expertise and Stable Business Relationships 
Analysts’ industry expertise is an important factor in determining whether a brokerage firm wins 
underwriting business (Krigman et al., 2001; Liu and Ritter, 2011; Kadan et al., 2012). Thus, we 
conjecture that a brokerage firm’s industry experience also plays an important role in its client 
funds’ decision whether to maintain a stable relationship. We use the industry overlap ratio as a 
proxy for brokerage firms’ industry expertise, and the baseline logit regression is modified as 
follows: 
Prob(Stable𝑖,𝑘) = 𝑓(𝐼𝑛𝑑𝑢𝑠𝑡𝑟𝑦 𝑅𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑖,𝑘,𝑡, 𝑀𝑢𝑡𝑢𝑎𝑙 𝑂𝑤𝑛𝑒𝑟𝑠ℎ𝑖𝑝𝑖,𝑘.,𝑡, Broker Features𝑖,𝑡,  
                                                𝐹𝑢𝑛𝑑 𝐶ℎ𝑎𝑟𝑎𝑐𝑡𝑒𝑟𝑘,𝑡)                                                                                 (2.3) 
                                                             
10
 To save space, these results are omitted from the paper but are available from the authors upon request.  
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The first ratio, Industry ratio1i,k,t, is computed as the number of industries in which Broker i 
covers stocks and Fund k also holds stocks divided by the total number of industries in which 
Broker i covers stocks in a given period. In the second ratio, Industry ratio2i,k,t, the numerator is the 
same as the first ratio, but the denominator is the total number of industries in which Fund k holds 
stocks in a given period. As these ratios increase, so does the expertise and coverage the brokerage 
firm has in these industries, ceteris paribus. Table 2.10 reports the results of logit regression (3) 
estimated using the Fama-MacBeth cross-sectional regression. In Models 1 and 2, the coefficients 
on Industry ratio1 are positive, whereas the coefficients on Industry ratio2 are negative in Models 3 
and 4. However, all of these results are insignificant. The coefficients on all of the other variables 
are consistent with those reported in Tables 2.8 and 2.9. As an additional robustness test, we 
estimate regression (3) using pooled panel regressions. The unreported results show that the 
coefficients on the industry overlap ratios are mixed, but the results for the other variables remain 
consistent. 
2.6 Conclusions and Discussion 
Customer relationship management has attracted increased attention in recent years, and a large 
body of literature also shows that past business ties are one of the most important factors for 
investment banks and brokerage firms to win underwriting and trading business. However, limited 
empirical evidence exists on how a stable relationship between a brokerage firm and its client funds 
might affect the recommendations of the brokerage firm’s analysts, nor it is clear what factors 
motivate brokerage firms and their client funds to maintain stable relationships.  
In the current study, we use a newly available dataset that contains detailed information on 
commission payments for approximately 300 open-end equity funds and 77 brokers from June 2004 
to December 2012; the main results are summarized as follows.  
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Table 2.10 Logit Regression of Stable Relationships on Industry Overlaps and Other Control Variables 
This table reports Fama-Macbeth logit regressions with Newey-West adjusted standard errors and one period lag. The 
dependent variable takes a value of 1 if Broker i and Fund k are stably related based on the definition in Section 3.2 and 
0 otherwise. Industry overlap ratio1 is the number of industries in which Broker i covers stocks and Fund k holds stocks 
divided by the total number of industries in which Broker i covers stocks in a given period. For Industry overlap ratio2, 
the numerator is the same as Industry overlap ratio1, and the denominator is the total number of industries in which 
Fund k holds stocks in a given period. Mutual Ownership takes a value of 1 if Fund k’s management company and 
Broker i are owned by the same company or Broker i is one of the owners of Fund j’s management company and 0 
otherwise. Broker firm variables include Broker age, broker firm size measured by Log(Net Cap), the number of 
analysts working for the broker firm, and broker reputation that is measured by its market share of IPO underwriting. 
Fund variables include Fund age, Fund size measured by Fund k’s net asset value, and fund family size (Family size) 
measured by the total net asset value of all funds in Fund k’s family. The numbers in parentheses are t-statistics of 
Fama-MacBeth regressions. 
***
, 
**
, and 
*
 indicate significance of 0.01, 0.05 and 0.1 levels, respectively. 
 Model (1) Model (2) Model (3) Model (4) 
Industry Overlap Ratio1 0.268 
(1.44) 
0.234 
(1.22) 
  
Industry Overlap Ratio2   -0.119 
(-0.46) 
-0.121 
(-0.48) 
Mutual ownership 2.13
***
 
(24.9) 
2.15
***
 
(26.3) 
2.13
***
 
(24.9) 
2.14
***
 
(26.4) 
Log (1+Broker age) 
-0.240
*
 
(-1.77) 
-0.240
* 
(-1.76) 
-0.245
*
 
(-1.72) 
-0.243
*
 
(-1.72) 
Log(net cap) 
0.408
***
 
(5.01) 
0.410
***
 
(5.06) 
0.390
***
 
(5.03) 
0.392
***
 
(5.12) 
Log (1+N of analysts) 
1.43
***
 
(10.8) 
1.43
***
 
(10.8) 
1.49
***
 
(16.0) 
1.50
***
 
(15.7) 
Broker reputation 
0.683 
(0.79) 
0.690 
(0.80) 
0.787 
(0.90) 
0.796 
(0.90) 
Log (1+Fund age) 
-0.453
*
 
(-1.92) 
14.4 
(1.37) 
-0.433
*
 
(-1.79) 
14.1 
(1.37) 
Log(Fund size) 
0.383
***
 
(6.55) 
4.53
*
 
(1.87) 
0.396
***
 
(6.66) 
4.47
*
 
(1.88) 
Log (Family size) 
-0.156
***
 
(-5.27) 
-2.77
**
 
(-2.34) 
-0.159
***
 
(-5.45) 
-2.74
**
 
(-2.38) 
Log (1+Fund age) ×  
Log(Fund size) 
 -1.20
*
 
(-1.79) 
 -1.18
*
 
(-1.79) 
Log (1+Fund age) ×  
Log(Family size) 
 0.784
**
 
(2.36) 
 0.773
**
 
(2.40) 
Intercept -16.4
***
 
(-12.3) 
-69.2
*
 
(-1.89) 
-16.5
***
 
(-12.2) 
-68.2
*
 
(-1.88) 
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First, both the amount of commission fees that a broker receives from its client funds and the 
proportion of stocks held by the client funds and covered by the broker firm’s analysts are 
positively related to the recommendations of the broker’s analysts. Second, analysts issue more 
optimistic recommendations on stocks held by brokerage firms’ SRFs than on stocks held by other 
funds. However, we could not rule out the possibility that brokerage-related fund managers invest in 
advance of revisions in analyst recommendations. In other words, this means that the analysts might 
provide a signal to the fund managers before a recommendation is changed. Third, analysts increase 
(decrease) their recommendations on the stocks they cover when these stocks are added to (dropped 
from) the portfolios of the brokerage firms’ SRFs. Fourth, a higher proportion of commission fees 
that a broker firm receives from a client fund and the larger the fund size is, the higher the 
possibility is of maintaining a stable relationship. Fifth, brokerage firms’ resources measured by net 
capital and number of analysts are important factors for funds to maintain a stable relationship with 
the firms, and this is particularly true for young funds in small fund families. Finally, when funds 
and brokerage firms are affiliated with a third entity, they tend to maintain a stable relationship 
because of their additional aligned interests.  
This paper sheds light on the current literature by showing the important role of stable 
relationships between brokerage firms and their client funds in analyst recommendations and 
identifying the factors that motivate funds and brokerage firms to forge such stable business 
relationships. However, many issues need to be further explored in future studies. For example, our 
findings are based on a sample from only one emerging market; results from other emerging 
countries or developed markets could be different because of, for example, institutional features or 
different levels of market transparency and liquidity, competition, and government regulations. In 
addition, similar to most other empirical studies, the current paper relies solely on ex post evidence 
due to limited publicly available data. Any additional tests using direct evidence such as surveys or 
interviews with fund managers and brokerage firms would inevitably enhance our findings.
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 Economic Policy Uncertainty and Capital Structure Choice: Chapter 3
Evidence from China 
3.1 Introduction 
Due to the nature of policy decision-making and implementation processes, economic policies 
typically generate a large amount of uncertainty, which can impose profound impacts on the financial 
market and firm behaviour. Using various policy uncertainty measures, previous literature has 
explored the association of economic policy uncertainty with asset pricing (Pastor and Veronesi, 
2013; Brogaard and Detzel, 2012), corporate investment decisions (Julio and Yook, 2012; Gulen and 
Ion, 2013), and IPO activities (Colak et al., 2013). However, our understanding towards the effect of 
economic policy uncertainty on firms’ capital structure choices, a core research question in corporate 
finance, is still limited. Meanwhile, prior research in this area has rarely paid attention to emerging or 
transition economies, where the financial markets tend to be highly regulated and prone to the 
influence of government policies (Erb et al., 1996). 
As an attempt to fill this void, we propose the current study to empirically examine how 
economic policy uncertainty affects firms’ capital structure decisions in China — a typical emerging 
financial market. We find strong evidence that Chinese firms’ leverage ratios are negatively related to 
economic policy uncertainty, and that this effect is more pronounced for firms that are in regions with 
higher degrees of marketization, are non-state owned or have no prior bank-firm relationship. We also 
identify the underlying mechanism of this effect as the deterioration of the external financing 
environment caused by policy uncertainty. 
The idea that economic policy uncertainty may affect firms’ capital structures is not new. Indeed 
there are two alternative channels which are categorized by this study as the supply effect and demand 
effect. The main idea of the supply effect is that uncertainty in economic policies will deteriorate the 
external financing environment. When economic policy uncertainty increases, the information 
asymmetry between borrowers and creditors would become more severe and, at the same time, firms’ 
future cash flows would be more volatile — indicating higher default risk. Both of these effects can 
lead to higher external financing costs, with firms generally lowering their leverage ratios in seeking 
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for financial flexibility. In support of this idea, recent empirical studies on the U.S. financial market 
document that economic policy uncertainty increases the risk premium of municipal bonds (Gao and 
Qi, 2012), reduces the average leverage ratio of listed firms (Cao et al., 2013), and imposes additional 
costs and more stringent non-price terms on bank loan contracts at both aggregate and firm level 
(Francis et al., 2013). On the other hand, the demand effect refers to the scenario whereby firms 
reduce their financing demand in face of increasing policy uncertainty. Prior research documents that 
when firms face high political uncertainty, they will be more conservative in making investment 
decisions (Bernanke, 1983; Bloom et al., 2007) and lower their investment levels (Kang et al., 2014; 
Gulen and Ion, 2013; Wang et al., 2014). In summary, both channels assert a negative relationship 
between economic policy uncertainty and firms’ capital structures; however, it is difficult to identify 
the dominant effect. 
We choose Chinese listed firms as the experiment sample due to three considerations. First, as 
stated above, the limited research on this topic mainly focuses on the U.S. market; therefore our study 
in China can provide an “out-of-sample” test for the existing empirical results in a market with 
distinct institutional features which play key roles in affecting corporate capital decisions
11
. It is thus 
important to test whether the documented relationship between policy uncertainty and capital 
structure decisions holds in this market. Second, the regional divergences in institutional environment 
and firm heterogeneities, such as ownership structure and bank-firm relationships, are more typical in 
the Chinese financial market (Fan et al., 2011; Allen et al., 2009). These characteristics generate 
significant cross-sectional variations, which can deepen our understanding about the possible 
asymmetry of the policy uncertainty effect. Third, China is still regarded as a transition economy 
moving from a planned economy towards a market-based one. The primary source of financing in this 
market is bank loans (Allen, et al., 2005; Ayyagari, et al., 2010); with the bank loan environment 
being extremely sensitive to the changes in government policies
12
. Therefore, this provides us with an 
                                                             
11
 Although the Shanghai Stock Exchange and the Shenzhen Stock Exchange ranked as sixth and eleventh in the world in 
terms of market capitalization at the end of June 2012, transitions to a more mature market through a series of financial 
reforms and modernization are still going on in China, and distinct institutional features exist to potentially affect 
corporate capital structure decisions. The most important features include, the dominating role of state ownership in the 
Chinese capital market; explicit or implicit control of the volume and price of equity issuance; and banking as the primary 
source of financing. For more detailed discussions on these features, we refer readers to Change et al. (2014). 
12
 One recent example is that, in 2009, the Chinese central government proposed a stimulus plan amounting to 4 trillion 
RMB. In order to fund these investments, the government required banks to increase the supply of loans dramatically. As 
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ideal experimental setting to identify the possible channels through which economic policy 
uncertainty affects firms’ capital structure decisions. 
To measure economic policy uncertainty in China, we resort to Baker et al. (2013), in which they 
construct a scaled frequency count of articles about policy-related economic uncertainty in the South 
China Morning Post (SCMP) — Hong Kong's Leading English-language newspaper 13 . This 
economic policy uncertainty index for China (EPU hereinafter) follows the similar logic and 
methodology of the news-based index for the United States, which has a wide range of applications
14
. 
In a recent study, Wang et al. (2014) adopt the EPU index to investigate the influence of economic 
policy uncertainty on corporate investment in China. 
Figure 3.1 plots the monthly EPU index from January 1995 to December 2013, as well as the 
quarterly GDP growth rate from Quarter 1, 1995 to Quarter 4, 2013. The left Y-axis represents EPU 
and the right Y-axis measures GDP growth rate as a percentage. It is evident that the movement of 
EPU is volatile across time, which can help us better identify the effect of EPU on capital structures. 
An interesting observation from the figure is that EPU tends to bump when the GDP growth rate in its 
downturn, suggesting that the pressure from economy declining tends to push the government to 
adjust current policies. There are three peaks of EPU over the whole sample, which are in October 
2001, September 2008 and November 2011. One main factor that contributed to the 2001 peak was 
China’s entry into the WTO, which generated a large amount of uncertainty because economic 
policies needed to modify to meet the requirements of marketization. From 2008 to 2009, in face of 
the global financial crisis, the Chinese government issued a series of macroeconomic policies to 
stimulate the economy.  For the most recent peak, three factors contributed to the jump of 
uncertainty, including the Eurozone crisis, the government’s stimulus policies in the presence of 
declining economic growth, and the election in 2012. 
                                                                                                                                                                                                          
a result, the bank loans jumped from 4.9 trillion RMB in 2008 to 9.59 trillion RMB in 2009. 
13
 South China Morning Post (SCMP), founded in 1903, is the first and largest English-language Hong Kong newspaper 
published by the SCMP Group, with an annual circulation of 104,000. Its contents cover the news regarding Hong Kong, 
the mainland China and Asia. 
14
 For instance, Pastor and Veronesi (2013) use the EPU index for US to study the risk premium of political uncertainty in 
the financial market; Kang et al. (2014) relies on this index to examine the effect of political uncertainty on firm-level 
investment in U.S.; Colombo (2013) explores the impact of the U.S. EPU index on Eurozone macroeconomic aggregates. 
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Figure 3.1:  Historic behaviour of the EPU (01/1995-12/2013) 
 
 
 
 
 
Note:  This figure plots the monthly EPU from January, 1995 to December, 2013. We also plot the time series of quarterly GDP growth rate from Quarter 1, 1995 to Quarter 4, 2013. 
The left Y-axis represents EPU, and the right Y-axis represents GDP growth in percentage. The EPU is obtained from www.policyuncertainty.com, and the GDP growth data is from 
the CEIC China Database. 
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We apply the EPU index to a panel data of listed Chinese firms from Quarter 1, 2003 to Quarter 4, 
2013 in the empirical analysis. The estimation results show that when the lagged economic policy 
uncertainty increases, firm-level leverage ratios decrease on average. Moreover, we split the total 
leverage ratio into short-term leverage and long-term leverage ratios, and our results show that 
economic policy uncertainty is negatively associated with both measures.  
We then make two extensions to the baseline regression model. In the first extension, we find that 
firms from the higher marketized regions have greater leverage-uncertainty sensitivity. This result is 
consistent with the fact that, in China, bank lending decisions often experience intervention from local 
governments, especially in less marketized regions. In the second extension, we incorporate two 
featured firm heterogeneities, ownership and bank-firm relationship, into the regression analysis. The 
results show that firms owned by the state or those with a prior bank-firm relationship are better 
positioned to attenuate the negative impact of economic policy uncertainty on capital structures. These 
results are in accordance with the findings in the U.S. market, which indicate that firms with easier 
access to public debt markets are less sensitive to policy uncertainty (e.g., Cao et al., 2013) and provide 
preliminarily evidence for the supply effect. 
To further identify the underlying mechanism of the documented relationship between economic 
policy uncertainty and capital structures, we first control for the effect of investment changes. 
Specifically, we split our sample based on the absolute adjacent change rate of investment (0%-25%, 
25%-50% and 50%-100%), and estimate our empirical model in each of these three sub-samples. The 
results show that the negative effect of policy uncertainty holds across all the three sub-samples with 
qualitatively and quantitatively similar size. We further explore the impact of economic policy 
uncertainty on the supply of loans at the provincial level, and find that the increase in policy 
uncertainty leads to a significant decrease in the supply of loans. Consistent with the evidence on loan 
supply, we also find a strong positive relationship between the cost of debt and EPU. All the above 
results suggest that the supply effect is the dominant effect that shapes the role of economic policy 
uncertainty. 
Finally, we study the impact of EPU on the usage of trade credit. Since the financial development 
level in China is still low, commercial bank loans cannot satisfy firms’ overall financing demands. 
Therefore, the supporting effects from trade credit may exceed that of commercial bank loans, 
  
60 
 
especially for non-state firms (Allen et al., 2005; Ayyagari et al., 2010). In this sense, it is possible that 
firms would switch from bank loans to trade credit to meet their financing demands ceteris paribus. 
This conjecture is confirmed by our empirical results that the measures for trading credit are positively 
related to EPU. 
As aforementioned, concurrent studies on the U.S. market, particularly Cao et al. (2013), draw a 
similar conclusion that economic policy uncertainty and capital structures is negatively related. Given 
our sample firms are from a typical emerging market, our results complement those of the U.S. market. 
Further, our study is distinct from other studies in three significant ways. First, we take into account 
firm heterogeneities, including regional differences in marketization, ownership structures and 
bank-firm relationships, which are unique features of the Chinese financial market. Second, we find 
robust evidence that the effect of EPU is mainly sourced from the “supply” channel, rather than the 
“demand” channel. Third, our study is the first one that examines the relationship between EPU and 
the usage of trade credits. We conclude that firms tend to switch from bank loans (the formal finance) 
to trade credits (the informal finance) in the presence of increasing policy uncertainty. 
3.2 Sample selection and Variable Definitions 
3.2.1 Sample Data 
We use quarterly financial statement data for Chinese listed firms to examine the effect of economic 
policy uncertainty on corporate financing decisions. We also use quarterly data to explore more 
time-series variations following Leary and Roberts (2005). Since China Securities Regulatory 
Commission (CSRC) stipulates that all publicly listed firms should publish quarterly financial reports 
from 2003, our sample period starts from the first quarter of 2003 to the fourth quarter of 2013. Based 
on previous studies on capital structure, we exclude 43 financial firms which are specially regulated 
and usually have extremely high leverage ratios, and 53 “ST” (special treatment) or “PT” (particular 
transfer) firms that are particularly monitored due to their poor operating performances
15
. After the 
                                                             
15 Aiming at enhancing corporate governance and protecting investors' interests, the CSRC introduced a particular 
delisting mechanism in 1998. Under this mechanism, a firm that has negative profits for two consecutive years will be 
designated as “ST” firm. If a “ST” firm continues to generate a loss for one more year, then it will be classified as “PT” firm 
and will be delisted if it cannot make a profit within the following year. The shares of ST firms are traded with a 5% price 
change limit every day while it is 10% for normal firms. Beside of this, their semi-annual financial reports must be audited. 
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above filtering procedures, our final sample contains 2,038 public firms listed as A-shares. We obtain 
the accounting data from the China Stock Market and Accounting Research Database (CSMAR) 
created by the Guotai’an Information Technology Company (GTA) and the data regarding firm 
ownership is sourced from the Chinese Center for Economic Studies (CCER) Finance Database. In 
addition, we use macroeconomic data, including the amount of loans, investments and deposit amounts 
at the provincial level for 31 provinces, as well as the GDP growth rates, loan interest rates and deposit 
reserve rates at the national level, from the CEIC China Database. Finally, we use the EPU index from 
Baker et al. (2013) and we refer readers to the Appendix 3.1 for detailed procedure in constructing 
this index
16
. 
3.2.2 Empirical Model and Variable Definitions 
We examine the impact of economic policy uncertainty on capital structures using the following 
baseline empirical model: 
𝐿𝑒𝑣𝑒𝑟𝑎𝑔𝑒𝑖,𝑡 = 𝛼 + 𝛽1𝐸𝑃𝑈𝑡−1 + 𝛾𝑋𝑖,𝑡−1 + 𝜆𝐿𝑒𝑣𝑒𝑟𝑎𝑔𝑒𝑖,0 + ∑𝑄𝑢𝑎𝑟𝑡𝑒𝑟 + ∑ 𝐼𝑛𝑑𝑢𝑠𝑡𝑟𝑦 + 𝜀𝑖,𝑡                          (3.1)  
where Leverage is the book leverage ratio, defined as total debt scaled by total assets
17
. We exclude the 
market leverage ratio in the current study due to the fact that before 2007, a large fraction of the shares 
of Chinese listed firms were non-tradable. Therefore, the market value of the firm is hard to measure 
accurately and difficult to compare between the pre-2007 and post-2007 periods. 
EPU represents one-quarter lagged economic policy uncertainty. Since the index of Baker et al. 
(2013) is monthly based, we adjust it to a quarterly observation following Gulen and Ion (2013), i.e.  
EPUt=(3EPUm+2EPUm-1+EPUm-2)/6. To scale it, we divide it by 100. X represents a set of one-quarter 
lagged control variables. Specifically, we include firm size, profitability, sales growth rate (∆Sales) and 
tangibility. We do not include Tobin’s Q to capture growth opportunity as in Rajan and Zingales (1995) 
and Huang and Song (2006) among others, due to the non-tradable shares issue mentioned above. 
Instead, we use the sales growth rate as a proxy following Petersen and Rajan (1997) and Love et al. 
                                                                                                                                                                                                            
Moreover, “PT” firms can only be traded on Friday, with a maximum of 5% upper boundary relative to last Friday's closing 
price, and there is no limit for price decrease (Bai, Liu, and Song, 2002). 
16
 Appendix 3.2 extracts important information from www.policyuncertainty.com. 
17
 The total debt in the Chinese context is primarily bank loans. Here, we have not included the accounts payables in 
calculating the total debt due to the consideration that policy uncertainty might impact the accounts payable (trade credit) 
differently from that of the bank loans. Thus, we study this particular effect separately in the later empirical analysis. 
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(2007). Leveragei,0 defines firm i’s initial leverage ratio and it is included as Lemmon et al. (2008) 
show that the variation in capital structures is primarily determined by factors that remain stable for 
long periods of time. Zhou and Xu (2012) also find that the initial leverage ratio relates positively to 
the future leverage ratio for Chinese firms. Lastly, we include quarter fixed effect and industry fixed 
effect to control for overall macroeconomic factors over time, seasonality in corporate financing 
decisions, and industry characteristics. Industry is defined based on the 22 industries classifications 
made by the CSRC. 
To measure the impact of the institutional environment and firm heterogeneities on the sensitivity 
of leverage to EPU, we include the interaction terms of marketization index, ownership and bank-firm 
relationship with EPU in the expanded models. We derive the marketization index for 31 provinces 
from Fan et al. (2011), who construct this index based on the degree of economic development, legal 
system and government intervention
18
. A higher score of the marketization index suggests better 
institutional development. Ownership is a categorical variable coded as 1 when the ultimate owner of 
the firm is the government or the state-owned Assets Supervision and Administration Commission, 
and is 0 otherwise. We define the bank-firm relationship based on whether the firm has a long-term 
loan contract with the bank, following Houston and James (1996) and Hao et al. (2013). Specifically, 
the bank-firm relationship is a categorical variable that equals 1 if the firm has a long-term loan 
contract in the prior year, and is 0 otherwise. We hand-collect this information from the appendences of 
the annual financial reports released on the Shenzhen Securities Information Company website from 
2003 to 2011
19
. We exclude the loans from the three policy banks, i.e. the China Development Bank, 
The Export-Import Bank of China and the Agricultural Development Bank of China. All the financial 
ratio variables are adjusted by the inflation rate and winsorized at the 0.5% and 99.5% levels. We refer 
readers to Appendix 3.2 for detailed definitions of each of the variables used in this paper. 
3.3 Summary Statistics 
Table 3.1 provides the descriptive statistics of the key variables at the firm-quarter level used in our 
                                                             
18
 This marketization index is compiled by the National Economic Research Institute of China. This index intends to 
capture the regional market development (including relationship between government and markets, development of 
non-state-owned sector in the economy, development of product markets, development of factor markets, and development 
of market intermediaries and legal environment (Wang et al., 2014). 
19
 Found at www.cninfo.com.cn. 
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empirical analysis. The quarterly EPU has a mean of 1.280, with the 25% quantile at 0.752 and the 
75% quantile at 1.634 — suggesting that the variation of policy uncertainty is not smooth. The 
quarterly Leverage is 52.2% on average, but can be as low as 3.50% and as high as 2.877 as well. It is 
also interesting to find that the Initial leverage shares a similar distribution with Leverage. The 
Ownership dummy has a mean of 0.387, implying that more firms are non-state owned in our sample. 
Meanwhile, the average percentage of firms that have a prior relationship with bank is 59.80%. The 
marketization index has a mean of 10.511 and standard deviation of 2.657. The maximum is 15.244, 
while the minimum is 0.730, indicating that the divergence of institutional development across 
different regions is considerable. 
 
Table 3.1 Summary statistics 
This table provides the descriptive statistics for the variables used in this paper. EPU is the China economic policy 
uncertainty index of Baker et al. (2013). We use the geometric mean method to transform it into quarterly data, then 
divided by 100. Leverage is the book leverage. Initial Leverage is the first observation of the book leverage of a firm. 
Trade credit is measured as the ratio of account payable to total asset. Profitability is the net income scaled by total 
assets. Size is the log of total assets. Tangibility is the tangible asset after depreciation and depreciation provision scaled 
by total assets. ∆ Sales is the sales growth rate. Sales revenue is the sales scaled by the total assets. Marketization index 
is from Fan et al. (2011). Ownership is a dummy variable which equals 1 when the firm is non-state owned and 0 
otherwise. Bank-firm relation is a dummy variable which equals 1 when the firm has a long-term loan contract with the 
commercial firm in the prior year, and 0 otherwise. All the variable are from Quarter 1,2003 to Quarter 4,2013, except for 
marketization index, which is from 2003 to 2011. All corporate financial ratio data is winsored by 0.5%. 
variables N Mean Std. Min 25 pctl Median 75 pctl Max 
EPU 72,010 1.28 0.672 0.540 0.752 1.01 1.63 3.23 
Leverage 67,536 0.522 0.304 0.035 0.350 0.509 0.651 2.88 
Initial leverage 71,975 0.414 0.242 0.035 0.262 0.394 0.531 2.88 
Profitability 67,535 0.034 0.054 -0.255 0.011 0.027 0.054 0.417 
Size 67,543 21.7 1.36 18.3 20.8 21.5 22.3 27.4 
Tangibility 67,352 19.9 1.70 4.64 19.0 19.9 20.9 27.2 
∆Sales 66,349 2E-5 10E-5 -10E-5 -0.1E-5 0 2E-5 100E-5 
Sales revenue 67,512 0.431 0.441 0 0.156 0.313 0.560 10.0 
Marketization 
index 
66,456 10.5 2.66 0.730 9.01 10.8 12.5 15.2 
Ownership 59,983 0.387 0.487 0 0 0 1 1 
Bank-firm 
relationship 
27,975 0.598 0.490 0 0 1 1 1 
Trade credit 66,288 0.088 0.092 0 0.036 0.068 0.118 5.98 
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3.4 Empirical Results 
3.4.1 Baseline Regression Results 
Table 3.2 presents the estimation results of our baseline empirical models for the whole sample. In the 
first column, we estimate the model using total Leverage as the dependent variable. The main 
explanatory variable of interest, namely the lagged EPU, is found to be negatively associated with 
Leverage at the 1% significance level. This finding is consistent with our main hypothesis that EPU 
can lead firms to decrease their debt financing due to the demand or supply effect.  
 
Table 3.2 The effect of economic political uncertainty on firm leverage (2003-2013) 
This table presents estimates from the baseline model using panel regressions. We analysis the effects of economic political 
uncertainty on book leverage, short-term leverage and long-term leverage. Leverage is the book leverage. Short-term Lev 
is the ratio of short-term loan (≤ 1 year) to total asset. Long-term Lev is the ratio of long-term loan (> 1 year) to total 
asset. All explanatory variables are one period lagged. The sample period is from Quarter 1, 2003 to Quarter 4, 2013. 
Standard deviations are reported in parentheses. *, ** and *** denote the significance at 1%, 5% and 10% respectively. 
 Leverage Short-term leverage Long-term leverage 
EPU -0.003
**
 
(0.001) 
-0.012
***
 
(0.001) 
-0.002
***
 
(0.001) 
Initial leverage 0.516
***
 
(0.005) 
0.192
***
 
(0.003) 
0.041
***
 
(0.002) 
Profitability -1.293
***
 
(0.021) 
-0.618
***
 
(0.012) 
-0.023
***
 
(0.007) 
Sales revenue 0.027
***
 
(0.003) 
0.0003 
(0.001) 
-0.022
***
 
(0.0004) 
Size  0.017
***
 
(0.001) 
-0.011
***
 
(0.001) 
0.045
***
 
(0.001) 
Tangibility  0.089
***
 
(0.006) 
0.089
***
 
(0.004) 
0.118
***
 
(0.002) 
∆Sales  0.406*** 
(0.087) 
-0.218
***
 
(0.051) 
0.105
***
 
(0.030) 
Intercept  -0.050
***
 
(0.019) 
0.385
***
 
(0.011) 
-0.504
***
 
(0.007) 
Quarter-fixed effect Yes Yes Yes 
Industry-fixed effect Yes Yes Yes 
Adjusted 𝑅  27.5% 16.6% 29.2% 
Observations 62,403 62,391 62,124 
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For the control variables, profitability is negatively correlated with the leverage ratio, and this 
finding is consistent with the pecking order theory and existing capital structure studies about China. 
In accordance with the trade-off theory, Size relates positively with leverage as the bankruptcy 
probability of large firms is low. Using the same measure for size, Bhabra et al. (2008) and Zou and 
Xiao (2006) have drawn the same conclusion. Tangibility is found to be positively associated with 
leverage, and is thus consistent with the prediction of the trade-off theory too, as firms with higher 
tangible assets are prone to have lower distress costs and fewer agency problems. Variable ∆Sales, a 
proxy for growth opportunity, is positively correlated with the leverage ratio. Though this is contrary to 
the predictions of the trade-off theory, this result is consistent with the feature of Chinese financial 
markets, in which firms with considerable growth opportunity rely primarily on bank loans to finance 
their projects (due to strict restrictions on equity issuance)
20
. Notably, the Initial leverage is positively 
associated with the leverage ratio, confirming the role of initial leverage in shaping the capital 
structure, as addressed by Lemmon et al. (2008). 
In the second and third columns, we replace total Leverage with long-term leverage and 
short-term leverage, respectively. The results show that EPU relates negatively to both measures of 
leverage, though the magnitude is more pronounced for the short-term measure. Collectively, the 
baseline regression estimates provide strong evidence that economic policy uncertainty has a negative 
relationship with firms' future capital structures. 
3.4.2 Impact of Regional Divergence of Marketization 
A typical phenomenon in China is that the degree of institutional development is uneven across regions 
and provinces (Fan et al., 2011). In addition, the performance assessment of local government officials 
mainly focuses on the performance of local firms. So it is common that local governments tend to 
intervene to claim more bank loans for their local firms, especially in the areas with low degrees of 
marketization. Therefore, the financing contract relation based on profit maximization between firms 
and banks is destroyed. As a consequence, the borrowing decision of banks would become less 
sensitive to the overall market condition in regions with lower degrees of marketization (Fang, 2007). 
                                                             
20
 Empirically, in existing capital structure research on China, the conclusions depend on the choice of proxy for growth 
opportunity. When Tobin's Q is used as the proxy, the coefficients generally become negative (Huang and Song, 2006; 
Bhabra et al., 2008). 
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In the spirit of this reasoning, we thus hypothesise that the impact of EPU on capital structures will be 
less significant for firms in areas with lower degree of marketization.  
To test this conjecture, we first split our sample into a high marketization sub-sample and a low 
marketization sub-sample based on the median of the marketization index of Fan et al. (2011), and run 
the baseline regressions in both sub-samples. The results, reported in the first two columns in Table 
3.3, show that the corporate leverage ratio for firms in the high and low marketization groups exhibit 
no significant difference and the coefficients on EPU are still significant and negative. Given that the 
naïve sample splitting (i.e. based on the median value) may not reveal much information, in the third 
column we create three marketization dummy variables based upon the 25, 50, and 75 quantiles of the 
index, and interact them with the EPU variable. Results in the third column show a clear pattern 
indicating that firms from lower marketized provinces are less sensitive to EPU, as the coefficients of 
the interaction dummies (which are 0.023, 0.017 and 0.002, respectively), are larger for lower quintile 
dummies. This finding thus confirms our conjecture that government intervention would mitigate the 
impact of economic policy uncertainty, and is also consistent with the result of Wang et al. (2014), who 
document that the corporate investment of Chinese firms in higher marketized regions are more 
sensitive to policy uncertainty
21
. 
3.4.3 Impact of Ownership and Bank-Firm Relationship 
The financial system in China remains under the control of the government to a large extent, even 
though there have been major economic and political reforms in recent decades. One typical feature of 
this system is that most commercial banks are owned by the government, while the government also 
holds majority ownership of the state firms. This political connection ensures that state firms tend to 
have a priority for loans from the commercial banks
22
. Meanwhile, banks are associated with a lower 
sensitivity of loan issuance to the default risk of state firms according to Hao et al. (2013). Therefore, it 
is natural to predict that the impact of economic policy uncertainty will be mitigated for firms that are 
stated owned. However, on the other hand, the exposure of firms with different ownership structures to 
                                                             
21
 Therefore, another possible explanation of our results is that the less sensitivity of capital structure to EPU in less 
marketized regions sources from the investment channel, i.e. the demand effect. We leave this question for further analysis 
in the Section 3.4. 
22
 There are various reasons for this kind of preference including political interest, information cost and government 
guarantee among others (Brandt and Li, 2003). 
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policy uncertainty risk may also be different; as state owned firms are more politically connected, they 
are assumed to bear more political risk. Consequently, the impact of EPU on capital structures may be 
more pronounced for state owned firms. For instance, Cao et al. (2013) find that in the U.S., firms that 
have less policy risk exposure are less sensitive to the economic policy uncertainty index. 
To empirically identify the impact of ownership, we introduce interaction term of the Ownership 
variable with EPU in the baseline regression model. In the first column of Table 3.4, we find that the 
coefficient on EPU is significantly negative, while the interaction terms between EPU and Ownership 
is significant and positive, suggesting that the negative effect of EPU on capital structure is attenuated 
for firms that are stated owned.  
 
Table 3.3 The impact of marketization on the effect of economic political uncertainty (2003-2013) 
This table presents the analysis of marketization on the effect of economic political uncertainty on capital structures. 
Marketize are dummy variables based upon 25%, 50% and 75% quantiles of the marketization index in every year. 
Variable definitions are provided in Appendix 1. The sample period is from Quarter 1, 2003 to Quarter 4, 2013. Standard 
errors are reported in parentheses. 
*
,
** 
and 
***
 denote the significance at 1%, 5% and 10% levels, respectively. 
 Low marketization 
(  e  a ) 
High marketization 
(  e  a ) 
Various degree of marketization 
EPU -0.007
***
 
(0.002) 
-0.008
***
 
(0.004) 
-0.012
***
 
(0.003) 
EPU*Marketize(>p25,    ) 
  
0.023
***
 
(0.003) 
EPU*Marketize(>p50,    ) 
  
0.017
***
 
(0.003) 
EPU*Marketize(>p75) 
  
0.002 
(0.003) 
Initial leverage 0.488
***
 
(0.006) 
0.550
***
 
(0.007) 
0.506
***
 
(0.004) 
Profitability  -1.27
***
 
(0.027) 
-1.18
***
 
(0.033) 
-1.21
***
 
(0.021) 
Sales revenue 0.030
***
 
(0.003) 
0.008
*
 
(0.005) 
0.027
***
 
(0.003) 
Size  0.030
***
 
(0.001) 
0.005
***
 
(0.002) 
0.018
***
 
(0.001) 
Tangibility  0.047
***
 
(0.007) 
0.088
***
 
(0.010) 
0.088
***
 
(0.006) 
∆Sales  0.699*** 
(0.109) 
0.401
***
 
(0.136) 
0.416
***
 
(0.085) 
Intercept  -0.287
***
 0.196
***
 -0.070
***
 
Quarter-fixed effect Yes Yes Yes 
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Industry-fixed effect Yes Yes Yes 
Adj. R
2
 25.6% 27.8% 27.5% 
N of Obs. 35,859 25,512 61,371 
Table 3.4 The impact of ownership and bank-firm relationship on the effect of economic policy uncertainty   
This table presents the analysis of the impact of ownership and bank-firm relationship on the effect of economic policy 
uncertainty. Variable definitions are provided in Appendix 1. The sample period is from Quarter 1, 2003 to Quarter 4, 
2013 for the model using ownership, and is from Quarter 1, 2003 to Quarter 4, 2011 for the model using bank-firm 
relation. Standard errors are reported in parentheses.
 *
,
** 
and
 ***
denote the significance at 1%, 5% and 10% levels, 
respectively. 
 Leverage 
EPU -0.004
**
 
(0.002) 
-0.042
***
 
(0.003) 
Ownership*EPU 0.003
*
 
(0.002) 
 
Bank-firm relationship*EPU 
 
0.045
***
 
(0.002) 
Initial leverage 0.533
***
 
(0.005) 
0.485
***
 
(0.006) 
Profitability -1.247
***
 
(0.022) 
-1.077
***
 
(0.032) 
Sales revenue 0.024
***
 
(0.003) 
0.040
***
 
(0.004) 
Size  0.013
***
 
(0.001) 
0.015
***
 
(0.002) 
Tangibility  0.084
***
 
(0.007) 
0.039
***
 
(0.010) 
∆Sales  0.377*** 
(0.092) 
0.304
***
 
(0.131) 
Constant  -0.009 
(0.021) 
0.020 
(0.034) 
Quarter-fixed effect Yes Yes 
Industry-fixed effect Yes Yes 
Adjusted 𝑅  27.3% 34.7% 
N of Obs. 55,052 24,066 
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Besides the ownership structure, we also examine the impact of the bank-firm relationship. If 
policy uncertainty affects capital structures through the supply effect, i.e. decreasing loan supply and 
rising financing cost, it is natural to predict that this effect will be weaker for firms maintaining a 
relationship with banks — possibly due to less severe information asymmetry. Following Houston and 
James (1996) and Hao et al. (2013), we define the bank-firm relationship depending on whether a firm 
has any long-term loan contract in the prior year. We then augment the baseline model by interacting 
the bank-firm relation variable with EPU. The estimation result reported in the second column of Table 
3.4 shows that the bank-firm relationship indeed mitigates the negative effect of EPU significantly. 
Overall, in this section, we find that the impact of policy uncertainty on firms with different 
financing capabilities and constraints are not symmetric. Our findings are also consistent with studies 
in U.S., which document that the impact of economic policy uncertainty on firm financing decisions is 
less significant for firms with public debt access
23
.  
3.4.4 Further Interpretations 
All the results above provide strong evidence that uncertainty in economic policy does have a negative 
impact on firms’ capital structure decisions in China. In this section, we conduct three experiments to 
help identify the possible channels through which EPU exerts its impact. 
3.4.4.1 Controlling for Investment Change 
It is widely documented by previous studies that policy uncertainty is negatively associated with 
corporate investment levels due to increasing discount rates (e.g. Gulen and Ion, 2013; Kang et al., 
2014; Wang et al., 2014). Therefore, it is possible that the significant sensitivity of capital structure 
towards policy uncertainty is driven by decreasing financing needs (demand effect) rather than the 
direct impact on the financing environment (supply effect). As a response, in this section, we first 
control for the change of investment in our empirical analysis. Specifically, we create three dummy 
variables based upon the 25, 50, and 75 quantiles of the absolute rate of investment ratio change 
(Cap.exp
24
), each of which is interacted with the EPU variable. If the decreasing investment caused by 
EPU is the main contributor for capital structure choice, we would see that the sensitivity of capital 
                                                             
23
 However, though the results are consistent with the supply effect hypothesis, we cannot rule out the demand effect. 
24 Cap.ex (investment) is defined as the ratio of capital expenditure to total assets in the last period. Capital expenditure is 
measured as the sum of cash paid for the acquisition of fixed assets, intangible assets and other long-term assets. 
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structure to EPU is less significant for firms with smaller variations in investments. However, the 
empirical results reported in Table 3.5 show that the coefficients of the interaction terms are 
insignificant. This finding, though preliminary, provides some evidence that the demand effect may 
not be the dominating effect shaping the role of EPU on firms' capital structure choices. This thus 
inspires us to explore the supply effect in the following context. 
 
Table 3.5 Control for investment change rate (2003-2013) 
This table presents the estimates from the baseline model using the subsample controlling for investment change rate 
(Absolute value of change rate of Cap.ex lower than its 25% quintile, between 25% quintile and median, and greater than 
the median). The sample period is from Quarter 1, 2003 to Quarter 4, 2013. Standard errors are reported in parentheses. 
*
,
**
 and
 ***
denote the significance at 1%, 5% and 10% levels, respectively. 
 Leverage 
EPU -0.006
***
 
(0.002) 
EPU*∆Cap.ex (≦p25) -0.0001 
(0.002) 
EPU*∆Cap.ex (>p25,≦p50) 0.001 
(0.003) 
Initial leverage 0.488
***
 
(0.006) 
Profitability -1.307
***
 
(0.021) 
Sales revenue 0.030
***
 
(0.003) 
Size  0.023
***
 
(0.001) 
Tangibility  0.095
***
 
(0.006) 
∆Sales  0.509*** 
(0.086) 
Intercept -0.178
***
 
∆Cap.ex (≦p25)*Controls Yes 
∆Cap.ex (>p25,≦p50)*Controls Yes 
Quarter-fixed effect Yes 
Industry-fixed effect Yes 
Adjusted 𝑅  29.8% 
Observations 35,859 
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3.4.4.2 Impact of EPU on Loan Supply and Cost of Debt 
In this section, we examine two possibly related channels through which economic policy uncertainty 
may affect firms’ external financing environment — namely, the supply of bank loans and the cost of 
debt. This experiment will provide us with a general picture regarding whether economic political 
uncertainty generates financial frictions for Chinese firms.  
We first examine the relationship between the change of EPU and the loan supply at the 
provincial level with the following model: 
Δ𝐿𝑜𝑎𝑛𝑖,𝑡 = 𝛼 + 𝛽1Δ𝐸𝑃𝑈𝑡−1 + 𝛽 Δ𝐼𝑛𝑣𝑒𝑠𝑡𝑚𝑒𝑛𝑡𝑖,𝑡 + 𝛽3𝐷𝑒𝑝𝑜𝑠𝑖𝑡𝑖,𝑡−1 + 𝛽4𝐼𝑅𝑡−1 + 𝛽5𝐷𝑅𝑅𝑡−1 + 𝛽6𝐺𝐷𝑃𝑖,𝑡−1 
                     +∑𝑄𝑢𝑎𝑟𝑡𝑒𝑟 +∑𝑃𝑟𝑜𝑣𝑖𝑛𝑐𝑒 + 𝜀𝑖,𝑡                                                                                                           (3.2) 
where ΔLoani,t is the growth rate of loans in province i, which is used as a proxy for loan supply
25
; 
ΔEPU is the change rate of the EPU index; ΔInvestmenti is the investment growth rate in province i; 
ΔDepositi is the growth rate of deposits in province i; ΔIR is the growth rate of the national loan interest 
rate; ΔDRR is the growth rate of the deposit reserve rate; and GDPi is the GDP growth rate in province 
i. All the control variables are one quarter lagged. We also include the quarter fixed effects alone or 
together with the province fixed effects. 
From the estimation results reported in Panel A of Table 3.6, we can see that when the change rate 
of EPU increases, the loan supply in the provincial level decreases on average, indicating that the loans 
available for firms have reduced. Provided that bank loans are the most important source of funding for 
firms in China (Allen et al., 2005), it is not surprising to see that the reduction in loan supply would 
force firms to adjust their capital structures. 
What’s more, given that policy uncertainty has a negative impact on loan supply; it is natural to 
predict that it will increase the price of debt (cost of debt). In this sense, we then test whether EPU 
increases financing costs, with the empirical model as follows: 
𝐶𝑜𝑠𝑡 𝑜𝑓 𝐷𝑒𝑏𝑡𝑖,𝑡 = α + 𝛽1𝐸𝑃𝑈𝑡−1 + 𝛾𝑋𝑖,𝑡−1 +∑𝑄𝑢𝑎𝑟𝑡𝑒𝑟 +∑𝐼𝑛𝑑𝑢𝑠𝑡𝑟𝑦 + 𝜀𝑖,𝑡                                                        (3.3) 
                                                             
25 In the Chinese context, it is a reasonable proxy for loan supply as the interest rate has always been regulated in the 
financial markets. The market interest rate is much higher than the regulated one. Therefore, the amount of loan mainly 
represents the supply side effect of debt. 
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where the Cost of debti,t represents the average financing cost from debt for firm i in quarter t. Since the 
interest rate in every loan contract is not available, we instead use the amount of interest payment 
scaled by the total amount of debt in every quarter to proxy for the average financing cost; X refers to a 
set of one quarter lagged control variables, including the leverage ratio, firm size, profitability, 
tangibility, sales revenue and sales growth rate. We also include the quarter and industry fixed effects. 
The estimation results are reported in Panel B of Table 3.6. The coefficient of EPU is estimated to 
be 0.066, which is significant at the 1% level. This positive coefficient thus provides supportive 
evidence that policy uncertainty increases firms' financing costs. This finding is also consistent with 
the study of Gao and Qi (2012) who document that political uncertainty is positively associated with 
firms' public financing costs. Collectively, all the results in Table 3.6 show that EPU has deteriorated 
the external financing environment for Chinese firms, thus suggesting that the supply effect helps 
explain the sensitivity of capital structures towards policy uncertainty. 
 
Table 3.6 The effect of economic political uncertainty on loan supply and financial cost (2003-2013) 
Panel A and B present the estimates of the effect of economic political uncertainty on bank loan supply and firm's 
financing cost, respectively. The sample period is from Quarter 1, 2003 to Quarter 4, 2013. Standard errors are reported 
in parentheses. 
*
,
**
 and
 ***
 denote the significance at 1%, 5% and 10% levels, respectively. 
Panel A: ∆ oa  Panel B: Financing Cost 
∆ P   -0.016*** 
(0.004) 
-0.016
***
 
(0.004) 
EPU 0.066
***
 
(0.011) 
∆     0.0003 
(0.002) 
0.001 
(0.002) 
Initial leverage -0.928
***
 
(0.032) 
∆ e os t  0.055* 
(0.032) 
0.020 
(0.032) 
Profitability 0.342
*
 
(0.176) 
∆    -0.236*** 
(0.017) 
-0.239
***
 
(0.017) 
Sales revenue 0.347
***
 
(0.021) 
∆     0.020 
(0.018) 
0.024 
(0.018) 
Size  -0.025
***
 
(0.006) 
GDP 0.001
***
 
(0.0003) 
0.001
***
 
(0.0003) 
Tangibility  -0.588
***
 
(0.046) 
 
  
∆Sales  1.059 
(0.685) 
Intercept -0.060
*
 -0.036 Intercept 1.204
***
 
Quarter-fixed effect Yes Yes Quarter-fixed effect Yes 
Industry-fixed effect  Yes Industry-fixed effect Yes 
Adjusted 𝑅  36.3% 37.2% Adjusted 𝑅  9.0% 
Observations 1,152 1,152 Observations 54,370 
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3.4.4.3 Impact of EPU on the Usage of Trade Credit 
Besides the loans from commercial banks, trade credit is an important informal financing channel, 
especially for firms in developing countries (Petersen and Rajan, 1997; Fisman and Love, 2003). In the 
presence of bank discrimination, trade credit has also been widely used by Chinese firms as a substitute 
for bank loans to meet their financing demands (Ge and Qiu, 2007; Allen et al., 2005)
26
. As we have 
shown, policy uncertainty has deteriorated firms' external financing environments; how firms would 
adjust their financing structures is an important and interesting question. In this sense, we are going to 
examine the relationship between EPU and the usage of trade credit with the following specification: 
𝑇𝐶𝑖,𝑡 = 𝛼 + 𝛽1𝐸𝑃𝑈𝑡−1 + 𝛾𝑋𝑖,𝑡−1 +∑𝑄𝑢𝑎𝑟𝑡𝑒𝑟 + ∑ 𝐼𝑛𝑑𝑢𝑠𝑡𝑟𝑦 + 𝜀𝑖,𝑡                                                                                     (3.4)  
where TCi,t represents one of two measures for the usage for trade credit. First, following Fisman and 
Love (2003), we define TC as the accounts payable scaled by total assets. Second, to capture the 
relative importance of trade credit compared to debt, we construct another variable (TC-debt ratio) 
as 
𝑇𝐶
𝑇𝐶+𝐿𝑒𝑣𝑒𝑟𝑎𝑔𝑒
; X is a set of lagged control variables, including firm size, profitability, tangibility, 
leverage, sales revenue and sales growth rate. We also incorporate the quarter and industry fixed 
effects. 
As reported in Table 3.1, the mean value of TC is 8.80%, about 1/6 of the leverage ratio — 
suggesting that the scale of trade credit used by Chinese firms is non-negligible. We present the 
estimation results in Table 3.7. In the first column, we find that TC is positively associated with EPU, 
indicating that in the event of increasing policy uncertainty, firms tend to raise their usage of trade 
credit on average. Further, we also document a positive relationship between the TC-debt ratio and 
EPU in the second column. This result suggests that the weight of trade credit in firms’ financing plans 
increase with policy uncertainty. Overall, our results confirm the role of trade credit in financing and 
suggest that Chinese firms would adjust their capital structures in response to economic policy 
uncertainty. Further, the positive association between EPU and the usage of trade credit also provides 
support for the supply effect instead of the demand effect, given that the financing cost of trade credit is 
actually higher than that of bank loans (Ge and Qiu, 2007; Petersen and Rajan, 1997). Nevertheless, 
                                                             
26
 According to the study of Ge and Qiu (2007), compared to state owned firms, non-state owned firms use more trade credit, and this 
higher usage is primarily for financing rather than transactional purposes. 
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due to the higher financing cost of trade credit and the fact that it is tied to the purchase of goods with 
less flexibility, the role of trade credit in attenuating the impact of EPU on capital structure may still be 
limited. 
3.4.5 Robustness Checks  
To ensure our results are robust to sample selection bias, outliers and endogeneity issues, we conduct 
several robustness checks in this section. 
Table 3.7 The effect of economic political uncertainty on trade credit usage (2003-2013) 
This table presents the analysis of the effect of economic political uncertainty on firms’ usage of trade credit. Variable 
definitions are provided in Appendix 1. The sample period is from Quarter 1, 2003 to Quarter 4, 2013. Standard errors are 
reported in parentheses. 
*
,
**
 and 
*** 
denote the significance at 1%, 5% and 10% levels, respectively. 
 TC TC-debt ratio 
EPU 0.001
**
 
(0.001) 
0.011
**
 
(0.001) 
Leverage  0.088
***
 
(0.001) 
-0.154
***
 
(0.004) 
Profitability -0.121
***
 
(0.007) 
-0.011
***
 
(0.021) 
Sales revenue 0.504
***
 
(0.001) 
0.143
***
 
(0.003) 
Size  0.003
***
 
(0.0003) 
0.007
***
 
(0.001) 
Tangibility  -0.041
***
 
(0.002) 
-0.248
***
 
(0.006) 
∆Sales  0.060** 
(0.030) 
0.304
***
 
(0.083) 
Intercept -0.080
***
 0.051
***
 
Quarter-fixed effect Yes Yes 
Industry-fixed effect Yes Yes 
Adjusted 𝑅  27.3% 20.1% 
Observations 62,150 55,809 
3.4.5.1 Excluding Utility Firms 
In our sample selection, we have excluded the financial firms and the “ST”/ “PT” firms. To further 
clean the sample, we exclude firms from the utility industries. In the Chinese context, the utility 
industries defined in this paper are the hydraulic industry, environmental industry and public 
management industry. We report the baseline regression results in Table 3.8. The results show that the 
exclusion of the firms from the utility industries has not affected the robustness of our results. 
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Table 3.8 Robustness Check 1: The effect of economic political uncertainty on firm leverage excluding utility firms 
(2003-2013) 
This table presents the estimates from the baseline model using panel regressions. We analyze the effect of economic 
political uncertainty on book leverage, short-term leverage and long-term leverage. The sample period is from Quarter 1, 
2003 to Quarter 4, 2013. Utility firms are excluded. Standard errors are reported in parentheses. 
*
,
**
 and 
***
 denote the 
significance at 1%, 5% and 10% levels, respectively. 
 Leverage  Short-term leverage Long-term leverage 
EPU -0.004
**
 
(0.001) 
-0.012
***
 
(0.001) 
-0.001
**
 
(0.001) 
Initial Leverage  0.517
***
 
(0.004) 
0.194
***
 
(0.003) 
0.043
***
 
(0.002) 
Profitability -1.35
***
 
(0.020) 
-0.632
***
 
(0.012) 
-0.053
***
 
(0.007) 
Sales revenue 0.028
***
 
(0.003) 
0.003
*
 
(0.002) 
-0.022
***
 
(0.003) 
Size  0.018
***
 
(0.001) 
-0.011
***
 
(0.0005) 
0.022
***
 
(0.0003) 
Tangibility  0.094
***
 
(0.006) 
0.091
***
 
(0.004) 
0.114
***
 
(0.002) 
∆Sales  0.483*** 
(0.086) 
-0.227
***
 
(0.052) 
0.070
***
 
(0.031) 
Intercept -0.068
***
 0.387
***
 -0.444
***
 
Quarter-fixed effect Yes Yes Yes 
Industry-fixed effect Yes Yes Yes 
Adjusted 𝑅  28.7% 17.1% 28.6% 
Observations 61,474 61,461 61,202 
 
3.4.5.2 Excluding Observations with Leverage Greater Than One 
In our sample, the maximum value of the leverage ratio is 2.877. This is unusually high and could be 
due to an outlier problem
27
. As a robustness check, we drop firm-quarter observations if the ratio of 
book leverage is greater than one, following the approach of Baker and Wurgler (2002) and Kayhan 
and Titman (2007). We then re-estimate the baseline regression model. From the results presented in 
Table 3.9, the conclusion that the EPU negatively relates to the leverage ratio remains stable. 
                                                             
27
 We would like to thank an anonymous referee for pointing this out. 
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Table 3.9 Robustness Check 2: The effect of economic political uncertainty on firm leverage (leverage less than 1) 
(2003-2013) 
This table presents the estimates from the baseline model using panel regressions. We analyze the effect of economic 
political uncertainty on book leverage, short-term leverage and long-term leverage. The sample period is from Quarter 1, 
2003 to Quarter 4, 2013. Firms with leverage greater than 1 are excluded. Standard errors are reported in parentheses. 
*
,
**
 
and 
***
 denote the significance at 1%, 5% and 10% levels, respectively. 
 Leverage  Short-term leverage Long-term leverage 
EPU -0.011
***
 
(0.001) 
-0.011
***
 
(0.001) 
-0.002
***
 
(0.001) 
Initial Leverage  0.381
***
 
(0.003) 
0.140
***
 
(0.002) 
0.033
***
 
(0.002) 
Profitability -1.08
***
 
(0.015) 
-0.538
***
 
(0.011) 
-0.069
***
 
(0.008) 
Sales revenue 0.034
***
 
(0.002) 
-0.002
**
 
(0.001) 
-0.035
***
 
(0.001) 
Size  0.047
***
 
(0.001) 
-0.003
***
 
(0.0004) 
0.023
***
 
(0.0003) 
Tangibility  0.055
***
 
(0.004) 
0.082
***
 
(0.003) 
0.117
***
 
(0.002) 
∆Sales  0.506*** 
(0.058) 
-0.205
***
 
(0.044) 
0.078
***
 
(0.031) 
Intercept -0.655
***
 0.234
***
 -0.457
***
 
Quarter-fixed effect Yes Yes Yes 
Industry-fixed effect Yes Yes Yes 
Adjusted 𝑅  39.7% 14.8% 29.6% 
Observations 60,250 60,237 59,986 
 
3.4.5.3 Controlling for Regional Fixed Effects 
In Section 3.3.2, we document a strong pattern that indicated that marketization levels of different 
regions would affect the impact of EPU on capital structure decisions. It is possible that some 
unobservable features in the geographic location of the firms would contribute significantly to the 
impact of EPU
28
. In line with this argument, we conduct a robustness check by including the regional 
fixed effects in the baseline regions. The results reported in Table 3.10 clearly show that including the 
regional fixed effects has not affected our results qualitatively or quantitatively. 
                                                             
28
 We are grateful to an anonymous referee for this suggestion. 
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Table 3.10 Robustness Check 3: The effect of economic political uncertainty on firm leverage (with regional fixed 
effects) (2003-2013) 
This table presents the estimates from the baseline model using panel regressions. We analyze the effect of economic 
political uncertainty on book leverage, short-term leverage and long-term leverage. The sample period is from Quarter 1, 
2003 to Quarter 4, 2013. The province fixed effects are used as a robustness check. Standard errors are reported in 
parentheses. 
*
,
**
 and 
***
 denote the significance at 1%, 5% and 10% levels, respectively. 
 Leverage  Short-term leverage Long-term leverage 
EPU -0.003
**
 
(0.001) 
-0.011
***
 
(0.001) 
-0.002
***
 
(0.001) 
Initial Leverage  0.492
***
 
(0.004) 
0.183
***
 
(0.003) 
0.033
***
 
(0.002) 
Profitability -1.31
***
 
(0.020) 
-0.573
***
 
(0.012) 
-0.054
***
 
(0.008) 
Sales revenue 0.038
***
 
(0.003) 
-0.003
*
 
(0.002) 
-0.033
***
 
(0.001) 
Size  0.023
***
 
(0.001) 
-0.009
***
 
(0.0005) 
0.023
***
 
(0.0003) 
Tangibility  0.079
***
 
(0.006) 
0.097
***
 
(0.004) 
0.105
***
 
(0.002) 
∆Sales  0.470*** 
(0.082) 
-0.207
***
 
(0.050) 
0.053
***
 
(0.030) 
Intercept -0.198
***
 0.344
***
 -0.472
***
 
Quarter-fixed effect Yes Yes Yes 
Industry-fixed effect Yes Yes Yes 
Regional fixed effect Yes Yes Yes 
Adjusted 𝑅  30.2% 17.2% 31.1% 
Observations 60,724 60,724 59,517 
 
3.4.5.4 Using Annual Observations 
In the capital structure literature, the annual sample is more commonly used. Quarterly observations 
may also have seasonality. Due to these considerations, we re-estimate the baseline model using an 
annual sample from 2003 to 2013. The annual EPU is defined as the average of four quarterly EPU 
measures within that year and is lagged one year in the estimation. The results presented in Table 3.11 
show that annual EPU relates negatively with the book leverage measures. The coefficients also have 
larger magnitudes when compared with the results in Table 3.2, which are based on the quarterly 
observations. 
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Table 3.11 Robustness Check 4: The effect of economic political uncertainty on firm leverage using annual data 
(2003-2013) 
This table presents the estimates from the baseline model using panel regressions. We analyze the effect of economic 
political uncertainty on book leverage, short-term leverage and long-term leverage. The sample period is from 2003 to 
2013. Standard errors are reported in parentheses. 
*
,
**
 and 
***
 denote the significance at 1%, 5% and 10% levels, 
respectively. 
 Leverage  Short-term leverage Long-term leverage 
EPU -0.017
**
 
(0.004) 
-0.024
***
 
(0.002) 
-0.003
***
 
(0.001) 
Initial Leverage  0.503
***
 
(0.009) 
0.189
***
 
(0.005) 
0.037
***
 
(0.003) 
Profitability -1.53
***
 
(0.042) 
-0.708
***
 
(0.025) 
-0.059
***
 
(0.014) 
Sales revenue 0.021
***
 
(0.005) 
-0.001 
(0.003) 
-0.036
***
 
(0.002) 
Size  0.017
***
 
(0.002) 
-0.010
***
 
(0.001) 
0.022
***
 
(0.001) 
Tangibility  0.080
***
 
(0.013) 
0.088
***
 
(0.008) 
0.109
***
 
(0.004) 
∆Sales  0.897*** 
(0.221) 
-0.014 
(0.134) 
0.130
*
 
(0.073) 
Intercept -0.001 0.379
***
 -0.452
***
 
Industry-fixed effect Yes Yes Yes 
Adjusted 𝑅  28.0% 16.8% 29.1% 
Observations 16,049 16,046 15,971 
 
3.4.5.5 Controlling for Endogeneity 
EPU may not be a strictly exogenous variable, but instead be affected by firms’ aggregate financing 
behaviours or common factors that relate to policy uncertainty and leverage decisions simultaneously. 
To address this consideration, following Wang et al. (2014), we use the one quarter lagged U.S. EPU as 
the instrumental variable for the current level of China EPU and adopt a two-stage least squares 
estimation procedure
29
. Specifically, Mackowiak (2007) shows that external shocks are an important 
source of macroeconomic fluctuations in emerging market countries, whose interest rates and 
exchange rates are quickly affected by changes in U.S. monetary policy. In addition, U.S. economic 
policy uncertainty is a suitable instrumental variable because it only affects the dependent variable 
(corporate investment, hence firms’ financing decisions) through the independent variable of interest 
                                                             
29 The U.S. EPU is also sourced from www.policyuncertainty.com. 
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(economic policy uncertainty in China). The first stage regression results in the Panel A of Table 3.12 
document a significantly positive relationship between the U.S. EPU and China’s EPU. In the second 
stage, the estimated EPU from the first stage regression is still negatively associated with the book 
leverage ratio — thus mitigating the concern of endogeneity.  
 
Table 3.12 Robustness Check 5: Controlling for endogeneity (2003-2013) 
This table presents the estimates from the baseline model using 2-stage regressions. We use the economic policy 
uncertainty index of the U.S. as an IV to perform the first stage. In the second stage, we analyze the effect of economic 
political uncertainty on book leverage, short-term leverage and long-term leverage. The sample period is from Quarter 1, 
2003 to Quarter 4, 2013. Utility firms are excluded. Standard errors are reported in parentheses. 
*
,
**
 and 
***
 denote the 
significance at 1%, 5% and 10% levels, respectively. 
Panel A: First stage regression 
 EPU   
U.S. EPU 0.970
***
 
(0.204) 
  
Intercept  0.072   
Adj. R
2
 34.9%   
N of Obs. 44   
Panel B: Second stage regression 
 Leverage  Short-term leverage Long-term leverage 
EPU -0.007
***
 
(0.003) 
-0.037
***
 
(0.002) 
-0.005
***
 
(0.001) 
Initial Leverage  0.517
***
 
(0.004) 
0.191
***
 
(0.003) 
0.043
***
 
(0.002) 
Profitability -1.35
***
 
(0.020) 
-0.628
***
 
(0.012) 
-0.054
***
 
(0.007) 
Sales revenue 0.028
***
 
(0.003) 
-0.003
*
 
(0.002) 
-0.036
***
 
(0.001) 
Size  0.018
***
 
(0.001) 
-0.009
***
 
(0.0005) 
0.022
***
 
(0.0003) 
Tangibility  0.093
***
 
(0.006) 
0.083
***
 
(0.004) 
0.116
***
 
(0.002) 
∆Sales  0.485*** 
(0.086) 
-0.222
***
 
(0.052) 
0.071
***
 
(0.031) 
Intercept -0.068
***
 0.391
***
 -0.445
***
 
Industry-fixed effect Yes Yes Yes 
Adjusted 𝑅  28.7% 17.6% 28.7% 
Observations 61,474 61,461 61,202 
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3.5 Conclusion 
The determinants of corporate capital structures are an enduringly important question in the corporate 
finance literature. In this paper, using a recently available measure of economic policy uncertainty for 
China, we explore the relationship between EPU and Chinese firms’ capital structure choices from 
2003 to 2013. We find that leverage ratios are negatively associated with EPU on average, and this 
negative effect is more significant for firms from regions with higher marketization indexes, are 
non-state owned, or have no prior bank-firm relationship. We then provide consistent evidence that the 
negative relationship between capital structures and EPU is sourced from the deterioration of the 
external financing environment caused by the EPU. Finally, we show that firms’ usage of trade credit is 
positively related to EPU, suggesting that firms tend to adjust their financing structures as a response 
to economic policy uncertainty. 
The results from this study contribute to the literature in a number of ways. First, our paper 
provides an “out-of-sample” test for recent studies on the relationship between economic policy 
uncertainty and firm capital structure choices using Chinese data, and we also shed new light on this 
topic by showing that Chinese firms tend to adjust their financing decisions between debt and trade 
credit in the presence of economic policy uncertainty. Second, our paper relates to the literature 
concerning the supply-side factors affecting a firm’s capital structure. Faulkender and Petersen (2006) 
find that firms with public debt market access have higher leverage ratios and Cao et al. (2013) 
document that having public access to debt can mitigate the financial constraints imposed by policy 
uncertainty. In this research, we provide consistent evidence that EPU affects firms’ capital structure 
choices mainly by influencing the firms' external financial environments. Finally, this paper also 
contributes to the growing studies examining the effect of policy uncertainty on corporate behaviour. 
By providing evidence about the effect of the EPU index on capital structure decisions for Chinese 
firms, our study suggests an overarching impact of policy uncertainty on financing choices.
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Appendix 3.1: China EPU Index Construction 
Procedures on the construction of China EPU Index 
First, we identify SCMP articles about economic uncertainty pertaining to China by flagging all articles that 
contain at least one term from each of the China EU term sets: {China, Chinese} and {economy, economic} and 
{uncertain, uncertainty}.  
Second, we identify the subset of the China EU articles that also discuss policy matters. For this purpose, we 
require an article to satisfy the following text filter: {policy OR spending OR budget OR political OR "interest rates" 
OR reform} AND {government OR Beijing OR authorities}} OR tax OR regulation OR regulatory OR "central bank" 
OR "People's Bank of China" OR PBOC OR deficit OR WTO. We use this compound filter because it outperforms 
simpler alternatives in our audit study.  
Third, we apply these requirements in an automated search over every SCMP article published since 1995. This 
automated search yields a monthly frequency count of SCMP articles about policy-related economic uncertainty.  
Fourth, we divide the monthly frequency count by the number of all SCMP articles in the same month. We then 
normalize the resulting series to a mean value of 100 from January 1995 to December 2011 by applying a multiplicative 
factor. 
An Illustration Example 
If an article includes both "policy" and "government", we regard it as at least partly about government policy. 
Therefore, if it also contains a word in each of the China EU term sets described above, the article enters our frequency 
count for economic policy uncertainty. However, the word "policy" is not sufficient for an article to count as policy 
uncertainty; the article must also contain one of "government", "Beijing" or "authorities". Certain other terms in our text 
filter - e.g., "tax" or "regulation" - do not involve a compound requirement. We determined when to apply a compound 
requirement based on our audit study. 
Robustness Check 
Our audit study considers 500 randomly sampled articles drawn from the universe of SCMP articles that satisfy the 
China EU term sets. The sampling period is January 1995 to February 2012. We subject all 500 sampled articles to 
human readings to evaluate the accuracy of various text filters. In assessing accuracy, we regard the classifications 
produced by the human readings as correct. 
According to the human readings, 492 of the 500 sampled articles pertain to economic uncertainty for China. The 
remaining 8 articles were incorrectly flagged by the automated search method as pertaining to economic uncertainty for 
China. In other words, the China EU term sets produce a very small false positive error rate for economic uncertainty 
pertaining to China. 
Using automated methods to further classify the articles as about policy-related economic uncertainty, or not, is 
more challenging. Here as well, however, our preferred text filter (described above) produces good results: 
• The policy-related economic uncertainty count produced by automated search methods exhibits a correlation 
of 0.82 with the true count (human reading) in quarterly time-series data. 
• The net error rate produced by automated search methods is nearly uncorrelated (-0.15) with the true count in 
quarterly time-series data. 
• The overall false positive rate produced by the automated method is 0.11. The overall false negative rate is 
0.21.
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Appendix 3.2: Variable definitions 
EPU Based on the economic political uncertainty index of Baker et al. (2013). We transform it into quarterly observations following: 
EPUt= (3EPUIm + 2EPUIm-1 + EPUIm-2)/6. Then divided by 100. 
Annual EPU equals to the average of quarterly EPU. 
Leverage Ratio of total debt to total asset. 
Short-term leverage Short-term debt (≦1year) divided total assets. 
Long-term leverage Long-term debt (>1year) divided by total assets. 
Marketization index From Fan et al. (2011). 
SOE Equals 1 when the ultimate owner of the firm is the state and 0 otherwise. 
Bank-firm relation Equals 1 if a firm has a long-term bank loan contract in the prior year and 0 otherwise. 
Cost of debt Interest cash payment divided by the total amount of debt. 
Sales revenue Operating income divided by total assets. 
Size Log of total assets. 
Initial leverage First observation of the leverage ratio for a firm. For firms listed before 2003, it is the first leverage ratio observation from the semi-annul 
financial report, while for firms listed after 2003, it is the first leverage ratio observation from the quarterly financial report. 
Profitability ROA, measured as net income divided by total assets. 
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△Sales logSalest – logSalest-1 
Tangibility Tangible asset after depreciation and depreciation provision divided by total assets. 
Cap.ex Capital expenditure divided by the one period lagged total assets. Capital expenditure is measured as the sum of cash paid for the acquisition 
of fixed assets, intangible assets and other long-term assets. 
△Loan Growth rate of loans in a province. 
△EPU Growth rate of EPU. 
△Investment Growth rate of total investment in a province. 
△Deposit Growth rate of the amount of deposit in a province. 
△LR Growth rate of the loan interest rate. 
△DRR Growth rate of the deposit reserve rate. 
TC Trade credit, measured as the account payable divided by total assets. 
TC-debt ratio Account payable divided by the sum of account payable and total debt. 
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 IPO Allocation Methods, Underpricing, and After-Market Chapter 4
Performance: Evidence from A Quasi-Natural Experiment in 
China 
4.1 Introduction 
In general, an initial public offering (IPO) refers to the first issuance of a firm’s equity shares to the 
public and the simultaneous listing of the firm’s shares on a stock exchange. An IPO represents a 
firm’s first efforts to raise capital in the public equity markets and is a milestone event that 
transforms the company from private to publicly listed. During the IPO process, investment banks 
play a critical role in bringing new shares to the market, particularly with regard to setting the offer 
price and distributing shares; both of these processes are regulated by a specific offering 
mechanism. 
Bookbuilding has been utilized throughout the world as an IPO offering method and is 
regarded as a good price discovery mechanism. Under the bookbuilding approach, the lead 
underwriter determines a price range by soliciting demand information from potential buyers, which 
is expressed in terms of non-binding indications of interest. The final IPO offer price is decided 
based on the demand revealed by means of this “roadshow”. A defining feature of bookbuilding is 
that lead underwriters are granted discretion over the allocation of shares. This discretion is vital 
under bookbuilding theory (Benveniste and Spindt, 1989; Benveniste and Wilhelm, 1990), which 
posits that lead underwriters will use this discretion to incentivize investors to reveal their private 
information, thus directly affecting IPO pricing efficiency. Empirical evidence is consistent with 
this prediction. In an examination of IPO underpricing in the Indian market, Bubna and Prabhala 
(2011) compare bookbuilding with the Dirty Dutch Auction approach – which are associated with 
varying levels of underwriter allocation power – and find that there is less underpricing when 
underwriters have greater discretion over allocation, suggesting that the allocation method affects 
the efficiency of the capital-raising process.  
Cornelli and Goldreich (2001) find evidence that supports the information-soliciting 
hypothesis, i.e., that more informative bids are favoured in terms of allocation. By contrast, 
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Jenkinson and Jones (2004) do not find such evidence; instead, these authors find that “long-term” 
investors who do not flip their shares are favoured in terms of allocation. Moreover, in a survey 
aiming to identify the views of institutional investors regarding IPO pricing and allocation, 
Jenkinson and Jones (2009) find – somewhat strikingly – that institutional investors consider that a 
relationship with the lead underwriter of an issue is the most critical factor affecting allocation. 
However, there are two major weaknesses with the studies discussed above. First, they are based on 
bids and allocation information related to IPOs underwritten by a single European underwriter, 
which makes it difficult to generalize their findings. Second, their evidence is insufficient. More 
evidence – such as data from emerging markets – will shed light on these mixed findings. 
Despite the trend toward homogeneous practices for IPOs worldwide since the end of the 
1990s
30
, i.e., a trend in which bookbuilding has become the dominant method in those markets in 
which it is permitted, other IPO allocation methods continue to survive. Specifically, in the U.S. 
markets, the majority of IPOs employ bookbuilding as their allocation method; nonetheless, a 
minority of IPOs continues to utilize non-discriminatory auction methods
31
. In comparison, the 
Taiwan Stock Exchange stipulates that discriminatory pricing auctions are the only valid allocation 
method (see Chiang et al., 2010), whereas France requires an auction-like mechanism called the 
“Mise en Vente”, and Israel permits on uniform price auctions (see Biais and Faugeron-Crouzet, 
2002).  
A debate has thus ensued regarding the efficiency of different types of offering methods, i.e., 
bookbuilding vs. auction, over the past two decades (e.g., Derrien and Womack, 2003; Ljungqvist et 
al., 2003; Sherman, 2005; Wilhelm, 2005; Jagannathan et al., 2014). This debate was sparked by 
criticisms regarding lead underwriters’ conflicts of interest under bookbuilding (see Loughran and 
Ritter, 2002; Ljungqvist and Wilhelm, 2003; Loughran and Ritter, 2004; Liu and Ritter, 2010). 
Specifically, due to the substantial discretion they enjoy over pricing and allocation as lead 
underwriters, investment banks are incentivized to lower offering prices and allocate shares to 
related parties with whom they want to curry favour. For instance, Loughran and Ritter (2004) and 
                                                             
30
 According to Ljungqvist et al. (2003), 80% of the non-U.S. offerings in their global IPO sample were brought to 
market using bookbuilding methods. 
31
 According to Degeorge et al. (2010), between 1999 and 2007, WR Hambrecht completed 19 IPOs in the U.S. using 
an auction mechanism. 
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Liu and Ritter (2010) find that lead underwriters will distribute “hot” (i.e., underpriced) IPO shares 
to an issuer’s manager account, an activity known as “spinning”. In addition, lead underwriters have 
also been found to use an IPO allocation as a quid pro quo for institutional investors’ trading 
commissions (see, Reuter, 2006; Nimalendran et al., 2007; Ritter and Zhang, 2007).  
In this study, we shed light on the efficiency of various IPO allocation mechanisms by 
comparing pro rata and lottery mechanisms in China. In 2010, the Chinese government stipulated 
that IPOs listed on the Small and Medium Enterprise Board (SMEB) and ChiNext (which is an 
exchange similar to NASDAQ) should allocate new issues through a lottery system, while a pro rata 
system had been utilized before the change. By contrast, IPOs listed on the main board continue to 
use a pro rata share allocation system.  
Such a regulatory change provides us with an excellent setting to test the efficiency of 
allocation methods in IPO activity. First, by utilizing the setting in China, we are able to overcome 
one major common concern for studies in corporate finance, i.e. endogeneity issue. Specifically, if 
not mandated, firms’ decisions of IPO allocation method are not made at random, but are usually 
deliberate decisions to self-select into their preferred choices. On the one hand, the self-selection 
will cause identification problem as unobserved factors may be related to both firms’ decisions and 
the variable of interest (e.g. underpricing in our study), leading to endogeneity issue. On the other 
hand, the non-randomness will result in estimation bias using OLS. On the contrary, the regulation 
change in Chinese stock market applies to all firms regardless of firms’ characteristics, so it creates 
an exogenous event for us to measure the efficiency of different allocation methods. The second 
advantage is that we can use difference-in-difference method, because only a subset of IPOs is 
affected by the regulation. Other than controlling for the unobserved factors related to firms, we are 
also able to control for unknown changes over time. Therefore, it provides us with a quasi-natural 
experimental research framework in which we compare the changes in the underpricing and 
long-run performance of IPOs between the treatment group (IPOs listed on the SMEB and ChiNext) 
with that of the control group (IPOs listed on the main board) subsequent to the reform.   
We precede our analysis as follows. First, using IPOs listed on the Main board as the control 
group, we examine the difference in the underpricing prior to and after the regulatory change 
between the control group and the treatment group. We find that underpricing is significantly 
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reduced for the treatment group in the post regulation period when allocation is determined through 
lottery.  
Second, we also hand collected bid and allocation data for 872 IPOs, which consist of 28,055 
institutional bids and allocations during the sample period. First, we compare two allocation size 
measures (one in an absolute sense and the other as a percentage) before and after the regulatory 
change within the control and treatment group, respectively. We find that both groups experienced 
significant changes in allocation size albeit in opposite directions; the median institutional investor 
in the treatment group obtains a larger allocation in the post-regulation period, whereas investors in 
the control group receive smaller allocations in the same post-regulation period. Second, we also 
utilize the commission fee data that enables us to define the business relationship between 
underwriters and institutional investors (see also Chapter 2). Notably, these data also allow us to 
directly test whether the underwriters have influence on allocations and allocate IPOs to their 
preferred investors. Specifically, we split the entire sample into pro rata and lottery subsamples and 
compare the allocation sizes for two groups of institutional investors: the lead underwriters’ clients 
and non-clients in the whole sample and in each of the two subsamples. The findings are mixed 
between the two allocation size measures: we find that lead underwriters’ client investors receive 
larger allocation quantities, but no significant difference is observed between clients and non-clients 
when allocation proportions are examined. Finally, to explore the association between allocation 
and underpricing (aftermarket performance), we divide the pro rata sample into three subsamples 
based on IPOs’ underpricing levels (aftermarket performance), and examine the differences in 
allocation sizes for client and non-client investors within each subsample. We find that underwriters’ 
client investors receive marginally larger allocations than non-clients but only in the low 
underpricing group. 
In the subsequent multivariate regression, we create two variables to capture the effects of 
client investors. The dummy variable equals one if at least one of the underwriter’s client investors 
participates in the offline allocation and zero otherwise; the other is a continuous variable that 
measures the proportion of client investors. Client participation affects IPO underpricing through 
two possible channels. First, investors may have stronger incentives to reveal their true private 
information about the IPO firms due to the chance to obtain larger allocation sizes subsequent to the 
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regulatory change. Second, it is more difficult for lead underwriters to influence the lottery outcome 
under the lottery mechanism, so the incentive to deliberately underprice IPOs to “tip” their clients is 
reduced following the regulatory shift. Therefore, underpricing is expected to decrease in the 
post-regulation period. The multivariate results do not show that client participation has statistically 
significant effects on IPO underpricing. 
Finally, to evaluate the effects of the regulation change on aftermarket performance (i.e., 18 
months subsequent to listing), we examine the effects of the regulation on the IPO aftermarket 
performance proxied by cumulative and buy-and-hold abnormal returns. Our findings show that 
aftermarket performance is improved for the treatment group in the post-regulation period, which is 
consistent with our conjecture that investors have stronger incentives to reveal their private 
information during the IPO process in the post-regulation period such that improving the 
information environment results in better aftermarket performances for IPOs. 
This study contributes to the literature in several ways. First, we add to the growing literature 
emphasizing the important role of institutional settings on IPO activities by comparing the 
efficiencies embodied in two IPO allocation methods. Second, our hand-collected bids and 
allocations data allows us to directly test whether lead underwriters are incentivized to misuse their 
allocation discretion by favouring their own related investors. Third, this analysis adds to the 
literature that explores the “black box” of allocation that is believed to be the “most interesting open 
question”, according to Ritter and Welch (2002). Finally, instead of using a pro rata allocation 
method which is common in the “Dirty Dutch Auction” approach, the November 2010 regulation 
proposed a new allocation method, i.e., a lottery; our findings show that the lottery method results 
in less underpricing and better aftermarket performance, which sheds some light on the debate 
regarding bookbuilding versus auction mechanisms. 
The remainder of this chapter is organized as follows. Section 4.2 introduces the institutional 
background for the IPO market in China. Section 4.3 reviews the related literature and Section 4.4 
develops our hypotheses. Our data and summary statistics are described in Section 4.5. In addition, 
univariate and multivariate results are presented and discussed in Section 4.6. The last section 
concludes the chapter and offers a discussion. 
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4.2 Institutional Background 
4.2.1 Market Structure in China 
There are three trading boards in China’s equity market: the Main board, the SMEB, and the 
ChiNext board (which is similar to the NASDAQ). Two trading systems are used. The SMEB 
shares the same trading system with the Main board, whereas the ChiNext board utilizes its own. 
Moreover, firms to be listed on the SMEB face the same financial requirements for listing as those 
on the Main board but are subject to stricter and wider restrictions on disclosing and trade 
monitoring. The ChiNext board imposes lower thresholds for listing but employs more stringent 
monitoring criteria.
32
  
Although both the SMEB and the ChiNext board host firms that are smaller and less mature 
than those on the Main board, the two markets are targeting firms that are at different 
developmental stages. Although the SMEB is the market where mature but smaller firms are listed 
(whereas bigger firms would choose the Main board), the ChiNext board is for firms that are still 
growing but have past those initial stages in which venture capital would prefer to invest. Moreover, 
although there is no formal industry limitation, from the perspective of policy guidance, the 
ChiNext does prefer to list firms in industries such as new energy, new material, bio-medics, 
electronic information, environmentally friendly products, energy-saving products, etc.  
4.2.2 IPO Regulations 
Before 2001, the IPO market had been strictly regulated by the Chinese Security Regulatory 
Committee (CSRC). For example, IPO pricing was bounded by various types of P/E ratios and the 
number of IPOs was also rationed. During this period, fixed price offerings were typically used with 
various allocation methods over time. Since 2005, a modified “bookbuilding” method was 
introduced in which the IPO regime in China became more aligned with international norms. In 
June 2009, the CSRC proposed an IPO reform with changes to be made at different stages in the 
future. The November 2010 regulation change was at the second stage of the reform. Appendix 4.1 
                                                             
32
In particular, due to its specialties in hosting growth and innovative firms, the ChiNext has lower thresholds regarding 
profits and income immediately before listing than both the Main and the SMEB, and no upper boundary for intangible 
asset proportions, but imposes other requirements such as reaching at least 30% of income growth rate and focusing on 
one main business to emphasize prospective growth and sustainability. 
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provides details about the history before the November 2010 regulation change and Appendix 4.2 
summarizes the follow-up regulatory policy that was included in our sample period. 
Before November 2010, the bookbuilding process in China was similar in some but not all 
respects to that in the U.S. or Europe. For an issuer who is interested in going public, an investment 
bank or syndicate is appointed to manage its IPO, which typically includes procedures such as a 
road show, bookbuilding, IPO bidding, price setting, and allocating shares before listing. In general, 
these processes take about ten working days. 
There are several distinctive aspects of the IPO process in China. First, shares are divided into 
two tranches that are offered through bookbuilding (offline offering) and fixed price public offering 
(online offering). Only institutional investors are allowed in the bookbuilding process, whereas both 
individual and institutional investors can participate in the fixed price public offering, in which 
shares are bid at a fixed price. Moreover, investors can choose only one of the above two channels 
through which to participate. Second, investors in the bookbuilding process are required to submit 
limit bids that specify both the price and number of shares. In addition, these bids are legally 
binding such that bidders with valid bids are legally obligated to purchase any allocations awarded 
by the underwriters. By contrast, bids are only indicative expressions of interest in the U.S. and 
European markets. As for investors under fixed price offerings, they need only indicate the number 
of shares bid on. Third, the quantities of shares available for allocation in the bookbuilding and 
fixed price offering are known before the offer
33
. Specifically, no more than 20% of the total 
number of new shares is reserved for institutional investors for issues that are smaller than 400 
million RMB, and the proportion is no more than 50% if some of the shares are allocated to 
strategic investors. Fourth, lead underwriters do not have allocation discretion. Within offline 
offering, new shares are distributed pro rata, which is computed as the number of total valid bids 
divided by the total number of new shares (assuming that overall demand is larger than supply). 
Valid bids are those that are at or above the final offer price. In an online offering, allocation is 
made by drawing a lottery. Therefore, the Chinese IPO regime is closer to the “Hybrid Dirty Dutch 
                                                             
33
 After the allowance of “clawback” from offline to online offering, investors face the risk of a changed number of 
offering shares. 
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Auction”34 than the “Bookbuilding” approach.  
4.2.3 Reform in November 2010 
On 1 November 2010, CSRC released its second batch of revisions, which covered four aspects of 
the IPO process. First, lottery allocation was recommended for firms that will be listed on the 
SMEB and ChiNext (but not for those listed on the Main board). By inspecting the data, all affected 
firms (i.e., those listed on the SMEB and ChiNext) switched to the new method. Second, the CSRC 
also stipulates that issuers using a "lottery" for their allocations should set an optimal number of 
shares for each allocating lot before beginning offline book-building. In this way, the number of 
winners is pre-determined. Third, underwriters might now recommend that some institutions take 
part in the offline IPO offering in addition to the six types of institutions
35
 that were previously 
allowed by CSRC. Fourth, detailed information regarding offer prices and the numbers of shares 
applied for during the book-building process was required to be made public..  
This regulatory change has the following effects. First, it would significantly reduce the 
possibilities of "strategically" allocating IPO shares to related parties (if there had been any such 
activity before the regulatory change) because it is difficult for underwriters to intervene in a lottery. 
Second, investors may be in a better position to bid prices because they are now aware of how many 
winners there will be before they start bidding. Finally, a better environment to monitor IPO 
processes is created as it requires the ex post release of bidding information. 
4.3 Literature Review 
In this section
36
, we provide a discussion of the literature related to IPO allocation, underwriters’ 
conflicts of interests, the debate over auction vs. bookbuilding, and the importance of business 
relationships. 
4.3.1 IPO Allocation 
IPO allocation is important in at least two respects regarding an IPO process: information revelation 
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 In a Dirty Dutch Auction, the offer price is typically set below the market clearing price 
35
 The six types of institutional investors are investment banks, mutual funds, pension funds, insurance companies, 
asset management companies, and investment consultancy companies. 
36
 Also refer to Ritter and Welch (2002) for an excellent review. 
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and ownership structure. Benveniste and Spindt (1989) and Benveniste and Wilhelm (1990) are 
among the first studies to address the role of the allocation regime with respect to IPOs, i.e., the 
discretion over allocation under the bookbuilding method allows underwriters to commit 
themselves to reward investors who reveal private information, which may substantially affect IPO 
pricing and the success of the IPO. However, issuers (and underwriters) also face the choice of 
favouring blockholders for the sake of better monitoring or larger investor pools of smaller 
investors to improve liquidity (e.g., Booth and Chua, 1996; .Mello and Parsons, 1998; Stoughton 
and Zechner, 1998). In this study, we focus on the first aspect. 
Despite the extensive influence of the theoretical models of Benveniste and Spindt (1989) and 
Benveniste and Wilhelm (1990), studies seldom provide direct empirical evidence for these models. 
There is very little in the way of detailed bid and allocation data that might help test the efficiency 
of soliciting information and of using allocations to compensate investors for revealing information. 
Earlier studies use aggregate allocation data for institutional and retail investors, and all these 
studies support the information-extraction mechanism of the bookbuilding process (e.g., Hanley and 
Wilhelm, 1995; Aggarwal, Prabhala, and Puri, 2002). Indeed, Ritter and Welch (2002) state that 
“…we believe that it (IPO allocation) explores the most interesting open question today”.  
Three papers make valuable contributions to this branch of the literature. Cornelli and 
Goldreich (2001) exploit bid information from 39 international equity issues (both IPOs and SEOs) 
that are underwritten by the same European investment bank. Their findings confirm that 
bookbuilding acts as a successful information soliciting mechanism. Specifically, limit and step bids 
– which are viewed as providing more information – are favoured. In addition, regular investors 
who participate in a large number of issues are also preferred. Finally, they find persistent evidence 
that large bids are well treated by the book-runner. Conversely, Jenkinson and Jones (2004) analyse 
similar data (27 IPOs) from another European investment bank and do not find that price-sensitive 
bids are allocated more shares. Instead, “long-term” investors who do not flip their shares are 
favoured. Moreover, Jenkinson and Jones (2009) conduct a survey to reflect the stated views of 
institutional investors regarding IPO pricing and allocation. To summarize the related findings, (1) 
institutions discount the bid price relative to their true values more often than not; (2) most 
strikingly, a relationship with the lead underwriter of an issue is perceived to be the most critical 
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factor affecting allocations; and (3) long-term, frequent and large funds are believed to be favoured 
by underwriters in terms of allocation
37
. 
Bubna and Prabhala (2011) provide a direct test of the effects of discretion over allocation on 
IPO underpricing by exploiting an exogenous regulatory change in the Indian IPO market. The new 
regulation (the November 2005 regulation) nullifies underwriter discretion and stipulates that all 
IPOs must be allocated on a pro rata basis. Because there are two offering mechanisms at any point 
in time, i.e., fixed-price offering and bookbuilding before the November 2005 regulation and fixed 
price offering and the “Dirty Dutch Auction” after the November 2005 regulation, the paper adopts 
a difference-in-difference approach and finds that withdrawing discretion regarding allocation leads 
to increased levels of underpricing. 
4.3.2 Conflicts of Interest 
Because underwriters are granted substantial discretion with respect to allocation and/or pricing 
depending on the allocation method, conflicts of interests naturally arise under such circumstances 
between underwriters and issuers. Moreover, it is likely that investment banks do not act in the best 
interests of IPO firms (e.g., with respect to maximizing proceeds); thus, underwriters may procure 
benefits by giving their good customers favourable underpricing, which might not occur without 
such conflicts of interest. In addition, discriminate allocation may lead to unfairness for IPO 
participants and lead to regulatory concern. 
Using share-holding data as the proxy for IPO allocation, Reuter (2006) examines the 
relationship between IPO allocation and brokerage commissions paid by mutual fund families to 
lead underwriters. Overall, the evidence supports the notion that underwriters use IPO allocation as 
a quid pro quo for brokerage commission fees. Nimalendran et al. (2007) offer another piece of 
evidence of such “transactions” between investment banks and investors by revealing a positive 
relationship between the abnormal trading volume of the top 50 liquid stocks during the six-day 
lead-up period before an IPO and the “money left on the table”.  
To reconcile the long-term and short-term agency views, Goldstein et al. (2008) show that on 
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 For other relevant studies related to IPO allocation, please refer to Rocholl (2009) for the dynamics of demand 
during the entire process of bookbuilding and to Degeorge et al. (2010) for IPO allocation using auctions in U.S. and 
etc. 
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the one hand, commission payments paid by short-term investors increase in underpricing; on the 
other hand, the cost of doing so for an underwriter increases with the concentration level of its client 
base. Nevertheless, the impact of brokerage commissions on allocations might further be 
complicated by other relationships (e.g., ownership). Ritter and Zhang (2007) argue that lead 
underwriters have incentives to dump “bad” issues to their affiliated mutual funds rather than to 
independent investors because of the “kickbacks” (i.e., brokerage commissions) from them, 
particularly for the sake of lowering the possibility of IPO failures (“dumping grounds”), although 
underwriters are also motivated to preferentially treat affiliated funds with more deeply underpriced 
issues to boost portfolio performance (“nepotism”), while earning more management fees.  
Puri and Rocholl (2008) study the retail banking relationship in the German setting, and 
document that lead underwriters will favour their retail clients to earn “cross-selling” profits (e.g., 
from brokerage accounts and retail loans). In addition, they propose an even more subtle way of 
doing so on a pro rata basis, i.e., biasing clients’ demand (i.e., upward when it is a “good” issue and 
downward when it is a “bad” issue) by leaking firm value–related information to them. Conversely, 
Bubna and Prabhala (2011) fail to support the cronyism hypothesis as they show that previously 
favoured bidders are no more likely to exit than un-favoured bidders after an exogenous regulatory 
shock that nullifies underwriters’ discretion in allocating shares 
Another activity that is also related to conflicts of interest is known as “spinning”. This term 
refers to underwriters allocating “hot” (underpriced) IPOs to company executives to influence their 
decisions regarding hiring investment banks for their own companies’ equity deals. Loughran and 
Ritter (2004) propose that the “spinning” activity together with “analyst lust” led to increased 
underpricing for IPOs in the late 1990s. Liu and Ritter (2010) show that IPOs whose top executives 
were spun had higher underpricing and that these firms were also less likely to switch underwriters 
in follow-up offers. 
4.3.3 Auction versus Bookbuilding Approaches 
Both of the two strands of studies discussed above are closely related to the debate over the usage of 
auction or bookbuilding as the optimal allocation method for IPOs. On the one hand, the debate is 
stimulated by the important effects of the allocation regime on IPOs, both negative and positive. In 
more detail, as underwriters in an auction typically do not have discretion over allocation, they lose 
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an effective tool to incentivize investors and motivate them to reveal private information; however, 
concerns regarding potential conflicts of interests associated with such discretion are mitigated in 
auctioned IPOs. On the other hand, because auction approaches have been successfully applied in a 
variety of situations for other financial securities, particularly with respect to the sale of government 
bonds, their application in IPOs is attractive. 
Biais and Faugeron-Crouzet (2002) compare four IPO mechanisms (i.e., fixed-price, uniform 
market-price auction, Mise en Vente, and bookbuilding) and conclude that both the auction-like 
bookbuilding
38
 used in France and the bookbuilding used in the U.S. and U.K. are optimal in terms 
of soliciting better information and more accurate pricing. Nevertheless, Derrien and Womack 
(2003) examine the French stock market where three issuing mechanisms (auction, bookbuilding, 
and fixed price) were allowed from 1992 to 1998. Derrien and Womack (2003) document that the 
auction method is associated with less underpricing than the other two methods, which is due to its 
ability to incorporate more information from recent market conditions into the IPO price. 
Furthermore, Ljungqvist et al. (2003) show that non-U.S. issuers can only obtain the recognized 
benefits associated with bookbuilding by involving U.S. investment banks with better access to 
high-quality investors in the underwriting process.  
Sherman (2005) and Jagannathan et al. (2014) address this issue by focusing on the effects of 
investors’ entry into the IPO process. Both studies argue that investors face greater uncertainty 
regarding the number of participants with endogenous entry, which may lead to both higher 
underpricing and aftermarket volatility. Because bookbuilding has better control over investors’ 
participation and allocation, it reveals certain advantages in controlling for such risks than other 
methods. These authors also attribute this reasoning to the popularity of bookbuilding over sealed 
auction, and Jagannathan et al. (2014) further suggest that a hybrid auction mechanism that limits 
participation in the auction tranche to sophisticated investors and features a non-competitive tranche 
that is open to all investors might be a good compromise/solution. 
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 The French name for it is Mise en Vente, pursuant to which investment banks collect potential investors’ buying 
interests through amassing their limit orders as in Bookbuilding, but the French bookbuilding adopts a pro rata 
allocation method rather than allowing for underwriter discretion over allocation as in the U.S. 
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4.3.4 The Importance of Business Relationship 
With regard to the type of business relationships discussed above in Chapter 2, i.e., between mutual 
funds and investment banks, the former must pay trading commissions to the latter, which may have 
a material effect on IPO share allocation (Reuter, 2006; Nimalendran et al., 2007; Goldstein et al., 
2008). The accounting literature shows that auditing firms are more likely to compromise their 
independence to maintain key clients (Khurana and Raman, 2006; Krishnamurthy et al., 2006; Zhou 
and Zhu, 2012). Extensive studies in the banking literature also show that prior firm-banking 
relationships can help firms enjoy lower costs of borrowing and that banks also benefit from 
firm-specific information and reduced marketing costs (Petersen and Rajan, 1994; Dass and Massa, 
2011). 
Nevertheless, a stable relationship – as opposed to a one-time transaction – provides enough of 
a stronger connection between the parties involved such that it should be more beneficial for both 
the bank and the mutual fund. Drawing on the findings from the marketing literature related to 
Customer Relationship Management (CRM), maintaining ongoing relationships can yield the 
following benefits: (1) reduced service costs; (2) stable income and increased revenues; (3) 
improved information sharing and reduced decision-making uncertainty; and (4) long-term 
partnerships and improved customer loyalty (Morgan and Hunt, 1994; Richards and Jones 2008).  
4.4 Hypotheses Development 
In this section, we derive the hypotheses regarding our main research questions, i.e., what is the 
effect of the allocation method change (i.e., the November 2010 regulation change) on IPOs? With 
regard to the influence on underpricing, we examine two aspects. First, based on Benveniste and 
Spindt (1989) and Benveniste and Wilhelm (1990), we analyse the effects of the November 2010 
regulation change on investors’ bidding incentives to understand the change in underpricing. 
Second, regarding recent studies of the conflicts of interests faced by underwriters – and based on 
similar rumours from China – we further examine the effects of the November 2010 regulation 
change on lead underwriters’ economic incentives that have important bearings on underpricing. 
Finally, we also explore the effects of this regulation change on post-IPO performance. 
Prior to the November 2010 regulation change, lead underwriters could use underpricing to 
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solicit information from informed investors, which led to higher underpricing. According to 
Benveniste and Spindt (1989) and Benveniste and Wilhelm (1990), underwriters can use the 
discretion over allocation to reduce IPO underpricing because it helps them successfully solicit 
information from informed investors. However – and importantly – no such discretion was granted 
to underwriters in the Chinese market
39
. As a result, lead underwriters may only resort to higher 
underpricing as an alternative form of compensation. For example, Bubna and Prabhala (2011) find 
that higher underpricing is required than would otherwise be the case if lead underwriters could 
exercise discretion over allocation, ceteris paribus. 
Assuming institutional investors have better information and are able to estimate a fair value 
for an IPO, in the pre-regulation period in which the pro rata method was used, these investors have 
strong incentives to hide their true and private information (i.e., their estimated fair value of the IPO) 
and not reveal it to the underwriters. As a consequence, another equilibrium tends to be reached 
under such a circumstance, i.e., investors submit bids that are lower than their estimated fair value, 
in the hope that the underpriced IPO will result in higher underpricing, should they obtain any 
allocations (Biais and Faugeron-Crouzet, 2002; Liu, et al., 2011). In addition, because the pro rata 
allocation method was used before the regulation (where a large number of investors have the 
opportunity to obtain an allocation), each successful bid would be distributed with only a small 
proportion of the total offering given that the size of IPO is pre-determined, which further reduces 
investors’ motivations to reveal their private information. 
Since the enactment of the November 2010 regulation change, offline bidders faced different 
incentives such that their bidding strategies were altered. Under the new allocation method, issuers 
pre-determine the number of winning bidders before subscribing begins, which is much smaller 
than the number of successful bidders under the pro rata mechanism. Because there are far fewer 
winning bidders (and because IPO sizes are fixed), each successful bid will be allocated a greater 
number of new shares, which suggests the allocation can be viewed as an option that is in the 
money: the larger the allocation is, the higher the option values. Hence, there is greater incentive for 
investors to fully reveal their true information and bid accordingly to be eligible to enter into the 
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 Please refer to Section 2 in this Chapter for more detailed information about the institutional background of the 
Chinese IPO market. 
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lottery process with a chance to become one of the successful bidders. Consequently, it is expected 
that the IPO is relatively fairly valued and should result in lower underpricing. On the other hand, 
by assuming that the cost of acquiring information remains stable over time, investors will require 
less underpricing to compensate for this cost than they otherwise might under a pro rata system 
because of the increased allocation quantity.  
Taken together, we derive our first hypothesis as follows: 
H1: IPO underpricing will be reduced after the new regulation takes effect. 
Despite the suppressed role of underwriters in distributing allocations, it is not impossible for 
them to exert inside influences on allocations. In particular, under a pro rata regime, one subtle way 
of doing this is to induce some investors (e.g., informed, related or favoured investors) to submit 
disproportionately high bids by leaking distinct opinions about “hot” and “cold” IPOs to them (Puri 
and Rocholl, 2008; Peng, 2013). Conversely, obtaining an allocation depends completely on luck in 
theory under the post-regulation lottery system. Therefore, such a change also affects IPO 
underpricing in light of the increasing interests in the agency problem that arises for underwriters 
during the underwriting process. Hence, we extend our discussion along this line below. 
First, to further benefit from trading commissions, investment banks are motivated to cater to 
their clients, who pay them lucrative commissions. In other words, new share allocations may be 
used as a quid pro quo for commissions – particularly for “hot” deals (Reuter, 2006; Nimalendran et 
al., 2007; Ritter and Zhang, 2007) – which predicts a positive relationship for both the presence and 
the proportion of client bidders with IPO underpricing. By contrast, after the regulation, it is more 
difficult for lead underwriters to control the lottery outcomes such that this relationship will not 
hold during the post-regulation period.  
Second, to avoid potential lawsuits and audits, underwriters may be selective regarding their 
preferred clients. Based on the CRM literature (Morgan and Hunt, 1994; Richards and Jones, 2008) 
and our findings in Chapter 2, it is likely that only stable clients are favoured. Alternatively, there 
may be a trade-off between favouring short-term clients and maintaining long-term clients (i.e., 
stable clients), according to Goldstein et al. (2008). Ritter and Zhang (2007) and Peng (2013) find 
that underwriters may “dump” bad issues to affiliated investors to obtain commissions; however, 
they are also likely to “dump” such issues to unaffiliated investors for the sake of boosting portfolio 
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performances and earning management fees. In a word, this is an open question to be empirically 
tested. 
Thus, we derive the following hypotheses: 
H2a: Under pro rata allocation, client bidders will be allocated more shares, and such a 
relationship may be most apparent for IPOs with the largest underpricing. 
H2b: Under pro rata, there is a difference in allocations for stable clients and non-stable 
clients. 
H2c: Issues that feature the presence or higher proportion of clients or stable client bidders 
will have greater underpricing;  
H3: Under a lottery, no such relationship holds. 
The November 2010 regulation may also have implications on post-IPO performance. In 
particular, the lottery regime may have led to a change in the information environment due to 
changes in the composition of the investor pool for IPO firms. As it becomes more difficult to 
obtain allocations in the new regulatory environment, investors tend to be more selective. In other 
words, under a pro rata regime, investors are equally likely to bid for IPO shares, regardless of 
having private information or not, and will participate in as many IPOs as possible, given the small 
quantity of IPO allocation offered for each IPO under the pro rata system. By contrast, under a 
lottery regime, it is irrational to apply for a new issue if investors do not know it well, as the 
allocation quantity may become too large to easily sell out in the secondary market (once investors 
win the lottery) and even harder with the mandatory three-month lock-up period
40
 for primary 
market shareholders. As a consequence, for a new issue, those investors who eventually subscribe to 
it are likely those who are more informed. With the potential reduction in information asymmetry 
for an IPO and possibly more rational investors, its aftermarket performance should be better.  
Thus, we hypothesize as follows: 
H4: Issues offered after the November 2010 regulation change will have better post-IPO 
performance than before the regulatory change. 
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4.5 Sample Selection and Summary Statistics 
4.5.1 Sample Selection 
We obtain IPO data over the period from July 2009 to November 2012 because there was no IPO 
either before or after this period due to governmental interferences. The IPO suspension preceding 
our sample period began in September 2008 and was due to the Global Financial Crisis (GFC). In 
addition, the suspension afterwards was not relieved until approximately January 2014, which 
occurred in the context of the Chinese stock market, which had been ranked at its worst for three 
consecutive years. 
During our sample period, there were 885 IPOs in total, and we obtain data (e.g., issuance and 
firm characteristics) from the Chinese Stock Market Accounting Research (CSMAR) database 
which is operated by Guo Tai An Enterprise, a database that is widely used in Chinese market 
studies. We drop entities in the financial sector and those with special financing purposes (for 
example, some firms issue new shares pursuant to a reverse merger), which reduces the sample size 
to 869 IPOs. Noticeably, this sample size varies under different tests due to missing values for some 
constituent data.  
Based on the industry categorizations provided by the CSRC, we find that that our sample 
covers 16 of the 18 industries. More specifically, we find that the distribution of industries is highly 
concentrated in manufacturing both as a whole or for three boards separately; for example, the 
proportion of manufacturing firms in the entire sample is 75.8%. In addition, wholesale & retailing 
and information technology (IT) ranks in second place for the Main board (almost 8%) and on the 
SMEB (approximately 4.5%), ChiNext (approximately 16%) board, respectively. This pattern is 
surprising for the ChiNext board because at least 70% of stocks belong to IT firms for its 
counterpart in Hong Kong (Guo and Fung, 2011).  
4.5.2 Summary Statistics 
The summary statistics of the key variables are reported in Table 4.1 separately for each of the three 
boards and the entire sample. Underpricing is the logarithm of the ratio of the first day closing price 
to the offer price. All three boards are shown to have positive underpricing at approximately 22%, 
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28%, and 26% for the Main board, SMEB, and the ChiNext board, respectively. The IPO 
aftermarket performance is measured by cumulative and buy-and-hold abnormal returns (CAR and 
BHAR, respectively). The benchmark returns used consisted of the Shanghai A-share composite 
index for IPOs listed on the Main board, and the Small and Medium component index for the 
remainder of the IPOs
41
. In addition, we compute the returns over 3, 6 12 and 18 months’ time after 
listing.  
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 Because the Growth Enterprise Component Index was calculated from 1 June 2010 on, which is later than the first 
date of our sample, we use the Small and Medium Component Index for IPOs listed on both the SME and ChiNext 
boards. 
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Table 4.1 Summary statistics 
In this table, we present summary statistics for IPO and firm characteristics variables. IPO characteristics include underpricing, after-market abnormal returns, offer size, underwriter 
reputation, P/E ratio, overhang, online winning ratios, and the ratio of offline offering number to the online offering number of shares. Firm-specific variables are total assets, firm 
age, and sales growth rate, earnings per share, return on equity, leverage ratio, and state ownership which are measured one year before IPO , and top 5 shareholders’ ownership 
concentration ratio which is measure after IPO. We also include pre-filing market returns which are calculated as the 30-day market index return before firms file their IPO 
documents. We report these statistics for three boards separately. 
 The Main board The SME The ChiNext All 
Variables N 
Mean 
[Median] 
Std. N 
Mean 
[Median] 
Std. N 
Mean 
[Median] 
Std. N 
Mean 
[Median] 
Std. 
Issue characteristics 
Underpricing (first day) 88 
0.22 
[0.17] 
0.30 426 
0.28 
[0.25] 
0.28 355 
0.26 
[0.23] 
0.25 869 
0.27 
[0.23] 
0.27 
3-month CAR 88 
-0.09 
[-0.12] 
0.17 426 
-0.04 
[-0.05] 
0.16 355 
-0.05 
[-0.06] 
0.20 869 
-0.05 
[-0.06] 
0.18 
6-month CAR 86 
-0.09 
[-0.10] 
0.19 426 
-0.04 
[-0.05] 
0.23 354 
-0.05 
[-0.06] 
0.26 866 
-0.05 
[-0.07] 
0.24 
12-month CAR 88 
-0.11 
[-0.15] 
0.27 426 
-0.09 
[-0.12] 
0.29 353 
-0.07 
[-0.10] 
0.34 867 
-0.09 
[-0.11] 
0.31 
18-month CAR 88 
-0.09 
[-0.13] 
0.37 426 
-0.08 
[-0.12] 
0.36 355 
-0.02 
[-0.07] 
0.43 869 
-0.06 
[-0.10] 
0.39 
Client dummy 84 
0.857 
[1] 
0.352 426 
0.796 
[1] 
0.404 353 
0.779 
[1] 
0.415 863 
0.795 
[1] 
0.404 
Client percentage 84 
0.343 
[0.377] 
0.228 426 
0.242 
[0.220] 
0.205 353 
0.311 
[0.310] 
0.248 863 
0.280 
[0.250] 
0. 229 
Offer size (billion RMB) 88 
3.45 
[1.84] 
6.10 426 
0.885 
[0.701] 
0.622 355 
0.651 
[0.522] 
0.422 869 
1.05 
[0.659] 
2.16 
Underwriter reputation (%) 83 
7.91 
[6.01] 
7.64 416 
4.76 
[3.43] 
6.10 340 
4.56 
[2.88] 
4.37 839 
4.99 
[3.43] 
5.73 
P/E 87 32.8 25.3 423 34.7 14.2 353 39.3 17.1 863 36.4 17.0 
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[26.4] [33.4] [36.6] [33.7] 
Overhang  80 
4.53 
[3.30] 
3.04 397 
3.47 
[3.00] 
2.00 339 
3.05 
[3.00] 
0.61 816 
3.40 
[3.00] 
1.79 
Online winning ratio (%) 88 
3.19 
[1.49] 
4.44 426 
1.26 
[0.675] 
3.49 355 
1.20 
[0.797] 
1.50 869 
1.43 
[0.774] 
3.04 
Offline offering N/Online offering N 84 
0.347 
[0.250] 
0.198 426 
0.268 
[0.250] 
0.101 353 
0.277 
[0.250] 
0.100 863 
0.279 
[0.250] 
0.116 
Firm characteristics 
Total assets 
(Billion RMB) 
88 
11.7 
[3.01] 
3.09 426 
0.978 
[0.589] 
0.266 354 
0.361 
[0.290] 
0.292 868 
1.81 
[0.464] 
1.05 
Firm age (years) 88 
8.38 
[8.11] 
5.44 423 
8.31 
[8.02] 
5.13 355 
8.31 
[8.48] 
4.67 863 
8.31 
[8.17] 
4.97 
Sales growth rate 88 
0.13 
[0.14] 
0.38 426 
0.13 
[0.14] 
0.38 354 
0.26 
[0.28] 
0.41 868 
0.18 
[0.19] 
0.976 
EPS (RMB) 87 
0.58 
[0.47] 
0.45 423 
0.79 
[0.72] 
0.39 353 
0.83 
[0.73] 
0.50 863 
0.78 
[0.71] 
0.45 
ROE 88 
0.22 
[0.19] 
0.10 426 
0.25 
[0.24] 
0.09 354 
0.28 
[0.26] 
0.10 868 
0.26 
[0.25] 
0.10 
Leverage ratio 84 
0.585 
[0.583] 
0.157 426 
0.484 
[0.486] 
0.148 352 
0.390 
[0.393] 
0.146 862 
0.456 
[0.458] 
0.160 
Top 5 shareholders’ ownership 
concentration (Herfindahl index ) 
84 
0.342 
[0.317] 
0.198 426 
0.237 
[0.207] 
0.153 353 
0.189 
[0.169] 
0.105 863 
0.228 
[0.192] 
0.148 
State ownership (%) 69 
38.7 
[9.66] 
44.1 352 
5.40 
[0.00] 
17.3 277 
3.60 
[0.00] 
11.41 698 
7.98 
[0.00] 
22.30 
Market status 
Pre-filing market return (%) 84 
-1.75 
[-2.62] 
6.33 421 
0.960 
[0.464] 
9.15 349 
0.204 
[-0.531] 
8.69 854 
0.384 
[-0.531] 
8.75 
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The results suggest several patterns. First, the abnormal returns are negative from the first 
month (not tabulated) after listing throughout the 18th month no matter which measure is 
considered, which is consistent with the finding that IPOs are commonly characterized by long-term 
underperformance. Second, there is no difference between the 3- and 6-month performance, but the 
performance deteriorates slightly after the 6th month up to one year, at which point it then improves 
until the 18-month. Notably, we find that IPOs listed on the SMEB and ChiNext perform better than 
those on the Main board during all periods
42
. Finally, although not tabulated, BHAR is generally 
higher than CAR, which is consistent with Fama (1998) and Lyon et al. (1999) who favour CAR 
because BHAR grows with the return horizon, leading to an upward bias in finding significant 
abnormal returns. 
As to the remainder of the issue-characteristic variables, we find that IPOs on the SMEB and 
ChiNext receive smaller amounts of proceedings (i.e., the proxy for offer size) but have higher P/E 
ratios (the offer price divided by the earnings per share from the previous financial year before the 
IPO) than firms on the Main board, which is consistent with the fact that the former two markets 
contain smaller and growing firms. In addition, Main-board IPOs are underwritten by more 
reputable lead underwriter(s) than IPOs from the other two boards, as shown by the average market 
share of underwriting IPOs and SEOs, which are 7.91%, 4.76% and 4.56%, respectively. As for the 
proxy for the alignment of interests between insiders and outsiders, i.e., the overhang ratio, which is 
computed as the ratio of pre-IPO shares to offered shares, we find that Main-board IPOs have the 
highest value, followed by SMEB firms and then by ChiNext issues. As the cost of underpricing for 
the issuer declines as the overhang increases (see Bradley and Jordan, 2002), a negative relationship 
between overhang and underpricing is expected. Moreover, IPOs are over-subscribed (i.e., the 
winning ratio is smaller than 1) across all three boards, with IPOs of Main board firms facing the 
strongest demand. Finally, there is a consistent pattern among IPOs from all three boards, i.e., 20% 
of the total new shares are distributed to offline investors and the remainder goes to the online 
public offering
43
. 
We also include firm-specific control variables. In particular, for total assets, the result echoes 
                                                             
42
 We will consider the statistical significance of the difference in the next section. 
43
 The higher ratio for Main board IPOs is caused because the regulation stipulates that issues that are larger than 400 
Million RMB can distribute more than 20% of the total shares to offline investors. 
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that for issuing size, and firms are of the same age when they seek their listing. Moreover, firms 
from the ChiNext board are more profitable (higher earnings per share and return on equity ratio 
before listing), have a higher sales growth rate, a lower leverage ratio (total debt divided by total 
assets), lower state ownership, and are less concentrated in ownership than firms from the Main 
board, whereas firms from the SME board rank between the Main board and the ChiNext board. 
Finally, firms from the Main board typically chose to conduct IPOs when the market has a negative 
30-day return, whereas those from the other two boards typically filed their IPO requests when the 
market has positive returns. 
4.6 Empirical Results 
In this section, we investigate the effects of the November 2010 regulation change on IPO activities. 
Because the change presumably affects only the SMEB and ChiNext – but not the Main market 
– we use the latter as the control group and conduct a difference-in-difference analysis, controlling 
for issue- and firm-level characteristics that are found to fluctuate across boards in a multivariate 
analysis. In addition, in light of the conflicts of interest faced by underwriters in allocating new 
shares, we also explore such effects within the Chinese IPO framework, which differs from the U.S. 
market in many respects.  
4.6.1 Univariate Analysis 
4.6.1.1 Effect of the November 2010 Regulation Change on IPO 
To quantify the effects of the November 2010 regulation change on IPOs, we examine the 
differences in underpricing and aftermarket performance for IPOs listed before and after the 
regulation change. In addition, to consider the potential differences across different markets, we 
also compare the differences across the three boards in the pre- and post-regulation periods, 
respectively. The results are reported in Table 4.2. 
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Table 4.2 Comparison of underpricing and after-market performance 
In this table, we compare the difference in underpricing and after-market performances for IPOs listed before and after 
the 2010 regulation change, as well as the differences across the three boards within pre-regulation period and 
post-regulation period respectively. We test the difference through both two-sample T test and Wilcoxon rank-sum test. 
For T tests, t statistics are reported in the parentheses; and for Wilcoxon rank-sum tests, p values are reported. Panel A 
reports the results of underpricing, and Panel B for 18-month CAR. In addition, ***, **, and * represents 1%, 5% and 
10% significant level respectively. 
 Pre-regulation period Post-regulation period   
 N Mean Median N Mean Median 
T test 
(Post - Pre) 
Wilcoxon rank-sum 
test 
(Post - Pre) 
Panel A: Underpricing 
Main board 24 0.300 0.253 64 0.185 0.117 
-0.115 
(-1.61) 
-0.136
*
 
(0.051) 
SME 231 0.358 0.314 195 0.192 0.156 
-0.166
***
 
(-6.31) 
-0.158
***
 
(<.0001) 
ChiNext 141 0.390 0.365 214 0.179 0.150 
-0.211
***
 
(-8.26) 
-0.215
***
 
(<.0001) 
  T test 
Wilcoxon  
rank-sum 
test 
 T test 
Wilcoxon  
rank-sum 
test 
  
Main - SME  
-0.058 
(-0.904) 
-0.061 
(0.238) 
 
-0.070 
(-0.168) 
-0.039 
(0.554) 
  
Main - 
ChiNext 
 
-0.09 
(-1.39) 
-0.112
*
 
(0.065) 
 
0.060 
(0.16) 
-0.033 
(0.477) 
  
SME - ChiNext  
-0.032 
(-1.16) 
-0.051 
(0.13) 
 
0.013 
(0.544) 
0.006 
(0.95) 
  
Panel B: 18-month CAR 
Main board 24 0.008 -0.122 64 -0.124 -0.149 
-0.131 
(-1.56) 
-0.027 
(0.143) 
SME 231 -0.126 -0.146 195 -0.025 -0.078 
0.101
***
 
(2.88) 
0.068
**
 
(0.011) 
ChiNext 141 -0.243 -0.231 214 0.126 0.086 
0.369
***
 
(9.00) 
0.317
***
 
(<.0001) 
  T test 
Wilcoxon  
rank-sum 
test 
 T test 
Wilcoxon  
rank-sum 
test 
  
Main - SME  
0.134
*
 
(1.81) 
0.024 
(0.124) 
 
-0.099
*
 
(-1.84) 
-0.071
*
 
(0.063) 
  
Main - 
ChiNext 
 
0.251
***
 
(3.30) 
0.109
***
 
(0.004) 
 
-0.249
***
 
(-4.54) 
-0.063
***
 
(<.0001) 
  
SME - ChiNext  
0.117
***
 
(3.20) 
0.085
***
 
(0.002) 
 
-0.151
***
 
(-3.82) 
-0.167
***
 
(<.0001) 
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In Panel A, we find that, subsequent to the November 2010 regulation change, there are 
statistically significant reductions in underpricing for all firms except for those on the Main board. 
What’s more, the changes are also economically large. Specifically, the changes in mean are 11.5%, 
16.6%, and 21.2% for the three boards, which represent 38%, 46%, and 54% of the average 
underpricing level in the pre-regulation period. In addition, the changes in the median values are 
consistent with the results from mean values. Nevertheless, we do not find significant differences 
between any pair of the three boards in either the pre or the post-regulation period. We report the 
results of the 18-month CAR comparisons in Panel B and find an insignificant decrease in 
performance for the Main board IPOs, but significant improvements for firms on the other two 
boards. Specifically, the average abnormal return was 0.8% before the November 2010 regulation 
change, which deteriorates to -12.4% afterwards for the Main board IPOs. However, it changed 
from -12.6% to -2.5% for firms on the SME board and from -24.3% to 12.6% on the ChiNext board, 
which are both significant at 0.01 level. Moreover, there are also significant differences across the 
three boards in both the pre- and post-regulation periods.  
Regarding the impact of the November 2010 regulation change on IPO allocation, we compare 
allocation sizes over the pre- and post-regulation periods within the Main board and the other two 
boards separately. Allocation size is measured by two variables, i.e., bidder-average allocation 
quantity and allocation proportion. The first variable is computed as the total number of shares 
allocated to an institutional bidder divided by the number of individual bidders that are managed by 
this institution and participated in a given IPO, which is an absolute measurement. To exemplify, if 
Fund Company F1 manages 10 mutual funds and received a total of 1000 new shares of Stock A, 
then the bidder-average allocation quantity for this company is 100. The second measure is 
calculated as the total allocation quantity distributed to an institutional bidder divided by the total 
offering number for offline investors for an IPO. Using the same example and assuming that Stock 
A issues 100,000 new shares offline, the allocation proportion for F1 is 1000/100,000, which is 1%. 
Noticeably, this measure takes IPO size into consideration, such that it allows for comparison across 
issues. The results are presented in Table 4.3. 
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Table 4.3 Uni-variate test of bidder-average allocation quantity and allocation proportion across periods 
In this table, we compare the average allocation quantity (in 1,000s) and allocation proportion across time and boards. 
Panel A and B reports for cross-time analysis within Main-board and the rest sample (i.e. IPOs from SME and ChiNext) 
respectively as well as between Main-board IPOs and the rest IPOs in the pre-regulation period and the post-regulation 
change respectively. Panel C show the results for cross-board analysis. The number of observations is at 
IPO-institutional-bidder level. Wilcoxon test is applied for the comparison, and the p value is reported in the 
parentheses. In addition, 
***
, 
**
, and 
*
 represents 1%, 5% and 10% significant level respectively. 
Panel A: Main-board IPOs 
  N Mean Std. Min Median Max 
bidder-average 
allocation quantity 
Pre-change 1814 2629 8505 6.09 338.2 125060 
Post-change 1795 781.9 2276 4.95 263.7 42695 
Wilcoxon test     
74.5
***
 
(<.0001) 
 
Allocation 
proportion  
Pre-change 1814 0.013 0.029 0.0001 0.005 0.659 
Post-change 1795 0.034 0.060 0.0001 0.013 0.635 
Wilcoxon test     
-0.008
***
 
(<.0001) 
 
Panel B: SME & ChiNext IPOs 
bidder-average 
allocation quantity 
Pre-change 22094 59.37 84.70 0.03 39.50 2734 
Post-change 2352 966.2 664.4 4.00 850.0 7165 
Wilcoxon test     
-810.5
***
 
(<.0001) 
 
Allocation 
proportion  
Pre-change 22094 0.017 0.025 0.00 0.010 1 
Post-change 2352 0.173 0.101 0.0004 0.166 0.971 
Wilcoxon test     
-0.156
***
 
(<.0001) 
 
Panel C: Main-board vs. the other two (Wilcoxon test) 
bidder-average 
allocation quantity 
Pre-change     
298.7
***
 
(<.0001) 
 
Post-change     
-586.3
***
 
(<.0001) 
 
Allocation 
proportion 
Pre-change     
-0.005
***
 
(<.0001) 
 
Post-change     
-0.153
***
 
(<.0001) 
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In Panel A, the results for the Main board show that although the bidder-average allocation 
quantity is significantly larger in the pre-regulation period, the proportion is actually smaller
44
; both 
differences are significant at the 1% level, whereas for the other two boards (see Panel B), both 
measures indicate that the median institutional investor receives a greater allocation size in the post- 
than the pre-regulation period, and the differences are also significant at the 1% level. Finally, the 
results from Panel C, which compares the Main board and the other two boards, suggest that median 
investors receive smaller allocation sizes from the Main-board issues than from other issues. In a 
word, the November 2010 regulation change is associated with a significant increase in the 
allocation size for institutional investors, which suggests a possible change in the incentives for 
investors to bid prices for new issues, and for underwriters to set offer prices. We further explore the 
effects of a business relationship between an underwriter and a fund investor on allocations and 
how the regulation change influences those effects in the next section. 
4.6.1.2 The Effects of a Business Relationship between Underwriter and Fund Investor on 
IPO Allocation 
4.6.1.2.1 Fee-Paying Business Relationship 
Prior studies document that underwriters, who are granted substantial discretion over pricing and 
allocation in equity issuances under a bookbuilding mechanism, face conflicts of interest. 
Specifically, underwriters may use IPO allocation as a quid pro quo for trading commission fees 
(see Reuter, 2006; Nimalendran et al., 2007; Ritter and Zhang, 2007). In addition, Jenkinson and 
Jones (2009) show in their survey that institutional investors themselves believe that the brokering 
business with a bookrunner is one of the most critical factors influencing IPO allocations. In fact, in 
another area of financial studies, researchers also revealed that business relationships between 
institutions and investment banks will lead to bias in banks’ analyst reports (see, e.g., Firth et al., 
2013; Gu et al., 2012). 
                                                             
44
 We conjecture that these contradictory results are due to the possibility that institutional investors receive smaller 
allocation quantities in larger issues and larger allocations in smaller issues. 
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Table 4.4 Differences in allocation quantity and proportion based on fee-paying relationship 
In this table, we compare the average allocation quantity (in 1,000s) and allocation proportion across the three types of 
bidders, namely Client fund companies, Non-client fund companies, and Other institutions, based on commission 
fee-paying relationships between mutual funds and investment banks. The number of observations is at 
IPO-institutional bidder level. Client fund companies are defined as fund companies that pay commission fees to a 
broker in a semi-annual period when the broker is the lead underwriter for the IPO from which the fund companies are 
allocated shares. For the rest bidders, they are further divided into Non-client fund companies and Other institutions. 
Because the fee-paying relationship is between a fund company and an investment bank, all other institutions that are 
not fund companies are automatically classified in the Other institutions group. Panel A reports the results for the whole 
sample, Panel B for “Pro-rata subsample” which includes SME and ChiNext IPOs listed before the November 2010 
regulation change and all Main-board IPOs, and Panel C for “Lottery subsample” which covers only SME and ChiNext 
IPOs after the regulation change. Wilcoxon rank-sum test is used to compare the distribution locations, and p value is 
reported in the parentheses. In addition, ***, **, and * represents 1%, 5% and 10% significant level respectively. 
 
Client fund 
companies 
Non-client fund 
companies 
Other 
institutions 
Wilcoxon test 
 
Client vs. 
Non-client 
Client vs. 
Others 
Non-client vs. 
Others 
Panel A: Whole sample 
N 5597 2545 19913    
Bidder-average allocation quantity 
Mean 361.9 228.6 359.0    
Median 52.53 48.11 48.54 
4.42
***
 
(<.0001) 
3.99
***
 
(<.0001) 
-0.430 
(0.603) 
Allocation proportion 
Mean 0.043 0.043 0.026    
Median 0.016 0.017 0.009 
-0.001 
(0.384) 
0.007
***
 
(<.0001) 
0.008
***
 
(<.0001) 
Panel B: Pro-rata subsample 
N 4935 2220 18548    
Bidder-average allocation quantity 
Mean 290.4 115.3 312.4    
Median 45.37 40.09 43.61 
5.28
***
 
(<.0001) 
1.06
***
 
(0.006) 
-3.52
***
 
(<.0001) 
Allocation proportion 
Mean 0.024 0.023 0.015    
Median 0.014 0.014 0.009 
0 
(0.666) 
0.005
***
 
(<.0001) 
0.005
***
 
(<.0001) 
Panel C: Lottery subsample 
N 662 325 1365    
Bidder-average allocation quantity 
Mean 894.5 1003 992.1    
Median 800.0 920.0 850.0 
-120
***
 
(0.004) 
-50
***
 
(0.005) 
70 
(0.316) 
Allocation proportion 
Mean 0.182 0.181 0.167    
Median 0.167 0.167 0.143 
0 
(0.558) 
0.024
**
 
(0.015) 
0.024
**
 
(0.011) 
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Although underwriters in China did not have the discretion to interfere with IPO allocation 
directly because the pro rata method was used for distributing new shares before the November 
2010 regulation change, it was not impossible for them to exert influences indirectly as suggested 
by Puri and Rocholl (2008), such as by “leaking” pricing information to their clients. However, 
such possibility seems to be removed to a large extent after the regulation change because winning a 
lottery is based on pure luck. If such is the case, underwriters will lose the incentive to underprice 
new issues to take care their clients in the post-regulation period. Hence, we examine the 
hand-collected bids information and divide the sample into three groups according to whether a 
bidder is a client of the underwriter or not (i.e., whether it pays trading commission fees to the 
underwriter in the same semi-annual year as the IPO), i.e., Client fund companies, Non-client fund 
companies and Other institutions. Then, we compare the allocation size among the three types of 
bidders, and the results are reported in Table 4.4. 
Panel A of Table 4.4 presents the results for the entire sample which documents that the client 
fund company receives a larger allocation quantity than the median non-clients, which is significant 
at the 1% level, but in similar allocation proportions. We further split the sample into pro rata 
subsamples and lottery subsamples, and the results in Panels B and C show that the significant 
positive difference is from pro rata subsample, whereas the client fund company in the lottery 
subsample is actually allocated with fewer shares. However, there is no significant difference in 
allocation proportion in all tests. As for the comparison between Other institutions and each of the 
other two groups, we hesitate to provide any conclusions based on the current results because our 
definition of underwriters’ clients and non-clients is based on the relationship between underwriters 
and mutual funds only, which indicates that non-fund clients may be included in Other institutions. 
To explore the possibility that the insignificant results discussed above ensue because 
underwriters only favour their clients in a specific group of IPOs and also to answer the question 
whether clients are discriminately favoured with IPOs with the largest underpricing or best 
aftermarket performance, we divide our sample into small, medium and large groups based on IPO 
underpricing and 18-month CAR, and compare the allocation size between clients and non-clients 
within each of the three groups. The results are reported in Table 4.5. Unfortunately, we find that the 
median client receives a slightly higher allocation proportion, which is marginally significant at the 
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5% level only in the small underpricing group and no significant differences in the other two groups. 
In addition, there is no significant difference in allocation between client and non-client within each 
of the three subsamples divided based on aftermarket performances. 
4.6.1.2.2 Stable Business Relationship 
Some studies show that not only the existence but also the strength of a relationship matters in the 
economy. For example, Ljungqvist et al. (2006) suggest that the most important factor in 
determining whether an investment bank wins either debt or equity underwriting mandates is the 
bank’s historical dealings (such as prior lending relationships) with the issuer and the strength of the 
relationship as measured by the share of the issuer’s past securities offerings that have been 
underwritten by the bank. Moreover, drawing from the CRM literature (Morgan and Hunt, 1994; 
Richards and Jones, 2008), we conjecture that stable relationships may be viewed more importantly 
than one-off fee-paying relationships by underwriters. Therefore, we compare the allocation size 
between stable and non-stable clients, and reproduce the results in Tables 4.4 and 4.5 in this section. 
The related results are not reported in the interests of brevity. 
Specifically, we classify a fund company as a Stable fund company if it pays trading 
commissions to the lead underwriter of a given IPO in at least 75% of the 17 semi-annual periods 
spanning from June 2004 to June 2012
45
 and if the longest suspension of payments is no longer 
than 2 semi-annual periods; the remaining firms who pay commissions are defined as Non-stable 
fund companies. Fund companies who do not pay fees to the lead underwriter comprise the third 
subsample, i.e., Non-client fund companies
46
. As with the findings using fee-paying relationship, 
we find that stable clients receive significantly larger allocation quantities but not in a significantly 
higher proportion in the pro rata subsample; moreover, there are no significant differences in the 
lottery subsample for both measures. Moreover, the results do not find evidence to support the 
proposition that lead underwriters face conflicts of interest for allocating new shares because stable 
clients are also not favoured in any of the three underpricing groups.
                                                             
45
 For more details about these data, please refer to Chapter 2 of this thesis. 
46
 This group is the same as in the previous section. 
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Table 4.5 Comparison of allocation proportion within underpricing/after-market performance groups for 
pro-rata IPOs based on fee paying relationship 
In this table, we compare the allocation proportions across the three types of bidders within small, medium, and large 
underpricing (after-market performance) groups for the pro-rata subsample. The pro-rata sample includes both IPOs 
listed in pre-regulation period and main-board IPOs listed in post-Nov 2010 period. The number of observations is at 
IPO-institutional bidder level. There are 456 IPOs that are allocated on a pro-rata basis; we divided them into three even 
groups (i.e. 152 IPOs in each group) accordingly. Panel A reports results for the small underpricing/performance group, 
Panel B for the medium group, and Panel C for the large group. Wilcoxon rank-sum test is used to compare the 
distribution locations, and p value is reported in the parentheses. In addition, ***, **, and * represents 1%, 5% and 10% 
significant level respectively. 
 
Client fund 
companies 
Non-client fund 
companies 
Other 
institutions 
Wilcoxon test 
 
Client vs. 
Non-client 
Client vs. 
Others 
Non-client vs. 
Others 
Panel A: Small group 
N 1260 535 4475    
Small underpricing 
Mean 0.032 0.027 0.021    
Median 0.017 0.016 0.011 
0.001
*
 
(0.054) 
0.006
***
 
(<.0001) 
0.005
***
 
(<.0001) 
Small CAR 
Mean 0.043 0.043 0.026    
Median 0.016 0.017 0.009 
-0.001 
(0.384) 
0.007
***
 
(<.0001) 
0.008
***
 
(<.0001) 
Panel B: Medium group 
N 1843 734 6710    
Medium underpricing 
Mean 0.022 0.023 0.014    
Median 0.013 0.013 0.009 
-0.00
**
 
(0.037) 
0.004
***
 
(<.0001) 
0.004
***
 
(<.0001) 
Medium CAR 
Mean 0.024 0.023 0.015    
Median 0.014 0.014 0.009 
0 
(0.666) 
0.005
***
 
(<.0001) 
0.005
***
 
(<.0001) 
Panel C: Large subsample 
N 1832 951 7363    
Large underpricing 
Mean 0.021 0.021 0.013    
Median 0.012 0.013 0.008 
-0.001 
(0.590) 
0.004
***
 
(<.0001) 
0.005
***
 
(<.0001) 
Large CAR 
Mean 0.023 0.023 0.016    
Median 0.013 0.012 0.008 
0.001 
(0.644) 
0.005
***
 
(<.0001) 
0.004
***
 
(<.0001) 
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Table 4.6 Correlation matrix 
In this table, we report the correlation matrix for all variables that are used in our analyses. Specifically, U/P is the underpricing; CAR18/BHAR18 are the 18-month cumulative 
abnormal and Buy-and-Hold returns adjusted by market index returns respectively; Period is a dummy that equals to one if an IPO is offered after the November 2010 regulation 
change, and zero otherwise; Market is another dummy and has the value of one if an IPO is listed on SME or ChiNext, and zero otherwise; Client (dummy) equals to one if there is at 
least one client bidder participating in the IPO, and zero otherwise; whereas Client (percentage) measures the proportion of client bidders who takes part in an IPO; Log(Proceeds) is 
the logarithm of the amount of proceeds received in this offering; Reputation refers to underwriter reputation which is proxied by their market shares in the year of IPO; Overhang is 
the ratio of the total number of shares before offering to the number of shares offered; Online winning ratio is the ratio of the number of shares offered to the number of shares 
demanded for online subscribers; Log(1+Age) is the number of years for firms until offering since incorporation; Leverage is calculated as total debt divided by total assets; Sales 
growth is computed over the year before offering; Ownership Herfindahl index is computed for the top 5 shareholders; Pre-filing market returns are the market index returns 30 days 
before filing; State ownership is computed as number of shares held by the State divided by total number of shares before IPO; P/E is offer price to earnings per share; and Offline 
offering/Online offering is the ratio of the number of shares in offline offering to the number of shares in online offering. Lastly, ***, **, and * represents 1%, 5% and 10% 
significant level respectively. 
 U/P CAR18 BHAR18 Period Market 
Client 
(dummy) 
Client 
(pct) 
Log(Proceeds) Reputation Overhang Online winning ratio 
U/P 1           
CAR18 -0.20
*** 
1          
BHAR18 -0.17
***
 0.91
***
 1         
Period -0.33
***
 0.25
***
 0.24
***
 1        
Market 0.06 0.03 0.03 -0.12
***
 1       
Client 
(dummy) 
0.05 -0.11
**
 -0.09
**
 -0.24
***
 -0.05 1      
Client 
(percentage) 
-0.04 0.01 0.04 0.11
**
 -0.09
**
 0.62
***
 1     
Log(Proceeds) -0.30
***
 -0.13
***
 -0.10
***
 -0.14
***
 -0.46
***
 0.20
***
 0.15
***
 1    
Reputation -0.05 0.01 0.04 0.07
*
 -0.17
***
 0.14
***
 0.24
***
 0.23
***
 1   
Overhang 0.11
**
 -0.05 -0.02 0.00 -0.21
***
 -0.05 -0.03 0.15
***
 0.09
*
 1  
Online winning ratio -0.26
***
 0.02 0.03 0.20
***
 -0.18
***
 -0.07 0.03 0.25
***
 0.04 0.04 1 
Log(1+Age) -0.06 0.11
**
 0.11
**
 0.37
***
 0.00 -0.16
***
 -0.05 -0.18
***
 -0.02 0.01 0.00 
Leverage -0.07 -0.08
*
 -0.11
***
 0.01 -0.27
***
 0.01 -0.04 0.25
***
 0.01 0.03 0.11
**
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Sales growth before IPO 0.06 -0.05 -0.01 0.13
***
 0.05 -0.05 0.08
*
 0.00 0.00 0.01 0.13
***
 
Ownership Herfindahl index  
(top 5 shareholders) 
-0.05 0.03 0.01 0.00 -0.25
***
 0.05 -0.02 0.25
***
 0.13
***
 0.16
***
 0.04 
Pre-filing market return 0.30
*** 
-0.12
***
 -0.11
***
 -0.34
***
 0.08
*
 0.14
***
 0.07
*
 0.08
*
 0.03 -0.03 -0.21
***
 
State ownership 0.08
*
 0.08
*
 0.10
*
 -0.03 -0.46
***
 0.04 0.05 0.30
***
 0.13
***
 0.09
*
 0.00 
P/E -0.04 -0.07
*
 -0.07
*
 -0.23
***
 0.06 0.13
***
 0.02 0.23
***
 -0.05 -0.02 -0.10
**
 
offN_ratio 
(Offline offering/Online offering) 
0.07
*
 0.12
***
 0.12
***
 0.14
***
 -0.19
***
 -0.17
***
 -0.05 0.06 0.11
**
 0.13
***
 0.03 
 
Table 4.6 (continued): 
 Log(1+Age) Leverage 
Sales growth 
before IPO 
Ownership Herfindahl index 
(top 5 shareholders) 
Prefile 
market return 
State 
ownership 
P/E offN_ratio 
Log(1+Age) 1        
Leverage -0.01 1       
Sales growth before IPO 0.00 -0.04 1      
Ownership Herfindahl index  
(top 5 shareholders) 
-0.06 0.13
***
 -0.23
***
 1     
Pre-filing market return -0.10
**
 -0.06 0.02 -0.05 1    
SOE ownership -0.07 0.17
***
 -0.05 0.22
***
 0.03 1   
P/E -0.12
***
 -0.09
**
 -0.33
***
 0.12
***
 0.13
***
 -0.08
*
 1  
offN_ratio  0.03 0.01 0.07
*
 0.13
***
 -0.03 0.50
***
 -0.20
***
 1 
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4.6.2 Correlation Analysis 
The correlation matrix is reported in Table 4.6. The dependent variables are underpricing (U/P) and 
the 18-month cumulative/buy-and-hold abnormal returns (CAR18/BHAR18); the remainder 
consists of independent variables. Among these, the variables of interest are three dummy variables 
and one continuous variable: Period takes a value of one if an IPO is issued in the post-regulation 
period and zero otherwise; Market is one if the IPO firm is listed on the SME or ChiNext board and 
zero otherwise; Client (dummy) and Client (percentage) are defined as above. 
With respect to the three dependent variables, we have the following findings. First, we find 
that underpricing is significantly and negatively related to Period (the correlation is -0.33, which is 
significant at the 1% level) but with weak correlations with Market, Client (dummy) and Client 
(percentage), which is similar to univariate results. Second, consistent with the IPO literature, 
underpricing is negatively related to issue size and the online wining ratio and positively associated 
with overhang and pre-filing market returns. We discuss these in greater detail in the next section. 
Third, CAR18 (BHAR18) also has a significant positive correlation with Period, with a correlation 
of 0.25 (0.24), which is significant at the 1% level, but exhibits low correlation with all three of the 
other interested variables. 
The results also show significant correlation among some of the independent variables. 
Notably, period is negatively related to Client dummy (-0.24) but positively related to Client 
percentage (0.11)
47
. In addition, underwriter reputation seems to be higher for issues with higher 
client proportions and larger sizes (the correlations are 0.24 and 0.23, respectively, which are both 
significant at the 1% level). Moreover, other notable things include: (1) the logarithm 
transformation of proceeds is highly correlated with Market, which suggests that Main board issues 
are larger than the others; (2) state ownership is negatively correlated with Market, with a 
correlation of -0.46, which indicates that the SMEB and ChiNext have significantly lower state 
ownership than the Main board; (3) P/E ratio has a significant negative correlation with sales 
growth rate before IPO, i.e., -0.33, which contradicts the notion that growth firms are priced higher; 
and (4) state ownership is also highly correlated with the ratio of the offline offering number to the 
                                                             
47
 This result might ensue because approximately 80% of the entire sample is defined as having clients’ participation. 
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online offering number as the correlation is 0.50, which is because both of the two variables are 
higher for the Main board. Given the above correlation results, we separately control for state 
ownership, P/E ratio, and the ratio of the offline offering number to the online offering number in 
regressions to alleviate the multi-colinearity issue.  
4.6.3 Regression Results 
4.6.3.1 Analysis of Underpricing 
In this section, we conduct a multivariate regression to examine the effects of the November 2010 
regulation change on underpricing after controlling for other related factors. The dependent variable 
is underpricing and the variables of interest include three dummies and one continuous variable. 
We include a set of control variables for the issue-specific factors: (1) IPO size – a proxy for 
the ex-ante uncertainty regarding an issue, and it is expected that the larger the issue size, the less 
the uncertainty is such that there is lower underpricing; (2) Underwriter reputation – the IPO 
literature generally supports the notion that IPOs underwritten by more reputable underwriters are 
associated with less short-run underpricing (e.g., Megginson and Weiss, 1991; Carter et al., 1998); 
(3) Overhang ratio – Bradley and Jordan (2002) argue that the higher the ratio is, the small the 
existing shareholder dilution is, and the lower the cost is per retained share because of underpricing; 
thus, a positive relationship between overhang and underpricing; (4) New share demand – a metrics 
measured by online winning ratio that is expected that the higher the demand is, the lower the ratio, 
and the higher the underpricing is; and (5) Relative proportion of institutional investors to retail 
investors – this measure is proxied by the ratio of offline offering numbers to online offering 
numbers (OffN_ratio), which is used to control for institutional investors’ participation; on one hand, 
Hao et al. (2014) document a significant positive relationship between this variable and 
underpricing, which supports the finding from Aggarwal (2003) that institutional participation is 
positively related to IPO underpricing. On the other hand, institutional participation may also have a 
negative correlation with underpricing if more institutional investors are believed to be associated 
with higher pricing efficiency. 
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Table 4.7 Regression of underpricing 
The dependent variable is underpricing. The sample used in this table excludes relation-unidentified IPOs (which amount to 44 IPOs) and the number of observations is at IPO level. 
The variables of interest are period, market and their interaction term, as well as client dummy and client proportion. We control for issue characteristics such as offering size 
(Log(proceeds)), underwriter reputation, level of interest alignment faced by issuer (Overhang), demand (Online winning ratio); we also control for firm features such as age 
(Log(1+age)), leverage ratio (Leverage), growth opportunity (Sales growth before IPO), ownership concentration level (Ownership concentration (H index) of top 5); and lastly, we 
consider market timing through the market index return during the 30-day period before prospectus releasing date. Additional three variables are considered separately, and they are 
P/E ratio, state ownership before IPO and offline to online offering number ratio. Whiter standard errors are reported in the parentheses, and ***, **, and * denotes 1%, 5% and 10% 
significance respectively.  
 Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 Model 5 Model 6 Model 7 Model 8 Model 9 
Period 
-0.234
***
 
(0.067) 
-0.219
***
 
(0.068) 
-0.222
***
 
(0.068) 
-0.145
**
 
(0.071) 
-0.146
**
 
(0.070) 
-0.209
***
 
(0.068) 
-0.212
***
 
(0.067) 
-0.219
***
 
(0.068) 
-0.222
***
 
(0.068) 
Market 
-0.226
***
 
(0.062) 
-0.209
***
 
(0.064) 
-0.208
***
 
(0.064) 
-0.136
**
 
(0.067) 
-0.135
**
 
(0.067) 
-0.201
***
 
(0.064) 
-0.199
***
 
(0.064) 
-0.209
***
 
(0.064) 
-0.208
***
 
(0.064) 
Client dummy  
0.013 
(0.024) 
 
-0.001 
(0.028) 
 
0.014 
(0.024) 
 
0.013 
(0.024) 
 
Client proportion   
0.029 
(0.036) 
 
0.028 
(0.041) 
 
0.032 
(0.037) 
 
0.029 
(0.036) 
Market*period 
0.045 
(0.067) 
0.028 
(0.070) 
0.026 
(0.069) 
-0.017 
(0.072) 
-0.019 
(0.072) 
0.017 
(0.069) 
0.015 
(0.069) 
0.028 
(0.070) 
0.026 
(0.069) 
Log(proceeds) 
-0.178
***
 
(0.016) 
-0.180
***
 
(0.016) 
-0.180
***
 
(0.016) 
-0.199
***
 
(0.016) 
-0.200
***
 
(0.016) 
-0.179
***
 
(0.016) 
-0.180
***
 
(0.016) 
-0.180
***
 
(0.016) 
-0.180
***
 
(0.016) 
Underwriter Reputation 
0.119 
(0.112) 
0.093 
(0.112) 
0.081 
(0.115) 
0.249
**
 
(0.111) 
0.228
**
 
(0.108) 
0.035 
(0.117) 
0.022 
(0.121) 
0.093 
(0.112) 
0.081 
(0.115) 
Overhang 
0.017
***
 
(0.005) 
0.017
***
 
(0.005) 
0.017
***
 
(0.005) 
0.018
***
 
(0.004) 
0.018
***
 
(0.004) 
0.018
***
 
(0.005) 
0.018
***
 
(0.005) 
0.017
***
 
(0.005) 
0.017
***
 
(0.005) 
Online winning ratio 
-0.017
***
 
(0.003) 
-0.017
***
 
(0.003) 
-0.017
***
 
(0.003) 
-0.012
***
 
(0.003) 
-0.013
***
 
(0.003) 
-0.017
***
 
(0.004) 
-0.018
***
 
(0.005) 
-0.017
***
 
(0.003) 
-0.017
***
 
(0.003) 
Log(1+age) 
0.024 
(0.015) 
0.024 
(0.015) 
0.024 
(0.015) 
0.027
*
 
(0.016) 
0.027
*
 
(0.016) 
0.024 
(0.015) 
0.024 
(0.015) 
0.024 
(0.015) 
0.024 
(0.015) 
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Leverage 
0.027 
(0.055) 
0.032 
(0.055) 
0.034 
(0.055) 
-0.006 
(0.061) 
-0.003 
(0.061) 
0.021 
(0.056) 
0.023 
(0.056) 
0.032 
(0.055) 
0.034 
(0.055) 
Sales growth before IPO 
0.082
***
 
(0.020) 
0.080
***
 
(0.021) 
0.079
***
 
(0.021) 
0.083
***
 
(0.022) 
0.082
***
 
(0.022) 
0.075
***
 
(0.022) 
0.074
***
 
(0.022) 
0.080
***
 
(0.021) 
0.079
***
 
(0.021) 
Ownership Herfindahl index (top 5 shareholders) 
0.014 
(0.054) 
0.008 
(0.053) 
0.011 
(0.053) 
-0.023 
(0.056) 
0.022 
(0.056) 
0.0006 
(0.052) 
0.004 
(0.053) 
0.008 
(0.053) 
0.011 
(0.053) 
Pre-filing market return 
0.646
***
 
(0.102) 
0.647
***
 
(0.102) 
0.641
***
 
(0.102) 
0.792
***
 
(0.109) 
0.785
***
 
(0.109) 
0.632
***
 
(0.102) 
0.624
***
 
(0.103) 
0.647
***
 
(0.102) 
0.641
***
 
(0.102) 
State ownership before IPO    
0.131
**
 
(0.051) 
0.130
**
 
(0.051) 
  
  
P/E      
-0.0004 
(0.0005) 
-0.0004 
(0.0005) 
  
offN_ratio        
0.112 
(0.094) 
0.110 
(0.092) 
Intercept 
2.46
***
 
(0.209) 
2.42
***
 
(0.214) 
2.42
***
 
(0.213) 
2.48
***
 
(0.221) 
2.48
***
 
(0.220) 
2.44
***
 
(0.216) 
2.45
***
 
(0.214) 
2.42
***
 
(0.214) 
2.42
***
 
(0.213) 
Industry dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
N 738 738 738 638 638 735 735 738 738 
Adj. R
2
 33.8% 33.8% 33.8% 36.3% 36.4% 33.9% 33.9% 33.8% 33.8% 
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Commonly controlled firm-specific variables were also included. First, firm age is an 
information asymmetry measure. Second, the leverage ratio could be a measure for the default risk 
such that it is positively related to underpricing; conversely, it might also represent a positive signal 
to the market, particularly in a market such as China in which debt is not easy to obtain, therefore 
leading to a negative relationship (e.g., Hao et al., 2014). Third, the ownership Herfindahl index is 
included for ownership concentration. Fourth, Hanley and Hoberg (2010) suggest include pre-filing 
market returns. Fifth, state ownership is used to control for potential government intervention. Sixth, 
the P/E ratio is a measure for the extent to which the issue is priced so that it is expected to be 
negatively correlated with underpricing. 
The results are reported in Table 4.7. Model one shows the results for the baseline model. First, 
we found that the coefficient for the Period dummy is negative and significant at the 1% level; it is 
also economically significant with respect to a 23% drop in underpricing after the regulation change, 
ceteris paribus. Second, the Market dummy is also significantly negative, indicating that IPOs on 
the SMEB and ChiNext suffer from higher underpricing than IPOs from firms on the Main board. 
Third, the interaction term of Period and Market is expected to capture the effect of the November 
2010 regulation change on underpricing through the difference-in-difference method. However, we 
failed to find significant differences for the change in underpricing between the SME and ChiNext 
boards and the Main board. We attribute the insignificance of the interaction variable to the high 
variation in underpricing and small sample size for the main board. Finally, with respect to the 
control variables, they are consistent with the previous findings. For example, the results show that 
underpricing is negatively and positively associated with issue size and pre-filing market returns, 
respectively, which is consistent with the information asymmetry and market timing hypotheses. In 
addition, underpricing increases with the level of conflicts of interest between insiders and outsiders, 
share demand, and firms’ growth rate. However, underwriter reputation, leverage ratio, and 
ownership concentration do not have a significant impact on underpricing in China. 
In columns two and three, we add a Client dummy and percentage variables into the regression 
to examine the effects of client investors’ participation. Nevertheless, inconsistent with our 
conjecture, we do not find that the participation and composition of institutional investors have 
significant effects on underpricing, while other control variables remain unchanged by and large. In 
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the remainder of the specifications (i.e., from Model 4 to Model 9), we add additional control 
variables for Models 2 and 3. The results are quantitatively and qualitatively comparable to the 
above results except when controlling for state ownership before IPO. Specifically, underwriter 
reputation becomes significant and positive at the 5% significant level. Moreover, state ownership 
itself is significantly and positively correlated with underpricing, which is more consistent with the 
“grabbing hand” hypothesis for government ownership (see, e.g., Cheung et al., 2010; Kang and 
Kim, 2012; Wei and Varela, 2013). In addition, neither the P/E ratio before the IPO nor the ratio of 
the offline offering number to the online offering number has a significant effect on underpricing. 
4.6.3.1.1 Analysis of After-market Performance 
Researchers have conducted long-run performance analyses for IPO firms to test the well-structured 
information asymmetry model for explaining underpricing. To be more specific, as firms become 
seasoned in the long term, they should perform as well as other seasoned firms, i.e., not earning 
significant positive or negative returns. To investigate whether the November 2010 regulation 
change alleviates high underpricing in China – which is the goal claimed by the policy itself – we 
regress the 18-month cumulative abnormal returns on the same variables used in the underpricing 
analysis
48
. The results are reported in Table 4.8. 
As above, the baseline model (column one) includes only the Period and Market dummies and 
their interaction term. In the next two columns (Models 2 and 3), we add the Client dummy and the 
percentage separately. In addition, the last six specifications control for the additional three 
variables (i.e., state ownership, P/E ratio, and OffN_ratio). As the results are consistent across all 
specifications, we address them together below. 
First, Period and Market dummies are negative but insignificant, which implies that the 
performances of firms on the Main board decline after the regulation change, whereas before the 
regulation change, firms from the SME and ChiNext boards slightly underperform compared with 
those from the Main board. Second (and notably), we find that the coefficient of the interaction term 
is positive and significant at the 1% level, which indicates that the change in performance for the 
IPO firms listed on the SMEB and ChiNext is more positive than that for firms from the Main board. 
                                                             
48
We also use BHARs as a dependent variable and find quantitatively and qualitatively similar results. To save space, 
these results are not tabulated. 
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However, we do not find that Client dummy or percentage play an important role in influencing IPO 
aftermarket performance. The results are consistent with our conjecture that in the post-regulation 
period IPOs experience positive externalities, which is caused by the improved information 
environment, as institutional investors have strong incentives to reveal their true private information 
but not the reduced conflict of interest faced by underwriters. 
As for control variables, we make the following findings. First, larger and growth issues are 
associated with worse performance, although not significantly for most specifications, as the 
coefficients for the logarithm of preceding and sales growth before the IPO are negative. Second, 
there is some evidence supporting the market-timing explanation for aftermarket underperformance 
for new issues. In other words, pre-filing market returns have a slightly significant and negative 
coefficient. So, firms that exploit market misspecifications perform worse in the future, i.e., in the 
long run. Third, overhang does not have as significant effect on long-run performance as it does on 
underpricing. Overhang is a proxy of the cost of underpricing borne by retained shareholders, so it 
does not show any direct effect on long-term performance. Moreover, ownership concentration has 
an insignificant and positive coefficient in most models (except for model 6 and 7), which is 
consistent with the finding that block shareholders help mitigate agency problems (e.g., Shleifer and 
Vishny, 1986, 1997; Boone et al., 2011). In addition, we did not find a significant effect for state 
ownership on performance in the aftermarket. Finally, it is interesting to find that the online 
winning ratio only influences firm performance immediately after listing, whereas the ratio of 
offline to online offering numbers only affects firm performance over relatively longer periods. On 
the one hand, this is reasonable in that a winning ratio reflects demand (most likely by individual 
investors), and the effect of demand is supposedly short-lived; and the positive sign of this 
coefficient suggests that there is a momentum for IPOs with higher online demands. On the other 
hand, the higher the ratio of offering numbers offline to online, the larger the relative proportion of 
institutional investors, which sends a positive signal to the market (i.e., firms with higher 
institutional ownership would perform better) as the sign indicates. 
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Table 4.8 Regression of CAR18 
The dependent variable is CAR18 which is 3-month cumulative abnormal returns calculated using the price at the end of the listing month and the end of the third month after listing. 
The sample and independent variables are the same as defined before. Again, Whiter standard errors are reported in the parentheses, and ***, **, and * denotes 1%, 5% and 10% 
significance respectively. 
 Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 Model 5 Model 6 Model 7 Model 8 Model 9 
Period 
-0.116 
(0.093) 
-0.118 
(0.092) 
-0.119 
(0.093) 
-0.065 
(0.104) 
-0.071 
(0.104) 
-0.122 
(0.091) 
-0.121 
(0.091) 
-0.084 
(0.097) 
-0.085 
(0.098) 
Market 
-0.136
*
 
(0.082) 
-0.135
*
 
(0.081) 
-0.135 
(0.082) 
-0.019 
(0.092) 
-0.016 
(0.093) 
-0.129 
(0.081) 
-0.127 
(0.081) 
-0.093 
(0.087) 
-0.087 
(0.088) 
Client dummy  
-0.025 
(0.042) 
 
0.015 
(0.045) 
 
-0.027 
(0.042) 
 
-0.007 
(0.043) 
 
Client proportion   
0.051 
(0.067) 
 
0.099 
(0.069) 
 
0.041 
(0.066) 
 
0.068 
(0.066) 
Market*period 
0.306
***
 
(0.094) 
0.304
***
 
(0.094) 
0.305
***
 
(0.094) 
0.196
*
 
(0.106) 
0.191
*
 
(0.106) 
0.304
***
 
(0.092) 
0.303
***
 
(0.092) 
0.261
***
 
(0.099) 
0.256
**
 
(0.100) 
Log(proceeds) 
-0.045
*
 
(0.025) 
-0.044
*
 
(0.025) 
-0.047
*
 
(0.025) 
-0.015 
(0.025) 
-0.017 
(0.025) 
-0.028 
(0.026) 
-0.031 
(0.026) 
-0.047
*
 
(0.025) 
-0.050
**
 
(0.025) 
Underwriter 
Reputation 
0.083 
(0.311) 
0.104 
(0.321) 
0.044 
(0.308) 
-0.195 
(0.238) 
-0.252 
(0.228) 
0.067 
(0.318) 
0.008 
(0.306) 
0.052 
(0.312) 
-0.011 
(0.298) 
Overhang 
-0.009 
(0.008) 
-0.009 
(0.008) 
-0.008 
(0.008) 
-0.011 
(0.008) 
-0.010 
(0.008) 
-0.013 
(0.008) 
-0.012 
(0.008) 
-0.008 
(0.008) 
-0.007 
(0.008) 
Online winning ratio 
0.011 
(0.007) 
0.010 
(0.007) 
0.010 
(0.007) 
0.011 
(0.008) 
0.011 
(0.008) 
0.009 
(0.007) 
0.009 
(0.007) 
0.010 
(0.007) 
0.010 
(0.007) 
Log(1+age) 
0.012 
(0.023) 
0.011 
(0.023) 
0.013 
(0.023) 
-0.004 
(0.023) 
-0.003 
(0.023) 
0.010 
(0.023) 
0.012 
(0.023) 
0.011 
(0.023) 
0.012 
(0.023) 
Leverage 
-0.137 
(0.104) 
-0.137 
(0.104) 
-0.133 
(0.104) 
-0.056 
(0.106) 
-0.047 
(0.106) 
-0.124 
(0.102) 
-0.122 
(0.102) 
-0.123 
(0.104) 
-0.118 
(0.104) 
Sales growth before 
IPO 
-0.055 
(0.039) 
-0.056 
(0.039) 
-0.056 
(0.040) 
-0.052 
(0.037) 
-0.057 
(0.038) 
-0.066
*
 
(0.040) 
-0.068
*
 
(0.040) 
-0.062 
(0.039) 
-0.064 
(0.039) 
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Ownership Herfindahl 
index (top 5 
shareholders 
0.131 
(0.088) 
0.132 
(0.088) 
0.135 
(0.089) 
0.081 
(0.088) 
0.085 
(0.088) 
0.158
*
 
(0.089) 
0.159
*
 
(0.089) 
0.120 
(0.089) 
0.124 
(0.089) 
Pre-filing market 
return 
-0.345
*
 
(0.177) 
-0.341
*
 
(0.177) 
-0.361
**
 
(0.179) 
-0.445
**
 
(0.173) 
-0.468
***
 
(0.174) 
-0.272 
(0.173) 
-0.291
*
 
(0.175) 
-0.335
*
 
(0.178) 
-0.356
**
 
(0.180) 
State ownership before 
IPO 
   
0.111 
(0.083) 
0.108 
(0.083) 
    
P/E      
-0.001 
(0.001) 
-0.002 
(0.001) 
  
offN_ratio        
0.276
*
 
(0.146) 
0.300
**
 
(0.143) 
Intercept 
0.632
*
 
(0.331) 
0.639
*
 
(0.331) 
0.637
*
 
(0.332) 
0.184 
(0.336) 
0.193
 
(0.336) 
0.527 
(0.331) 
0.520 
(0.331) 
0.527 
(0.334) 
0.521 
(0.331) 
Industry dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
N 738 738 738 638 738 738 735 738 738 
Adj. R
2
 11.7% 11.6% 11.6% 7.78% 8.06% 11.6% 11.6% 11.9% 12.0% 
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4.7 Conclusion and Discussion 
Extensive work in the IPO literature has focused on exploring the reasons for underpricing, 
particularly in the U.S. and other developed markets; recently, increasing attention has been 
diverted to investigate the role of various institutional frameworks around the world (e.g., emerging 
markets), which provides interesting settings to test current theories in this area. The November 
2010 IPO regulation change in China mandates that a subgroup of the IPO firms use the lottery 
mechanism to allocate new shares, replacing the pro rata method that was used previously. In this 
study, we exploit the mandatory and exogenous nature of this reform and the data structure 
appropriate for a difference-in-difference analysis to examine the effects of the new allocation 
method on IPO activities through investigating investors’ “information revealing” incentives 
(Benveniste and Spindt, 1989; Benveniste and Wilhelm, 1990) and lead underwriters’ conflicts of 
interest. The main results are summarized as follows. 
First, we find a significant reduction in IPO underpricing for IPOs on the SMEB and ChiNext, 
but not for IPOs on the Main board in the univariate test. Although in the multivariate regressions, 
we do not find that the decrease in underpricing for IPOs from the SMEB and ChiNext is 
significantly larger than that for IPOs from the Main board, we find that the reduction in 
underpricing is significant for all markets. In addition, we attribute the inconsistent result to the 
possibility that IPOs from the Main board are affected by the strong signal sent out by the regulators, 
rather than rejecting our hypothesis outright.  
Second, our results do not support the findings that have been revealed in the developed 
markets (e.g., the U.S.) that lead underwriters’ clients (or stable clients) are favoured in new share 
allocations. Specifically, clients receive larger allocation quantities, but not in terms of proportion in 
comparison with non-clients. This result is further confirmed by a multivariate regression, and we 
thus conclude that under a pro rata allocation method that does not grant underwriters discretion 
over allocation, it is hard for underwriters to discriminately allocate new shares. This result is 
consistent with the findings in Bubna, and Prabhala (2011). 
Third, performance in the aftermarket (i.e., 18 months after IPO) is better for IPOs from the 
two secondary markets than IPOs from the Main board, which is consistent with the prediction of 
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our conjecture that investors have stronger incentives to reveal their private information in the 
post-regulation period such that improvement in the information environment leads to less 
underperformance for new issues. Notwithstanding the foregoing, without detailed bidder-level 
pricing information, we cannot draw a conclusion that is too strong from these results.  
Thus, the November 2010 regulation change can be viewed as a success in that it reduces 
underpricing and improves aftermarket performance. Given that some scholars already recognize 
the efficacy of an auction-like book building procedure for IPOs (e.g., Biais and Faugeron-Crouzet, 
2002; Jagannathan and Sherman, 2005), the evidence from the Chinese market also implies a 
promising future for it, and may give rise to more enlightened discussions and studies in this area. 
Hence, future work investigating the pricing efficiency and differences between clients and 
non-clients using bidder-level price information should illuminate the issue regarding the 
hypotheses raised in this study even further. 
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Appendix 4.1: IPO Institutions before November 2010 
1. Par Value Offering (1986-1992) 
Since 1986, when the first two stocks began over-the-counter trading, there were eight stocks in 
total at the time when the two Exchanges (i.e., the Shanghai (SH) and the Shenzhen (SZ) Exchanges) 
were established in 1990 and 1991, respectively. Without much formal guidance, these stocks were 
issued based on their par values. Not surprisingly, with disproportionately small supplies, all stocks 
experienced tremendous rises in their prices
49
. Then, in 1992, a limited number of allocation 
warrants were sold to the public for approximately 30 RMB each and IPO offerings were made 
through lot drawing for investors who held such warrants
50
. 
2. Fixed Price Offering (1993-Dec. 2004) 
During this period, there were approximately three identifiable IPO regimes being used under fixed 
price offering. Before the release of the 1999 Security Law, the IPO offer price was subject to strict 
control and bounded from above by the P/E ratio, which was stable at approximately 15. In addition, 
various allocation methods were put in use during this period. For example, in 1993, an unlimited 
number of allocation warrants were issued and allocations were made based on lot drawings for 
subscribers who held the warrants. In the same year, to curb investors’ over-optimism in applying 
for new shares, regulators required that investors could only buy the certificates in proportion to 
their savings deposits. In 1996, investors faced similar requirements, except that they had to deposit 
the full amount of their applications before allocation. In short, compared with the period before 
1993, unlimited warrants addressed the unfairness during the distribution process but also resulted 
in extreme over-subscription. On the other hand, the linkage of buying warrants to savings account 
balances indeed bridled investors’ over-optimism, but it burdened the banking system, which was 
undesirable. 
Second, from July 1999 to November 2001, a market-oriented pricing trial was launched, 
which allowed issuers and lead underwriters to determine offer prices, or price ranges with offer 
                                                             
49
 For example, the SH market index increased approximately 30% in less than a month and 130% in one year. 
50
 Because of the fanatic enthusiasm toward buying the certificate, chaos occurred in Shenzhen on 10 August 1992, 
which led to the suspension of this certificate. 
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price being determined after collecting information from potential investors. Another available 
pricing method was online bidding with a reservation priced pre-determined by issuers and 
underwriters. In addition, the final offer price would be decided through methods that were based 
on oversubscription ratios, market-clearing prices, etc. During this period, P/E ratios were higher 
than before and with larger standard deviations, implying less interference from the government. As 
for the allocation methods, issues with more than 400 million shares were allowed to distribute a 
tranche of new shares (up to 75%) to strategic and institutional investors with a lock-up period 
requirement; whereas for other issues, the afore-mentioned method had to be used (i.e., full deposit 
before allocation with linkage to savings account balance). 
Third, due to the policy that aimed to reduce state ownership in late 2001, many new offerings 
suffered from negative returns on the first day of listing during this market downturn as investors 
expected huge share supply after this policy and deemed it to as a negative signal. Regarding this 
situation, price control was resumed and regulation stipulated that an offer price should be neither 
10% higher than the upper boundary of the initial price range nor 10% lower than the lower 
boundary of the range, with P/E ratios no more than 20 during the period from November 2001 to 
December 2004. In addition, in 2002, regulators allowed 50% to 100% of the total offering to be 
distributed, with priority to existing investors based on their market value of shareholding in the 
secondary market, and the rest was offered to new investors. 
3. Bookbuilding Offering with Implicit Price Control (Jan. 2005 - Oct. 2008) 
In December 2004, The Notice of Using Bookbuilding to Price IPO as a Trial mandates the usage 
of bookbuilding formally. Nonetheless, because of the Share Split Reform which started in May 
2005 and ended approximately in June 2006, no new issue was offered during this period. Moreover, 
the issuance of The Regulation on Security Issuing and Underwriting in September 2006 reiterates 
the usage of bookbuilding as the legal method for pricing IPOs. However, among the 280 IPOs 
since then and before July 2009, only 24 of them were priced with P/E ratios larger than 30, which 
imply implicit government interferences. 
4. IPO Regulation Change series 
In June 2009, an IPO reform was proposed to pursue a genuine market-oriented capital market; the 
goals were intended to be achieved through step-by-step actions with regard to the following 
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aspects. With respect to pricing, an improved bookbuilding system was implemented and a quoting 
constraint was imposed to prevent arbitrary bidding. Regarding issuing and underwriting, the 
regulation aimed to increase supply and improve online offering, and a tilt toward small investors 
was included. Finally, there was a built-up share transferring system (“Clawback”) between online 
and offline offerings, as well as issuing suspension regime. 
There were two main changes in the regulation at the first stage (i.e., July 2009). One was to 
separate online and offline subscribing, where each investor can participate in only one mode. The 
other was requiring issuers to take actions, such as setting a minimum number of shares to be 
applied for, to encourage investors to reveal their true information about firm values and to prevent 
them from binding prices arbitrarily. 
Appendix 4.2: Follow-up Reforms (after November 2010) 
Following the 2010 regulatory change, there were three more revisions concerning IPO institution 
to date, which were on 28 April 2012, 30 November 2013, and 21 March 2014 respectively. Though 
the third revision is not our focus, it occurred within our sample and we briefly introduce it. To 
summarize, there were seven changes: (1) The off-market proportion of offering should be no less 
than 50% of the total number of shares offered (including both new and secondary offerings), while 
it was stipulated that the proportion was no more than 20% for offers smaller than 400 million 
number of shares and no more than 50% if shares are also allocated to strategic investors otherwise. 
(2) Abandon the requirement of 3-month lock-up for all off-line investors who receive share 
allocations. (3) Allow secondary offering in which shares that were held by shareholders before IPO 
can be sold in IPO. (4) Allow methods other than book-building to be used to determine offer price. 
(5) Issuers are discouraged to set the offer prices at levels that are associated with P/E ratios which 
are higher than a comparable one such as the industry average by 25%; otherwise, IPO may be 
postponed by CSRC. (6) Shares now can be transferred from online to offline offering and vice 
versa. Specifically, if the off-line winning ratio is within 2 to 4 times of the on-line ratio, 10% of the 
total number of shares offered can be transferred from off-line to on-line, and 20% if it is more than 
4 times.
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 Conclusion Chapter 5
The effect of business relationships has attracted increasing attention in financial studies. For 
example, institutional investors’ monitoring roles would be compromised by their business ties with 
invested firms; thus, rather than representing shareholders’ interest, these investors are likely to vote 
with the management of those firms, dampening the agency problem (e.g., Borokhovich et al., 2006; 
Davis and Kim, 2007). In addition, as banks are the principal financial intermediaries in the 
economy, their business ties have important influences on not only their own economic incentives 
but also those of their related parties. For instance, investment banks’ analyst reports are biased by 
their client investors who pay lucrative commission fees or have pre-existing underwritten 
relationships (e.g., Barber et al., 2007; Gu et al., 2012; Firth et al., 2013). However, banks also tend 
to curry favor with their existing clients for future business (Cliff and Denis, 2004; Ljungqvist et al., 
2006; etc.), and firms that have successfully borrowed from banks also benefit from lower cost of 
capital (Petersen and Rajan, 1994; Dass and Massa, 2011; Ivashina and Kovner, 2011; etc.). In this 
thesis, we shed light on various types of business relationships, which are addressed in three 
separate chapters. 
Chapter 2 investigates the interaction of the business relationship between mutual funds and 
investment banks and the banks’ analyst recommendations. Based on the literature review and  
CRM studies in Marketing, we focus on stable rather than “paying to play” business relationships, 
which have been examined recently.  
We find that analysts issue more optimistic recommendations on stocks held by brokerage 
firms’ SRFs than on stocks held by other funds after controlling for funds’ commission payments 
and shareholding sizes. More importantly, analysts increase (decrease) their recommendations on 
the stocks they cover when these stocks are added to (dropped from) the portfolios of the brokerage 
firms’ SRFs. Further analysis shows that several factors influence mutual funds’ and investment 
banks’ decisions to forge stable relationships. For example, as the proportion of commission fees 
and the fund size increase, an investment bank’s resources increase (proxied by the net capital and 
number of analysts), and if the bank and fund are affiliated with the same third entity, the likelihood 
that the fund and bank form a stable relationship increases. These findings shed light on the current 
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literature by showing the important role of stable relationships between brokerage firms and their 
client funds in analysts’ recommendations. Furthermore, the current study contributes to the extant 
studies by being the first to identify the factors that motivate funds and brokerage firms to forge 
such stable business relationships.  
In Chapter 3, we turn to another important business relationship in finance, i.e., the bank-firm 
relationship. In this chapter, our research goal is to investigate the effect of EPU on firms’ capital 
structure choices. We recognize two channels through which EPU exerts its influences, i.e., the 
supply channel and the demand channel. With respect to the supply channel, the uncertainty in 
economic policies deteriorates the external financing environment, leading to shrinking capital 
supply and lower leverage ratios. As the banking system enjoys a dominant role in firm financing in 
emerging markets, we hypothesize that firms with pre-existing bank-firm lending relationships 
should be less sensitive to EPU. However, the demand channel predicts that firms reduce their 
financing demand in the face of increasing policy uncertainty.  
We find that leverage ratios are negatively associated with EPU, on average, and this negative 
effect is more significant for firms that are from regions with higher marketization indexes, are 
non-state owned, or have no prior bank-firm relationship. We then provide consistent evidence that 
the negative relationship between capital structures and EPU is sourced from the deterioration of the 
external financing environment caused by the EPU. Finally, we show that firms’ usage of trade 
credit is positively related to EPU, suggesting that firms tend to adjust their financing structures as a 
response to economic policy uncertainty. This analysis provides consistent evidence that EPU 
affects firms’ capital structure choices mainly by influencing firms' external financial environments, 
which relates to the literature concerning the supply-side factors affecting a firm’s capital structure. It 
also contributes to the growing studies examining the effect of policy uncertainty on corporate 
behavior. 
Finally, in Chapter 4, we utilize the same data on commission payments used in Chapter 2 to 
explore the effect of the business relationship on IPO allocation, which has an important influence 
on IPO underpricing. This analysis is set within the framework of investigating the effects of an IPO 
regulation change implemented in China.  
In November 2010, the Chinese government stipulated that IPO firms listed on the SMEB and 
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the ChiNext use the lottery mechanism to allocate new shares rather than the pro rata method that 
was used prior to this change. On the one hand, the allocation method has direct effects on how 
investors will be allocated new shares; it will also influence investors’ incentives to reveal private 
information when they are submitting bids. Therefore, the new regulation will affect IPO 
underpricing and aftermarket performance. On the other hand, the regulation change will alleviate 
the conflict of interest faced by lead underwriters (i.e., discriminately favoring client investors in 
new share allocation) because IPO allocation is now entirely due to luck rather than underwriters’ 
discretion, which is accused of breeding potential conflicts of interest.  
Our results show that there is a significant reduction in underpricing and improvement in 
aftermarket performance for IPOs from the SMEB and the ChiNext in the post-regulation period. 
However, based on statistical significance, we do not find consistent evidence to support the notion 
that underwriters favorably allocate shares to their clients, as the allocation proportions are similar 
between their clients and non-clients. This study provides new evidence to the literature on the 
effects of IPO institutions based on an important emerging market. It also sheds light on studies 
about lead underwriters’ conflicts of interests in allocation by utilizing a larger sample and 
providing a direct test. 
In sum, the current thesis provides evidence that supports the notion that business relationships play 
an important role in the economy. Nevertheless, one should be aware that our findings are based on 
a sample from one emerging market alone; thus, care should be taken when applying the findings to 
other markets because of country-level differences such as institutional features or different levels 
of market transparency and liquidity, competition, and government regulations. In addition, several 
issues may be further explored in the future. For example, additional tests using direct evidence 
such as surveys or interviews with fund managers and brokerage firms would inevitably enhance 
the findings presented in Chapter 2. Furthermore, an analysis of bidder-level price information to 
compare the pricing efficiency and difference in bidding behaviors between clients and non-clients 
would reinforce our understanding of the results presented in Chapter 4. 
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